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Broadly, this dissertation asks why rape? In address, this research posits a leadership
preference-based strategic theory of rape during war; marking the first large-N, quan-
titative exploration of leadership preferences on the use of rape in civil war. Using an
original dataset, preferences of armed group leaders are evaluated against the level of rape
across all civil conflicts between 1980 - 2009. The results highlight three critical findings.
First, evidence suggests that rape is distinctive from other human rights violations and is
permitted or controlled differently than are more common forms of extra-combat violence
(i.e., torture, extra-judicial killings, disappearances). This work argues that the symbolic
meaning of rape, given its gendered nature and uniquely devastating outcomes, makes it a
particularly attractive tool of war under some conditions. Second, statistical tests reveal
that different factors predict state-perpetrated rape than predict rebel-perpetrated rape;
with the strongest predictive power across rebel groups in ethnic war. Finally, results
illustrate that the predictive power of the models is conditioned by the type of war. That
is, provided the characteristics of ethnic war, models perform better in predicting rape
in ethnic war than in non-ethnic war.
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Introduction
Explaining Rape during Civil War
“It already is bigger than everything
else. It lives in front of me, behind
me, next to me, inside me every
single day. My schedule is dictated by
it, my habits by it, my music by it.”
Daisy Whitney
As Ziba and more than 100 other Muslim women sat with their infant children in a
school gymnasium, a dozen armed Serbian militiamen stormed in. The men screamed,
‘Look at how many children you can have. Now you are going to have our children. You
are going to have our little Chetniks’ (Fisk 1993). In Rwanda, chilling accounts detail the
experiences of teenage girls raped with such violence and frequency that movements as
basic as walking cause internal organs to fall from inside the body. While the phenomenon
of wartime rape is as old as war itself, our understanding of rape as a wartime practice
remains opaque. In fact, the subject of wartime rape seems to have a near-instantaneous
half-life. Stories no sooner emerge than are absorbed by larger discussions of human
rights, casualties of war, and terror campaigns. As accounts of the Jihadist rape campaign
in Iraq and Syria circle the media, we are once again confronted with our inability to
offer adequate explanations.
Despite increased attention in the 1990s, there is little consensus about the forces
responsible for rape during war. Only recently have scholars moved beyond documenting
individual accounts of wartime rape in an effort to understand the factors that explain
variation in its systematic use. For instance, Brown (2012) indicates that more than
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65% of sexual violence victims in the DRC were children; noting that the DRC holds an
exceptional status as the rape capital of the world. Yet research conducted at the Peace
Research institute in Oslo found that in a sample of 48 African conflicts involving 236
armed groups (including both state, rebel, and militia), only 29% were reported to have
committed acts of sexual violence. In fact, the study points out that 72% of the armed
actors in African conflicts had no known record of sexual violence (Nords and Cohen
2012, 2). While sexual violence is under-reported in nearly all contexts, Sann and Wood
(2014) highlight that even after rape achieved salience in 2000, more than half of the
armed groups were not reported to have committed acts of sexual violence. What causal
factors explain the variation in the incidence of rape across civil conflicts?
While scholars struggle to understand causation, we are continually accosted with the
devastating consequences of sexual violence during war. In its wake, weaponized rape re-
sults in psychological trauma (Fisher 1996), female victim infertility (Heit 2009), physical
trauma (Frljak et al. 1997), infanticide and suicide (Heit 2009), and in some cases, the
partial destruction of a group resulting in identity crises (Fisher 1996). Historically, rape
has been seen as an expected, inevitable part of war. In fact, the act of rape held a priv-
ileged status as one of the spoils of war (Baaz and Stern 2009). Yet despite its historical
prevalence (Fisher 1996; Zurbriggen 2010; Benard 1994), rape was not documented as a
military practice of war until after World War I (Heit 2009). In fact, it has only been
since 2008 that the United Nations recognized rape as a tactic of war.
The delayed recognition of tactical rape by the UN is due, in part, to the challenges
associated with documenting and quantifying wartime rape. Every society associates
some social stigma with rape. Rape survivors endure everything from harassment, to loss
of property, to ‘sanctioned’ murder (honour killings). Victim death and the fail to report
attacks leaves available data incomplete (Cohen 2013a). This is particularly disarming
given that reports of rape are on the rise. In the DRC, 1,100 rapes were being reported
each month in 2011 (UN Report 2011). Even the data that are available present their own
obstacles. As Cohen (2013a) points out, we are without precise measures of the number
of rape victims per war (466). In addition, the language currently used to quantify rape
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is, itself, ambiguous. Words like ‘mass’ or ‘widespread’ often have different meanings in
different contexts (Cohen 2013a, 467). This is particularly problematic given that studies
of gender and war typically rely on data gathered from interviews with the women-victims
or in a select few studies, male perpetrators (Baaz and Stern 2009).
No longer is a lack of awareness an excuse for our failure to offer explanations. Now
is the time to understand the conditions under which rape becomes a widespread com-
ponent of military strategy (Heit 2009; Cohen et al. 2013; Cohen 2013a; Bourke 2007;
Wood 2006; Wood 2008). To date, the fields of psychology, sociology, criminology, po-
litical science, and gender studies have posited niche theories with little interdisciplinary
discussion. What might we learn if we aggregate these theories? What new theories
lay undiscovered in this larger conversation? Addressing the lack of interdisciplinary
discussion, my research will contribute to the literature in four primary ways.
First, this analysis seeks to aggregate scholarly knowledge across disciplines in order to
categorize explanations of wartime rape by level of analysis. Using this interdisciplinary
approach, I propose an a preference-based theory to explain variation in wartime rape
across groups. Second, I move beyond a simple dichotomous reference to ethnic war in
order to offer a more nuanced understanding of the way rape in ethnic civil conditions
both leadership preferences and the use of wartime rape. Furthermore, this work seeks to
fill a quantitative gap in the literature. With the preponderance of research in the form
of case studies and qualitative work (Wood 2008; Wood 2006; Zurbriggen 2010; Fisher
1996; Heit 2009), this dissertation endeavors to apply more advanced quantitative tools
to analyze theories of rape during war. Finally, this research will contribute an original
dataset accounting for variance in wartime rape across actors and civil conflicts. Relative
to the dependent variable, rape, this research seeks to address two primary questions:
(1) What factors explain variation in the use of rape during civil war? (2) Do the same
factors that explain rape also explain other human rights violations in civil war? (3)
What, if any, explanatory differences do wartime rape theories hold in ethnic wars when
compared to application in non-ethnic wars?
3
Chapter 1
Theories of Rape in Civil War
“Awareness requires a rupture with
the world we take for granted; then
old categories of experience are called
into question and revised.”
Shoshana Zuboff
Why do we see rape used pervasively in some civil wars, but not in others? Under
what conditions do groups integrate rape as a tactical strategy? What explains inter-
group variation in the use of rape across time, cultures, and war types? The literature
on wartime rape reflects the ebbs and flows of its salience. There is a renewed call for
research after the horrors of war are revealed. As the memory of the war fades, so too
does investigative interest in wartime tactics. Years later, another war, another set of
horrors, and another call to academic arms. In this undulating tradition we have become
complacent. We have let atrophy our ability to deconstruct old mechanisms and use them
in new ways. Our periodic revisitation of wartime rape leaves us in a perpetual state of re-
beginning; spending twice as much time re-learning past work as we do pushing forward.
Worse yet, we accept what has become the norm and cease to challenge those norms.
This work is an effort to upset that normative balance. The following propositions seek
to reframe the old while incorporating the new.
Broadly, this review of literature highlights three deficiencies in existing explanations
of wartime rape. First, systemic and quantitative accounts of the influence of institutions
are absent. Second, the role of leadership preferences is implied, but has never been
tested. Third, the influence of war-type has been only nominally addressed, rather than
thoroughly investigated. This chapter proceeds in five parts. First, I provide a brief
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discussion of the definition of wartime rape. Second, I explore existing classifications
of wartime rape, highlighting theories and their relationships to one another. Third, I
introduce an agency-based theory that accounts for elite preferences. Next, I argue for a
reconceptualization of wartime rape; one which is viewed through the lens of ethnic war.
Finally, I discuss the data and variables used in following chapters.
0.1 Defining Wartime Rape
As highlighted by Gottschall (2004), the term wartime rape never indicates isolated ex-
amples of rape by individual fighters. Rather, the term is used interchangeably with mass
wartime rape to indicate distinct patterns of rape by soldiers at rates that are signifi-
cantly increased over rates of rape during peacetime (129). Using the definition of rape
provided by Cohen (2013a, 462) and Wood (2006, 308), I define rape as “the coerced
(under physical force of threat of physical force against the victim or a third person)
penetration of the anus or vagina by the penis or another object, or of the mouth by the
penis.” This serves to distinguish rape from the broader category of sexual violence that
not only includes rape, but also “coerced undressing and non-penetrating sexual assault”
along with other forms of violence (Cohen 2013a, 462; Wood 2006, 308). Following Co-
hen’s (2013a) classifications of rape frequency, ‘mass’ or ‘systematic’ rape refers to those
conflicts in which rape was most prevalent; described as a ‘tool’ or ‘tactic.’ This differs
from the ‘widespread’ category, indicating a lower incidence of rape described as ‘com-
mon’ or ‘frequent.’ Conflicts with still fewer reports of rape are described as ‘isolated,’ or
those in which there were ‘some reports’ of rape (Cohen 2013a, 10). While not entirely
discrete, these classifications offer the best available measures of the incidence of rape
during civil war.
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0.2 Explanations of Wartime Rape: An Overview
Today, explanations of rape are sectioned and sub-sectioned into a litany of classifica-
tions. While the literature benefits from a diversified set of lenses, so many subsections
can produce a kind of tunnel vision. That is, we risk becoming so routinely classified
that we cease to evaluate the overlap between categories and literatures; stifling our own
forward progress. Across the spectrum, literature on rape is divided according to bio-
logical motivation (Amir 1971; Groth 1979; Baaz and Stern 2009; Thornhill and Palmer
2000; Gould and Lewontin 1979; Siefert 1996; Goldstein 2001), purpose of rape (Brown
2012; Mullins 2009; Groth and Hobson 1983; Pratt and Werchick 2004), type of rape
(Enloe 2000; Horvath 2013; Isikozlu and Millard 2010), type of rapist (Groth 1979; Amir
1971; Baaz and Stern 2009), discussed by field (Wood 2008, 2009; Gottschall 2004), or
aggregated by theme (Cohen 2013a). This entropic progression means extant theories
of wartime rape remain fragmented and incomplete. In address, this dissertation moves
away from the hyper-classification of the last ten years. Rather, I integrate literature on
sexual violence (from psychology, sociology, and political science), ethnic conflict, and
state (or otherwise broad scale) repression to distill explanations of rape into three gen-
eral categories. Borrowing from Gottschall’s (2004) terminology, these categories include:
(1) bio-social explanations, (2) explanations based in the pathology of gendered relations,
sexuality, and culture, and (3) strategic explanations. To this end, I make three primary
arguments.
First, I argue that current explanations fail to account for (sufficient) differences at
the group-level, leaving them incomplete and unable to explain variation in rape across
time and conflicts. Second, I argue that in order to create a more group-centric theory
of wartime rape, we must account for strategic leadership preferences within the armed
group. To this end, I posit a preference-based theory of wartime rape to be tested in
subsequent chapters. Finally, I argue that theories must be tested separately in ethnic
and non-ethnic war. The practice of relegating ethnic war to dummy variable prevents us
from understanding the differential predictive capabilities of individual theories. We may
agree that ethnic war matters, but does that mean these theories can explain variation
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equally across ethnic and non-ethnic war? In what way do the explanatory powers of our
theories change based on war context? The section that follows uses current literature to
elaborate on these points.
Biosocial Theory. Despite offering some of the earliest suppositions, biology-based theo-
ries are among the weakest explanations for rape variation between armed groups. Bioso-
cial theories assume that rape during war is, in some sense, natural to human males.
That is, biosocial theories agree that the motive for wartime rape is the simple, innate
sexual desire of individual fighters, but that the phenomena cannot be distinguished from
sociocultural context (Gottschall 2004, 134).1 For instance, incentive arguments suggest
that “wartime sexual violence is higher because of a putative link between the aggression
1Gottschall (2004) is careful to distinguish it from its predecessor, biological determinism theory.
Biological determinism is described as a theory in which sociocultural factors are insignificant in soldiers’
decisions to rape. Rather, the activity falls entirely under genetic control (Gottschall 2004). In this vein
resides a well-developed psychology literature emphasizing the role of inner motivations brought on by
psychological factors (e.g., personal trauma, mental illness, anger and aggression, etc.), conceptions
of masculinity, and the nature of man as causal forces of rape. More specifically, literature on the
psychology of rape incorporates theories of perversion, sexual orientation and fetishes, organic causes
(such as disease or mental deficiency), psychiatric and psychoanalytic approaches, studies of aggression,
socialization and sexual deviation, trauma, and feelings of sexual inferiority and inadequacy (Amir 1971;
Baaz and Stern 2009; Groth 1979). For example, in his typology of lone-offender rape, Groth (1979)
used clinical information based on over 500 male sex offenders to identify three components, prominent
in patterns of rape: anger (40%), power (55%), and sadism (5%). Here, anger rape refers to attacks that
are reactive, often preceded by perpetrator distress, and carried out such that the victim is a ’vehicle’ of
violent aggression. Power rape is committed by offenders who do not seek to harm but rather to possess
their victim; often inspired by feelings of inadequacy. Finally, sadistic rape represents the fusion of
sexuality and extreme aggression (Groth 1979, 12-58). More narrowly, theories in biological determinism
offer male aggression as a primary causal factor. One such explanation suggests that rape is a product
of an irrepressible male sexual drive, which, if not restrained, will inevitably have its way (Siefert 1992,
1; Hauffe and Porter 2008). In fact, Siefert (1992), and Feldman (1992) suggest that rape is not always a
sexually motivated act, but can be an act of aggression. In this way “rape is not an aggressive expression
of sexuality, but a sexual expression of aggression” (Siefert 1992, 1), serving to degrade, humiliate, and
subjugate the subject (Brown 2012; Mullins 2009; Groth and Hobson 1983; Pratt and Werchick 2004;
Baaz and Stern 2009). Since biological determinism explains wartime rape as a product of genetic control,
we would expect the level of rape to fluctuate only narrowly. However, data reveal that wartime rape
characteristics vary widely within and across conflicts (Cohen 2013a; Leiby 2009; Gottschall 2004; Wood
2006, 2008, 2009; Bourke 2007). To this end, biological determinism cannot explain why some rape is
implemented with degrees of force that far exceed those required to perpetrate rape. Specifically, if the
biological drive to rape is motivated by a latent desire to perpetuate the genes of the rapist, then the
excessive brutality of wartime rape (including rape with objects and rape that ends in in murder), would
be counterproductive (Gottschall 2004). Why would a man, driven to propagate his genetic material
kill the individual capable of bringing his offspring into being? Given the profound weaknesses of purely
biological rape, biosocial theory reigns as a plausible variant.
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necessary for combat and male sex drive” (Wood 2006, 323).2 More broadly, proponents
argue that men may possess condition-dependent biological adaptations that are specifi-
cally designed to promote rape in appropriate cost-benefit environments (Thornhill and
Palmer 2000; Wood 2006, 2008; see Gould and Lewontin 1979 for a related argument
on rape as a non-adaptive byproduct of adaptations for consensual sexual activity). For
instance, the “pressure cooker theory” (Siefert 1994, 55) suggests that rape is the result of
irresistible biological urges and the chaos of war that encourages men to act on their oth-
erwise stifled impulses (Gottschall 2004, 130). With man’s heterosexuality unleashed by
suspension of “normal” societal controls during war, the rules of warfare reign (Baaz and
Stern 2009; Siefert 1996; Goldstein 2001). Sometimes called the substitution argument
(Wood 2009), another iteration suggests that men will develop a genetic predisposition to
rape based on an innate motivation to increase chances of propagating their genes through
the rape of women (Wood 2006, 2008; Thornhill and Palmer 2000). Yet, if the biological
adaptation (or maladaptation) is primal, the expected compulsion to be to reproduce
within one’s own ‘species’ or group. Why then, do soldiers predominantly rape women
outside their group? More broadly, if a biological reaction triggers sexual instincts at a
primal, reproductive level, then any woman of child-bearing age should have an equal
likelihood of becoming a victim. However, empirics tell us that rape victims are most
often intentionally selected.
Biosocial theories raise more questions than they answer. If rape is a product of
some primal need to propagate the species, why do we see the extreme violence (rape
with objects, mutilations, murder, etc.) that so often accompanies wartime rape?3 Are
all persons who take advantage of crumbling state institutions (through looting, rape,
and other crime) predisposed to do so? Does the existence of a power vacuum left by a
2Wood (2006) also highlights ways in which levels of testosterone are presumed to effect men (both
in and out of the wartime context). Nevertheless, the author is quick to point out that these hormone-
based explanations struggle to explain individual behavior, including that of female perpetrators, and
fail entirely at group-level explanations.
3To this end, Wood (2009) notes that some arguments for the absence of rape are based on a lack of
female cadres. Still, the author acknowledges that some armed groups with significant numbers of female
combatants continue to engage in high levels of sexual violence (i.e., Sierra Leone). In other words, the
substitution argument would be expected to follow the logic of Enloe (2000) who argues argues that
recreational rape occurs when soldiers are not adequately supplied with sexual partners. Empirically,
however, rape persists seemingly regardless of access to prostitutes.
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weakening government cause a change in neurochemistry that increases the propensity
to rape? More directly, if the biology to rape is triggered by war, then why don’t all
men rape? If the trigger is war itself, then rape should exist at a relatively constant level
across all wars. Furthermore, as men cannot be impregnated, what biological urge can
explain why some women become perpetrators of rape while others do not? This question
is becoming increasingly relevant as Cohen’s (2013a) survey data are among the first to
question victims about the sex of their attackers. Based on the information collected,
the author suggests that the participation of female combatants in sexual violence may
be more common than currently believed (Cohen 2013a, 386).
In sum, the broad failure of biosocial theories is that they cannot explain larger pat-
terns in wartime rape (see Amir 1971; Trasler 1962). Why do some armed groups use rape
pervasively in one conflict, but not in another? Despite consideration of socio-cultural
factors on individual motivation, such factors would be expected to interact differently
within each person and therefore remain unable to explain variation in the outcome. Ad-
ditionally, if rape is the product of primal human nature, and that nature is expressed or
repressed by culture, then biology can be assumed away in favor of cultural motivators.
In short, biology-based arguments suffer the same achilles heel as do other individual-
level explanations in that they cannot explain variation in the use of rape between groups.
Pathology of Gendered Relations, Sexuality, and Culture. Literature in wartime rape
owes its roots to the feminist scholars and activists who were among the first to system-
atically investigate, document, and raise consciousness about the problem of mass rape
(Gottschall 2004, 130; Jaleel 2013). Although cultural arguments are often presented as if
they are distinct from feminist arguments, these two moieties function quite interdepen-
dently. Cultural pathology theory analyzes a nation’s history to see what development
factors motivate(d) men to ‘descend to the vilest barbarism’ (Gottschall 2004, 131). The-
ories in this tradition explain rape as a product of some shared cultural understanding
that functions to predispose particular societies to rape. In this way, the very notion of
culture is, at least in part, defined by understandings of gender, gender roles, and power
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relationships. Similarly, feminist theories also divorce rape from sexual desire. In the
feminist vein, rape is frequently explained as a crime motivated by the desire of man
(even unconsciously so) to exert dominance over woman (Gottschall 2004, 130; Siefert
1996; Mullins 2009; Bond 2003; Brown 2012; Reid-Cunningham 2008; Russell-Brown
2003; Enloe 2000; Wood 2006, 2008, 2009; Anwary 2012; Cook 1994; Kim 2012; Kohn
1994; MacKinnon 1994; Melandri 2009; Richey 2009; Schott 2011; Ttreault 1997; Baaz
and Stern 2009; Cerretti 2016; Cohen 2014; 2013a). At present, the strongest cultural
arguments use feminist logics to discuss the role of patriarchy, women’s rights, and the
relative preservation of a woman’s value. For these reasons, feminist and cultural argu-
ments fit harmoniously into an amalgamated class of explanations exploring the evolution
of culture as it defines gendered identities, roles, and hierarchies.
Theories based in gendered relations, sexual and culture posit three primary forces
motivating wartime rape. Citing both conscious and unconscious expressions of domi-
nance, these forces include rape cultures or rape-prone societies, the value/preservation of
women relative to men, and the symbolic meaning of rape, with its wide-reaching impact
far beyond the victim. Beginning with rape cultures, I will explore each of these in turn.
Speaking broadly, Tompkins (1995) argues that rape is rooted in inequality, discrim-
ination, and male domination. To this end, Siefert (1992) and Sanday (2003) argue that
there are rape-free and rape-prone societies. For Siefert (1992, 1993), rape-free societies
are those in which male supremacy is completely unchallenged; providing the example
of Islamic societies. Thus, rape in war and peace is expected to prevail only in a lim-
ited subset of societies that evidence specific socialization practices. In particular, rape
would be expected in societies in which male power has been destabilized, women have
subordinate status and are held in low esteem, and in the presence of rigid definitions
of “masculine” and “feminine” that define a gendered hierarchy (Siefert 1993, 2). Citing
the example of the United States with its strong women’s movement and correspond-
ingly unstable male power, nearly all modern Western societies would be expected to
experience more frequent occurrences of rape (Siefert 1993, 1996). Today, however, we
see an increase in rape-based tactics within the Islamic world. Most recently, rape has
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been institutionalized by radical Islamic militants seeking to establish a caliphate. More
importantly, however, the idea of rape-prone societies implies that within each ‘society,’
there are cultures of rape. In this way, we would expect rape used equally by armed
groups within the same society. Empirically, however, this is not the case. Suffering from
similar weaknesses are arguments based in cultural understandings of a woman’s value.
Simply explained, proponents argue that gender inequality facilitates the acceptance
of violence against women (Cohen 2013a). Emphasizing power relationships, female in-
feriority is furthered by “the persistence of customs, practices, and legislations that dis-
criminate women” (Brown 2012, 30; Alison 2007). Societies in which women are seen as
property or those that emphasize a patriarchal social order reinforce the dehumanization
of women and contribute to male beliefs about sexual privilege (Brown 2012, 30). Still,
others argue that men in deeply patriarchal societies are conditioned to distrust, despise,
and dominate women. Thus, “warrior rapists” are those who act out their contempt for
women while perpetuating gendered arrangements from which all men benefit (Brown-
miller 1975, 32; Siefert 1994; Gottschall 2004, 130; Wood 2006, 326). Here, wartime rape
is the result of an (often unconscious) conspiracy of men to dominate and suppress women
(Gottschall 2004,131). In an alternate example, Ohambe et al. (2005) argue that there
has been a feminization of poverty that legitimizes gender-based violence. In particular,
it is the subordinate view of women that fuels the use of rape as a weapon of war. Still,
these broader theories should be able to explain why beliefs about male sexual entitlement
are primarily expressed through the rape of women outside the male’s culture/group. For
instance, Wood (2009) points out that the LTTE in Sri Lanka’s civil war had remarkably
low levels of rape, despite traditional gendered expectations of women. Simultaneously,
the LTTE insurgency was well-known for instituting formal units of female combatants.
Thus, while Tamil civilian women were expected to wear dresses or skirts, those serving
in the armed force wore pants and otherwise masculine military uniforms.
Despite the logic of the hypotheses, there is little very empirical support linking the
use of widespread rape to patriarchal societies (Gottschall 2004; Wood 2009). More
broadly, Wood (2006) and Gottschall (2004) point out that data do not support feminist
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theories. Not only is peacetime rape a cultural universal (Palmer 1989), but large-scale
rape is a common outcome of conflicts among bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and state societies
(Gottschall 2004, 131). Furthermore, masculinist notions of honor, a deeply engrained
patriarchy, and strict adherence to traditional gender roles are present in many conflicts
that do not see the widespread use of wartime rape (Wood 2006).4 The primary problem is
that culture- or society-based arguments tend to be measured at the state-level of analysis.
As Siefert (1992) and Heit (2009) note, “cultural” factors often become institutionalized
by the state and codified into law. Subsequently, these theories cannot explain variation
among armed groups; measurements are too insensitive to capture variation at the group-
level. Cultural arguments struggle to explain why wartime rape is perpetrated similarly in
areas with vastly different socialization experiences, or why rape is used at different rates
within conflicts between culturally homogenous groups (Sann and Wood 2014; Gottschall
2004). Thus, to truly understand the use of rape, theories must capture changes and
elements within and between armed units.
Unlike the two motivators discussed above, the a third body of theories focusing on
gender, gender relations, sexuality, and culture operates at the group-level of analysis.
Resolving state-based measurement weaknesses, these arguments discuss motivations for
wartime rape that derive from the symbolic meanings of rape. In particular, the emphasis
is on the relationship between gender inequality and the conflict in which wartime rape
occurs (Siefert 1992, 1993; Hansen 2001; HRW 2004; Koo 2002; Cohen 2013a; MacKinnon
1994; Baron and Straus 1989), focusing heavily on the symbolic and extending meanings
of rape. For instance, in her discussion of the militarization of women’s lives, Enloe (2000)
notes that women are stereotypically associated with a need for protection, peacefulness
and life-giving, while men are associated with protecting, warring, and killing (Enloe 1990,
2000; Goldstein 2001; Higate and Hopton 2005; Pin-Fat and Stern 2005). In particular,
these associations render women and girls particularly vulnerable to the logics of rape
4A lesser, but often-cited problem with cultural arguments is that there is little consensus on the
definition and measurement of culture. Cultural variables range from skin color (Von Hentig 1940),
ethnicity, religion and region, to male dominance, conceptions of masculinity, societal violence, and
the role of women (Wing and Merchan 1993; Sanday 2003; Cohen 2013a). This not only poses broad
measurement challenges, but frequently prevents direct comparison between studies.
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as a weapon of war (Enloe 2000).5 To this end, Kohn (1994) and Brownmiller (1975)
posit rape as an affront to men as women’s protectors, and mass rape as a conspiracy
against national honor and manhood. In this way, rape is a crime that allows men to
inflict psychological harm on women and their communities as it shames not only the
victim but her husband and other male relatives who failed to protect her (Cohen 2013a;
Benard 1994; Green 2006; Seifert 1996; Baaz and Stern 2009; Bastick et al. 2007; Hansen
2001; Wood 2006, 2009; Brownmiller 1975; Kohn 1994).
Theories focusing on the symbolic meaning of rape overcome many of the weaknesses
plaguing individual-level and state-level theories. In particular, theories of symbolism
are not only able of capturing ideological differences between groups, but they are also
capable of identifying who may be the victims of rape. While these benefits make it
possible to capture variation between forces within and across cultures, they continue to
struggle with time. We know that the use of rape varies across time, even within the
same armed unit. Why would an armed group use rape pervasively in one year, but not
in others? Here, the conclusions are two fold. First, now operating at the appropriate
level of analysis, the symbolic use of rape provides a powerful argument for distinction
of rape above and beyond other types of human rights violations. To this end, the first
hypothesis is proffered. Second, what is missing from these symbolic explanations is the
force that determines when to inflict the unique devastation of rape upon an enemy. This
latter point provides strong support for the notion that armed group leadership may play
a pivotal role in explaining variation in the use of rape by an armed group over time.
While capturing elements of leadership is new, the idea of using rape intentionally has a
nascent development in theories of strategic rape.
Strategic Rape Theory. The basis for the preference-based theory of wartime rape prof-
fered in this dissertation finds its foundation in theories of strategic rape. In particular,
strategic rape theories argue that rape is used as a tactic to accomplish larger, strate-
5For a detailed discussion of gender and militarization see Enloe (2000). Additional resources address-
ing sexual violence and militarized conceptions of masculinity include: (Baaz and Stern 2009; Connell
1995; Ehrenreich 1997; Enloe 1990, 2007; Goldstein 2001; Higate and Hopton 2005; Morgan 1994; Shep-
herd 2007; Stern and Nystrand 2006; Siefert 1992).
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gic objectives. The idea is that war increases the opportunity for rape through changes
(reductions) in social norms, changes in the willingness or ability to punish offenders,
and increased contact with potential victims (by forcibly entering homes for looting, or
through displacement camps) (Wood 2006). Here, I argue that strategic arguments can
be divided into short-term and long-term strategies.
Short term strategic arguments include those focusing on an immediate pay-off. Most
commonly, these include non-biological opportunity arguments.6 For instance, Carlson
(2009) argues wartime rape emerges out of male desperation resulting from poverty,
ongoing war, and a destroyed economy. In particular, the author contends that soldiers
rape to steal goods. While not likely a military-wide strategy, rape in this case is a
strategic means to a specific short-term end. However, there are four critical problems
with such short-term strategic arguments. First, as Baaz and Stern (2009) note, in this
case all men become potential rapists (Paglia 1993; Thornhill and Palmer 2000) and rape
becomes a regrettable side effect of war (Siefert 1996, 36).7 Secondly, the idea that men
would rape to acquire food doesn’t answer the central question: Why rape? If the purpose
of the act is to acquire some good, then why not steal, or murder, or beat a victim? In
fact, in many cases, it seems these methods would be easier means to the end. Thirdly,
raping for goods suggests that we should only see rape in impoverished conditions, but
this is not the case. These short term strategies cannot explain why rape occurs in areas
where soldiers are provided-for. Finally, short-term strategic arguments may explain the
actions of an individual soldier under a particular set of circumstances presented with
a specific opportunity, but do not behavior behavior of entire armed groups. To the
latter point, long-term strategic arguments hold greater promise for explaining variation
between armed units.
Long-term strategic rape theories argue that rape is used by the military as a tactic to
6Short-term strategic arguments would include Tilly’s (2003) salience of short-run damage (13).
7Additionally, as much as broad opportunity arguments imply that every man is a potential rapist,
they also suggest that every woman is a potential victim. This erroneously assumes that every man in
the war has an equal potential to rape and every woman has the equal potential to be raped. However,
as Wood (2006) points out, armed groups do not target all women with rape. Rather, women of certain
ethnicities or those possessing other social characteristics tend to be targeted quite intentionally. Thus,
not only do opportunity arguments fail to identify perpetrators, they also fail to identify potential victims.
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achieve larger, strategic objectives.8 Used in this way, strategic rape is usually perpetrated
by a well-organized armed group under an order to attack civilians in an effort to fulfill
goals of the war (Isikozlu and Millard 2010). One subset of strategic rape theory are
theories of social cohesion. Social cohesion arguments are predicated on the notion that
rape creates bonds in social groups and therefore may provide psychological benefits to
the perpetrators by improving group morale (Benard 1994; Card 1996; Sanday 2007;
Wood 2006, 2009; Cohen 2013a). Wood (2009) suggests that such explanations are based
in small-group dynamics and primary group cohesion. More specifically, the military
process of training and socialization is based in the idea that men are broken down and
then reborn as group members through such initiation rituals and are more likely to hold
fast under fire; not because of patriotism or ideology, but because of their commitments
to their ‘primary group’ of fellow combatants (Wood 2009, 138).
For instance, refuting previously research suggesting that social cohesion emerges
easily, Cohen (2013a) contends that where armed groups are comprised of fighters who
have been abducted or otherwise forcibly recruited by their peers, cohesion is unlikely
to form spontaneously. In such groups, rape, and specifically gang rape, serves as a
tool for creating social cohesion among unfamiliar combatants. Thus, used as a tool for
socialization, groups with low levels of social cohesion are more likely to commit rape.
The problem, of course, is that the level of cohesion (being intangible) is very difficult
to test. Additionally, the theory implies that rape would only be used at some points
in the conflict (arguably when an armed force is building its cadres through abduction),
which does not explain the persistently high levels of rape used by some groups. Further,
since data on the level of abduction are absent, it is impossible to tell whether a handful
of abductions in only one area of the conflict produce the same levels of rape as a more
widespread abduction habit. Most profoundly, however, Cohen’s (2013a) theory suffers
the same short-coming as other strategic theories of rape in that it cannot explain, why
rape? Arguably any form of shared violence could be used to establish camaraderie,
8Long-term strategic arguments would include Tilly’s (2003) extent of coordination among actors
(13). Additionally, the long-term / short-term delineation of strategy is also complementary to the
work of Bates (2008) who argues that as elites abandoned longer-term strategies in favor of shorter-term
maximization of personal benefits, there was an increase in predatory behavior.
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beatings, murders, etc. Why would social cohesion require or even preference rape?
Nevertheless, by bringing together elements of strategy cultivated and imposed at the
group level, Cohen’s (2013a) theory moves us one step closer to understanding wartime
rape. In this way, I argue that Cohen (2013a) has captured some of the important vari-
ables, but that the logic of the theory is misplaced. Rather than viewing abductions as
a causal force in rape, I contend that the use of abduction is a reflection of the ideology
of the leader of the armed force. That is, the use of (what would have to be) systemic
abductions to create an army is evidence of a more radical leader who is willing to use
unconventional, even violent tactics against his own population in order to achieve his
goal. A leader willing to use abusive measures against his own group would also be ex-
pected to use more violent tactics against the enemy group. Beginning from this premise,
I proffer a preference-based theory of wartime rape.
0.3 A Preference-based Theory of Wartime Rape
The preference-based theory of wartime rape (PTWR) offered here seeks to address four
current problems in extant literature. First, given that the emphasis is on the leader
of a specific armed group, the PTWR operates at the group-level and can therefore
explain variation between armed groups. Second, ideological differences between leaders
can identify why armed groups in otherwise homogeneous cultures use rape differently;
accounting for differing levels of rape within and across armed units. Third, the ideology
of a leader defines both the in-group and the enemy group, and can therefore predict which
population is most likely to be victimized by the rape strategy. Finally, the PTWR argues
that rape is used intentionally by leaders to accomplish long-term strategic objectives. In
turn, the interaction between leadership preferences and war-type posits seeks to directly
address the question, why rape?
Contemporary literature is replete with scholarship touting the impact of leadership
preferences on conflict (Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 2013c; Horowitz et al. 2014; Ganguly
2001; Powell 1999; Fearon 1995; Rubenstein 1983; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Her-
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mann and Kegley 1995; Ungerer 2012; Karsh 2011; Roux 2011). In fact, the impact of
elite-level variables enjoys broad support from both international relations and compar-
ative politics literature. For instance, Yashar (1997) argues that outcomes are a product
of the interaction between the actions of actors negotiating an issue and the political in-
stitutions that constrain or promote a given outcome. Similarly, Grindle (2007) contends
that governance is the consequence of new opportunities and resources, the impact of
leadership motivation and choices, civic history, and the effect of institutions that con-
strain and facilitate innovation (3). Within conflict literature, rationalist explanations
of leadership behavior during conflict have long benefitted from a privileged place (Toft
2006; Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Higley and Burton 1989; Fearon 1995, 2004; Reiter
2003; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Horowitz and Ye 2013a, 2013c). Despite this consensus,
however, the role of leadership preferences in explaining variation in wartime rape has
yet to be explored. How might leadership preferences effect the use of rape by armed
groups? How might outcomes change as the interactions between leaders and their con-
text changes? As emphasized by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2013) and Hermann and
Kegley (1995), the cost-benefit and options-available calculus used by leaders will change
depending on the ways in which those leaders internalize institutional constraints. What
can we learn from these interactions?
The PTWR seeks to explain variation in the use of rape within and between conflicts,
cultures, and armed groups. Based in the bargaining model of war, the PTWR considers
war and words as bargaining tools used by leaders to achieve an optimal distribution of
goods (i.e., border placement, composition of government control over land/resources,
etc.) (see Reiter 2003, 27). Following early bargaining theories that view conflict as a
deliberate choice within the bargaining model (Schelling 1960; Bueno de Mesquita 1981;
Reiter 2003), the theory proffered here recognizes that the fighting (i.e., expression) of
warfare is itself serving a function (Goldstein 2001; Snyder 2002; Reiter 2003; Mercer
1995; Wendt 1999). Borrowing elements of constructivist logic, the PTWR supports the
idea that the means of war can be used to generate and reinforce an ideology (for a more
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detailed discussion, see Wendt 1999, 275). 9 Violence, then, is not just a degree of conflict
but a form of conflict; a form of social and political action in its own right (Brubaker and
Laitin 1998, 425). In this way, the active preference for the use of rape is deliberate and
prioritized over other forms of repression, violence, and human rights violations. Certainly
scholars of wartime sexual violence agree that rape is often predicated on the deleterious
effects it has on enemy populations, including the instillation of terror, diminishing civil
resistance, demoralizing, humiliating, emasculating enemy soldiers, and as an ends in
ethnic cleansing and genocidal campaigns (Enloe 2000; Baaz and Stern 2009; Gottschall
2004). Therefore, in parallel with existing rape literature, wartime rape is seen as the
coherent, coordinated, logical means of prosecuting warfare (Wood 2006, 2008, 2009;
Gottschall 2004; Allen 1996; Littlewood 1997; Thomas and Regan 1994; Isikozlu and
Millard 2010) to achieve a political goal. Echoing Carl von Clausewitz’s (1976) sentiments
the PTWR recognizes that, “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching
it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose” (87).
Further support for this logic comes from Roux (2011) who notes that in defining the
ideology of the conflict, the main perpetrators of gross human rights violations reinforce
the differentiation between the targeted group and the rest of the population by creating
juridical-legal separations between citizens and aliens, elites and masses, in-groups and
out-groups (Roux 2011, 656). Subsequently, these forces are more than collections of
isolated individuals. but rather represent a connected system that carries out genocide
and other crimes against humanity (Roux 2011, 660). In fact, McCormick and Mitchell
(1997) argue that regimes choose different mixes of torture, killing, and imprisonment
depending on their calculation of costs and benefits. Where the use of torture and killing
carries the likelihood of higher external costs, governments may opt for ‘disappearing’ the
victims rather than killing them (514). Here, leaders perceive different benefits attached
to the use of different types of repression depending on their preferences. As regimes see
repressive practices as more or less acceptable, decision-makers will frame their choices
accordingly. In turn, efforts to explain these practices must account for the different types
9For a skillfully woven elaboration on the bargaining model of war, its evolution, and its relationships
to other theories in international relations, please see Reiter (2003).
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of activities, as well as their differing meanings, contexts, and the nature of the political
challenge (McCormick and Mitchell 1997, 515).
Similarly, with notable exceptions at the extremes, preferences alone do not imply
strong likelihoods of particular outcomes without information on other variables affecting
leadership calculations of costs and benefits (Horowitz and Ye 2013a, 509, 2013c; see also
Horowitz et al. 2014). To this end, the PTWR assumes that the level of rape is a
product of leadership preferences conditioned by two additional groups of variables: the
status quo, and relative power. Here, relative power includes those factors that determine
potential gains and losses resulting from a change in the status quo. In contrast, status
quo conditions determine the opportunity costs of war. As status quo conditions decline,
the lower are the perceived costs of conflict (Horowitz and Ye 2013a). To this end,
Horowitz et al. (2014) suggest, “leadership preferences influence outcomes by placing
different relative values on the various possible outcomes - sticking with the status quo,
risking the upside and downside of war outcomes, and accepting a mutually acceptable
redistributive bargain...” (3). Thus, where post-Fearon bargaining models emphasize
calculations to avoid war, the theory developed here emphasizes the calculations in the
use or prevention of conflict modalities. That is, where contemporary bargaining models
of war focus on conditions determining when war will occur, the PTWR focuses on how
the war will occur.
The ‘how’ of warfare has particularly important consequences for the political land-
scape of the post-war environment. Just as contemporary bargaining models argue that
war is costly, the PTWR recognizes that the tactics used in war also have significant po-
litical costs. Focusing on strategies of political actors rather than individual motivations
of the perpetrator, Kalyvas (1999) argues that the key element in civil war is civilians
as competing political actors need to attract and maintain civilian support in order to
secure power. As war threatens the very survival of civilians, political actors will try to
commit civilians to their side by providing benefits and sanctions (Kalyvas 1999, 252; see
also Taylor 1988). Sanctions (i.e., punishments) are cheaper than benefits and ongoing
war further reduces the availability of benefits. Thus, actors are more likely to resort
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to terror to shape civilian behavior and reduce the probability of defection. However,
to be efficient, terror needs to be selective, as indiscriminate terror tends to be coun-
terproductive (Kalyvas 1999). To this end, Gottschall (2004) highlights evidence that
rape committed by soldiers can be a serious threat to the larger strategic interests of the
armed group, leading to efforts to proscribe it (Gottschall 2004, 132). As an example,
Gottschall (2004) discusses the experience of the Japanese military in Korea and China
in the 1930s through the end of World War II. Far from breaking resistant populations,
Japanese commanders found that frequent rapes of civilian women served to antagonize
and enrage the population. In fact, the institution of “comfort women” was, in large part,
because rape was considered detrimental to military goals. Inaugurated in Shanghai in
1932, the first comfort station was arranged in direct response to an official requests for
comfort women who could prevent Japanese sailors from raping local women (Gottschall
2004, 132; see also Chang 1997). Said differently, post-conflict leadership goals inform
leadership preferences on wartime tactics. Where an organization aspires to govern the
civilian population, leaders are more likely to restrain combatants’ use of rape against
those civilians for fear of undermining support for the coming revolution. That is, if the
present ‘enemy’ is expected to make up the future constituency, leaders will be less likely
to risk their political power by pursing terror strategies. Similarly, if an armed group is
dependent on civilians (for tax revenue, etc.), leaders have greater incentives to prevent
wartime rape (Wood 2006, 328-329; Wood 2009). In contrast, if the purpose of the war
is genocide and/or forcible removal of a population from a given territory, leadership is
less likely to be concerned with the post-conflict sentiments of the enemy and therefore
more likely to exhibit passive preferences of indifferences toward sexual violence or active
preferences for the strategic use of rape.
The ability to capture and measure leadership preferences is made possible using
Horowitz and Ye’s (2013a, 2013c) two-dimensional leadership preference typology. Within
a bargaining framework, the authors select two central concepts repetitive across interna-
tional relations and specifically conflict, literature: Nationalism (i.e., nationalist behav-
ior), and Power-seeking behavior (i.e., principled versus unprincipled behavior). Applied
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to the study of wartime rape, the nationalist dimension assesses how strongly maximum
nationalist goals are valued relative to the cost of using a given war tactic. The power-
seeking dimension assesses how much pursuing and maintaining political power is valued
relative to other political goals (509). Particularly relevant, in their study of the influ-
ence of these preferences on civilian targeting in ethno-territorial war, Horowitz and Ye
(2013c) find evidence that leaders use civilian targeting in ways that reflect their varying
emphasis on nationalist and power-seeking goals (388). Axiomatically, if accounting for
nationalist and power-seeking preferences holds explanatory power over the selection of
targets in conflict, then it is reasonable to expect that those same preferences are able to
provide insight into leadership decisions regarding wartime strategy.
0.4 Ethnic Versus Non-Ethnic War: The Case for Differentiation
Scholarship in sexual violence literature widely agree that ethnic war matters. However,
at present, no quantitative research compares the predictive power of theories across
ethnic and non-ethnic wars. Plainly stated, the logic to date has been backward. How
can we determine whether a theory explains wartime rape within ethnic war if theories
are not applied within and compared across ethnic wars? In fact, most culture-based
explanations relegate the very idea of ethnic war to the periphery. Those positing strictly
cultural explanations (Siefert 1992), fail to recognize and account for variation in the
use of wartime between armed groups within cultures. Even so, scholars recognizing the
interplay between ethnicity and conflict seem to accept as sufficient the inclusion of an
ethnic war dummy variable. Subsequently, empirical evidence suggests that ethnic war
likely matters, but the research process seems to have stopped there. Moving beyond
an ad hoc account of context, this research seeks to advance current understanding by
systematically comparing hypotheses specifically within the context of ethnic war in order
to discern explanatory patterns in the conditional effects of ethnic war on inter-group
variation in the use of wartime rape.
Wood (2006) argues that the type of war (at the broadest level) does not explain
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the variation in wartime rape. Sexual violence varies in prevalence and form between
civil wars and inter-state wars, among ethnic wars as well as non-ethnic, across cases
of genocide and ethnic-cleansing, and among secessionist conflicts (318). Though em-
pirics emerge in resounding support of Wood’s (2006) argument, ethnic war is all too
often confined to little more than a dummy variable. However, ethnicity is neither an
afterthought nor a factor operating in isolation of other contextual variables. In fact, the
role and salience of ethnicity is inextricable from the norms that guide both conflict and
leadership preferences. To that end, Kausikan (1993) argues that human rights are an
output of cultural traditions, values, political structures, and levels of development. The
force of ethnicity simultaneously informs and is a consequence of institutional, political
and social structures, both present and historical. In the context of wartime rape, the
interaction between ethnicity and leadership preferences alone holds the power to deter-
mine: (a) who are likely to be targets of rape, (b) the extent to which there are likely
to be differences in the advocation for, indifference to, or prevention of rape by a given
armed group, (c) the level of rape used by a particular group in armed conflict.
Though there is a paucity of literature specifically exploring causal mechanisms of
wartime rape in ethnic conflict, there is a clear intersection between ethnic conflict and
sexual violence literature. Most basically, conflict literature has clearly established that
ethnic war is a distinct type of conflict (Sambanis 2001; Laitin 1995). In the context of
ethnic war, scholars note that violence, political mobilization, and military socialization
usually work in tandem to polarize local, and specifically ethnic, identities (Wood 2008;
Kaufmann 1996; Fearon and Laitin 2001). In fact, because ethnic conflicts engage the
very notions of identity and therefore an existential threat, some argue that ethnic conflict
is prone to more human rights violations and extreme violence, including rape (Tronvoll
2008, 66; Cohen 2013a; Horowitz 1985; Plmper and Neumayer 2006; Bloom 1999).
Support for the specificity of ethnic conflict and its relationship to rape comes from
genocide literature. In particular, at the intersection of literature on genocide, ethnic
war, and sexual violence is a body of work devoted to genocidal rape. A specific subset
(consciously or not) of wartime rape, genocidal rape is used to annihilate a people and a
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culture (Baaz and Stern 2009; Enloe 2000; Sharlach 2000; Gottschall 2004; Allen 1996;
Barstow 2000; Hyuan-Kyung 2000; MacKinnon 1994; Salzman 2000; Rittner and Roth
2012; Koo 2002; Wood 2009; Ward and Marsh 2006; Russell-Brown 2003; Hayden 2000;
Bloom 1999; Cohen 2013a; Farr 2009). As ethnic wars are also frequently territorial
wars (Horowitz and Ye 2013a), the same strategic objectives (removing a population
from a territory) that lend themselves to genocide also make rape a particularly rational
wartime tactic.10 To date, however, neither feminist literature nor analyses specifically
investigating genocidal rape give real consideration to the circumstances under which
mass rape takes place (Hayden 2000, 29). While some argue there is no direct confirmation
that rape in Bosnia was used tactically (Gottschall 2004; Hayden 2000), a majority of
scholars agree that the use of rape in the Bosnian genocide was strategic and systematic
(Kohn 1994; Enloe 2000; Sofos 1996; Volkan 2002, 2006; Diken and Lausten 2005; Salzman
1998; Fisher 1996; Skejlsbk 2001).11 Still others argue that it is the genocide itself, rather
than the characteristics of ethnic war that promote widespread rape (Mullins 2009).
However, just as not all wars are ethnic, not all ethnic wars are genocidal. In fact,
even within ethnic war violence is not homogenous (Brubaker and Laitin 1998). Subse-
quently, there is no reason to expect that the heterogeneous components of large-scale
10Genocidal rape may take several forms: occurring through forced impregnation (Guttman 1993;
Diken and Lausten 2006; Volkan 2002, 2006); immediately before the lethal violence of genocide, as a
form of lethal violence itself (a victim may be raped until he or she dies or the intentional spread of HIV
(Rittner and Roth 2012; Sharlach 2000); as a way of inflicting long-term trauma (e.g., victims may be
physically unable to or be emotionally incapable of having children after a rape) (Koo 2002); as an effort
to remove a population from a given territory (Isikozlu and Millard 2010; Cohen 2013a; Bloom 1999;
Farr 2009). Certainly this list is not exhaustive.
11Evidence for rape as a strategy of war is perhaps most apparent in the forced impregnation that
occurred in the rape camps (located in Brcko, Dboj, Foca, Gorazde, Kalinobik, Vesegrad, Keatern,
Luka, Manjaca, Osmarka and Tronopolje), as such a practice necessitates thorough pre-planning (for
more detailed information, see Skejlsbk 2001 and Diken and Lausten 2005). Within the camps, women
were continuously raped until a doctor could establish pregnancy and subsequently held in captivity
until abortion was no longer possible (Kohn 1994; Diken and Lausten 2005, 112; Fisher 1996, 112;
Salzman 1998, 359). Furthermore, television propaganda used footage of Muslim women being rapes,
but dubbed over the voices in order to make people believe that the victims were Serbian woman (Diken
and Lausten 2005, 115; Goldstein 2001, 354; Salzman 1998, 353). In fact, Serbian propaganda entitled
‘Laying Violent hands on the Serbian Women’ written by Milovan Milutinovic claimed, “By order of
the Islamic fundamentalists from Sarajevo, healthy Serbian women from 17 to 40 years of age are being
separated out and subjected to special treatment. According to their sick plans going back many years,
these women have to be impregnated by orthodox Islamic seeds in order to raise a generation of janissaries
on the territories they surely consider to be theirs, the Islamic republic. In other words, a fourfold crime
is to be committed against the Serbian woman: to remove her from her own family, to impregnate her by
undesirable seeds, to make her bear a stranger and then to take even him away from her” corroborated
by (Diken and Lausten 2005; Volkan 2002, 2006; Guttman 1993).
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violence across ethnic and non-ethnic war can be understood by a single theory. To
this end, the role of leadership preferences becomes particularly intriguing. Yet, despite
widespread agreement that the role of leadership in ethnic politics is critical (Horowitz
and Ye 2013a, 2013b, Kausikan 1993; Brown 2001), literature investigating the impact of
leadership preferences on sexual violence outcomes within ethnic war is virtually absent.
Highlighting interplay between leadership and ethnic conflict, Brown (2001) argues that
in times of political and economic turmoil, leaders can provoke ethnic conflict as a diver-
sionary effort. Fortunately, the work of Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 2013b) provides one of
the first analyses exploring leadership preferences in the context of ethnic war. Specifi-
cally, relative to ethno-territorial conflict the authors investigate the impact of leadership
preferences on outcomes such as war onset, war duration, war strategy choice, and mode
of war termination (508). Here, the authors find that accounting for leadership prefer-
ences in the investigations of conflict outcomes significantly increases overall explanatory
power. Moreover, Horowitz and Ye’s (2013a) detailed account of the ideology, rhetoric,
and pre-conflict behaviors suggest that the context of war is a central determinant of
leadership preferences. In a separate account, Horowitz and Ye (2013b) argue that in
large-scale ethnic conflict, ethnic group leaders make strategic choices about civilian tar-
gets as part of an overall strategy (373). The authors go on to note that such civilian
targeting strategies are specifically chosen by comparing costs and benefits relative to
political goals. In short, these works provide support for the hypothesis that the PTWR
may operate differently in ethnic war than in non-ethnic war. Subsequently, seeking to
extend the literature, this research expands the scope of Horowitz and Ye’s (2013a) in-
vestigation in order to better understand the differential effects of leadership preferences
on the use of strategic rape during ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars.
0.5 Data and Methods
Data
This dissertation expands Cohen’s (2013a) dataset documenting the level of rape
across 86 civil wars between 1980 and 2009 to include (among other factors) 4 measures
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of leadership preferences based on Horowitz and Ye’s (2013) two-dimensional typology.
Subsequently, the dataset used in this dissertation represents the first large-N dataset
accounting for the impact of leadership preferences on the level of wartime rape perpe-
trated by armed groups in civil conflict.12
Dataset Descriptives. Using Cohen’s (2013a) original dataset, the data used here cover
all 86 major civil wars between 1980 - 2009 as defined by Fearon and Laitin (2011), an
update of Fearon and Laitin (2003). Data were collected only for those years overlapping
with the study period. If a war began before 1980, the data reflect only the period
starting in 1980. In total, data account for 983 conflict-years.13
The first empirical chapter of this dissertation seeks to determine whether variation
in rape differs from variation in the levels of other human rights abuses during war.
Necessarily, this requires different data than are used in the latter chapters of this work.
Specifically, chapter two uses individual, ordinal measures of physical integrity violations
from the Cingranelli and Richards (2011) CIRI dataset. These include measures for
torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings. In addition, a mass-killings dummy
variable, taken from Cohen’s 2013a) original dataset and based on Valentino et al.s (2004)
measure, captures whether the government killed over 50,000 civilians. As well, there are
two rape variables used in the analysis taken from Cohen’s (2013a) dataset, including
government-perpetrated rape and conflict-level rape. These measures are described in
more detail below.
Outside of the rape variables, data for the dominant portion of the dissertation differ
substantially. First, the unit of analysis is actor type-conflict-year (i.e., state forces in
the Afghanistan-Muhajideen conflict in 1981). There are a total of three dependent rape
variables. These include: (1) the highest level of rape perpetrated by the insurgent group,
(2) the highest level of rape perpetrated by the state, and (3) the highest level of rape
12A full list of cases present in the dataset as well as the conflict-years and the highest level of rape
achieved in each case are listed in the appendix in Figure 3.
13Cohen’s (2013a) original dataset was a tremendous undertaking that makes an invaluable contri-
bution to the field. Data are collected from a variety sources including original interviews, surveys,
government records, etc., and corroborated with existing literature for definitional and coding consis-
tency. For more information about these data and/or coding specifics, please see Cohen (2013a, 2013b).
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in the conflict-year, using the maximum coded level by either actor type in the conflict
year. Data for the dependent variables were compiled by Cohen (2013a) and measured
using a modified four-point scale that reflects the magnitude of violence.14 As Cohen
(2013a) highlights, while not fine grained, the four-point scale permits inferences about
the relative magnitude of rape committed by warring parties across conflicts (466). To
this end, variation across regions as well as the severity of rape across the data is signifi-
cant. These data confirm Wood’s (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009) longstanding assertions that
rape is not a ubiquitous feature of conflict, nor consistent across armed groups within the
same conflict.15 As discussed earlier, there are three groups of variables that describe the
PTWR. These groups include leadership preferences, the status quo, and relative power.
Below, variables are presented and discussed by group.
Leadership Preferences. Leadership preferences were coded using Horowitz and Ye’s
(2013) two dimensional typology. A principled-unprincipled (or power-seeking) dimension
assesses how much pursuing and maintaining political power is valued relative to intrin-
sic nationalist and other political goals (Horowitz and Ye 2013a, 527). Power-seeking
preferences are measured using a three-level ordinal scale. Each level is divided into four
categories that capture evidence of the preference in terms of level of commitment, consis-
tency and risk acceptance, political organization, and corruption. The first level captures
the lowest form of power-seeking (i.e., strongly principles behavior). This level represents
the ideologues; those with near-absolute commitment to one or more political goals. In
particular, one would expect to see an absolute consistency in the pursuit of core goals,
14For each of the 4 category dependent variables Cohen (2013a) used coding procedures similar to
those in Butler et al.’s (2007) study of state-directed sexual violence. The original authors based their
coding scheme on the widely used Political Terror Scale (PTS), a five-point measure of the level and
degree of physical integrity rights violations (Gibney et al. 2011). FOr more information see Cohen
(2013a).
15As documented by Cohen (2013a), 18 conflicts reached levels of widespread rape (with at least one
conflict-year coded as 3), 35 conflict have many or numerous reports of rape (with at least one conflict-
year coded as 2), 18 conflicts have isolated reports (with at least one conflict-year coded as 1), and
15 wars had no reports of rape (all conflict-years coded as 0). In broad terms, 53 of the 86 conflicts
(62%) have at least one conflict-year coded as either 2 or 3, and 71 of 86 conflicts (83%) have at least
isolated reports of rape. Furthermore 62% of the conflicts with rape evidence both state and insurgent
perpetrators, while only 31% (22) have rape perpetrated by state only and 7% (5) on conflicts involve
only insurgent perpetrated rape (467).
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using strategies that are consistent with the stated goals and priorities. Furthermore,
commitment is reflected by a frequent willingness to risk power loss or personal safety in
pursuit of goals. Within the organization, the leader is expected to value other purely
principled leaders, independent of their political stature. Here, no personal corruption
is expected and client corruption is strongly discouraged but tolerated if perceived as a
necessary-evil in service of substantive goals.
The mid-level power-seekers (i.e., balanced behavior) are kindred to typical career
politicians. There is evidence of significant commitment to one or more substantive po-
litical goals, but an expectation that these goals will be subverted for a large enough
political advantage. Balanced leaders are expected to be generally risk avoidant, evi-
dencing moderate strategies and consistency in pursuit of stated core goals. Within the
organization, there is a strong emphasis on principled and effective leaders, with little
personal and client corruption expected. However, client corruption will be viewed as
acceptable if and when it serves the larger political goals. Finally, the highly power-
seeking leaders (i.e., strongly unprincipled behavior) are opportunists with no convincing
commitment to any substantive political goals. Any stated goals will be sacrificed for a
significant political advantage. Here, leaders are expected to be risk-avoidant, personally
and professionally, in pursuit of goals. This behavior is characterized by a pronounced
inconsistency in pursuance of goals, with strategies inconsistent with efforts to achieve
stated objectives; particularly where inconsistency brings political advantage. The orga-
nization is expected to be dominated by the presence of “yes-men”, drawn from personal
networks in order to preserve the emphasis on loyalty, though often at the expense of
political efficacy. In general, corruption is the primary mechanism used to achieve goals,
unless that corruption threatens power.16
In contrast, a nationalist goals dimension assesses how strongly nationalist goals are
valued relative to the conflict costs and outcome risks that may result from pursuing
them. A more extreme nationalist position is defined as more highly valuing risks of
crisis-induced concessions and victory relative to the downside risk of defeat as well as
16For a thorough explanation of coding and a detailed example of the application of this coding to
several case studies, please see Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 2013b).
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crisis and conflict costs.17 Nationalist preferences are coded on a five-category ordinal
scale beginning at non-nationalist, and ending at extreme nationalist. Non-nationalists
are those whose statements and actions convey little to no interest in collective political
goals. That is, non-nationalists place very little emphasis on expulsion or assimilation of
the outsider group, and no strong feelings toward independence, or institutional and/or
cultural autonomy. Thus, there is no significant effort to elicit civilian support for col-
lective goals and the individual rights of ethnic others are strictly respected. In general,
non-nationalists are expected to discourage collective goals of own and other groups.
Moderate nationalists are those in which independence or assimilation goals may ex-
ist theoretically, but the dominant emphasis is on coexistence and improvement under
existing conditions. Moderate nationalists have a strong attachment to the status quo,
avoiding political confrontations and economic disruptions. Political pressures may be
used for bargaining for institutional or policy changes, but are expected to be confined
within the current legal and political framework. Though the leader may prioritize col-
lective goals of his own group, there is general acceptance of the collective goals of other
groups. These groups tend to collect other moderate nationalists but identical view are
not enforced.
The third level of nationalism is that of the ordinary nationalist. Here, there is an
active policy agenda aimed at one or more specific political objectives (i.e., independence,
autonomy, or state-sponsored assimilation, etc.), but compromise is acceptable if the costs
of pursing maximal goals cause significant disruption of the current system. Thus, more
disruptive measures are only likely to occur under conditions in which there is a very
strong possibility of success or a possibility of success at a relatively low cost. While the
collective goals of his own group are prioritized and collective goals of the other group are
17Here, it is important to clarify that Horowitz and Ye (2013a) originally developed this two-
dimensional typology following Fearon’s (1995) bargaining model of war. Fearon (1995) argued that
if states could agree on the outcome of possible war, then they could also avoid war. Given the con-
centrated costs of war for both sides, regardless of the winner, war is rarely the rational option. The
authors show that the greater relative power and a smaller share of the status quo goods make it more
likely that a given side will initiate a crisis (i.e., take a risk, exhibit more extreme behavior) (Horowitz
and Ye 2013a, 510). Thus, in the original work, ‘crisis’ refers to the action that marks the start of the
war. In this research, the word crisis is used infrequently, but is meant to convey the severity of terrorist
tactics and more extreme human rights violations overall.
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discouraged, the individual rights of the other-group members are defended. In pursuit
of core goals, some extraordinary tactics are plausible, but are likely limited to activities
that maintain the defense of others’ individual rights. However, if attacked, moderate
nationalists are expected to reciprocate in kind where it is likely to advance core goals.
Within the group, ordinary nationalist views are encouraged but not enforced.
The next nationalist level represents strong nationalists. Strong nationalists are ex-
pected to have an active policy agenda consisting of one or more (and most likely more)
political goals. Goals tend to be ranked hierarchically such that intermediate goals can
be discount or sacrificed in pursuit of maximal goals. The intermediate goals offer room
for bargaining, high costs are acceptable only if there is a significant chance of victory. In
pursuit of goals, the individual rights of the other-group are likely to be restricted where
they can be viewed as threatening own-group goals. Violence is possible, but targets are
limited to other-group civil society organizations, military operatives, and political insti-
tutions. So long as violence is in pursuit of goals, there is likely to be passive support for
or indifference to violence against out-groups. Within the organization, strong nationalist
views are a pre-requisite for high positions and incumbent leadership goals are prioritized
over ‘institutional protocol.’
Finally, the extreme nationalist is one that demonstrates an active interest and policy
agenda in pursuit of one or more goals. Maximal goals are preferanced over intermediate
goals are pursued almost any cost, even with little short-term prospects for success. As
is expected, the collective goals of own-group are prioritized and the collective goals
of the other group are completely excluded. In general, the individual rights of the
other-group are generally viewed as threatening own-group goals and are likely restricted.
An extreme nationalist demands that extreme views are enforced in all positions, and
violence is therefore directed not only at political institutions, the military, and civil
society organizations of other-group, but also of own-group where differing views are
perceived as threats either power or ideology.18
One of the particular challenges of coding leadership preferences is to make sure mea-
18Explanations of the dimensions are contained in the appendix. However, for further information,
please see Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 2013b).
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sures are distinct from the independent variable. To this end, Horowitz and Ye (2013a)
highlight ways through which to ensure that preferences are not conflated with out-
comes. The authors recommend collecting information on both actions and statements
and evaluating them over a long period of time (to the extent possible). In this work,
particular care was taken to implement Horowitz and Ye’s (2013a) recommended strategy
of separating actors’ statements from their actions. This is vital, as actions indicating
preferences may include elements of the dependent variable. Thus, to implement the
two-dimensional typology, information about actions indicating the nature and extent of
power-seeking and nationalist goals, as well as the costs and risks in pursuing them was
excluded. While this also excludes information on other types of action, the approach
minimizes the chance that information on the dependent variable might contaminate the
measurement of leadership preferences.19
Relative Power. There are five relative power variables included in the models. Log-GDP
is used to provide a broad measure of the resources available to both state and rebel
groups. For rebel groups, Log-GDP measures the level of resources available to rebel
groups at the time of the conflict. Rebel groups with more resources are expected to be
more powerful, and therefore better able to enforce norms and distribute punishments
to defectors. For the state, Log-GDP is a measure of the relative prosperity of state
leadership. That is, a higher GDP suggests that state leadership has more available money
and therefore greater liquidity to use on military resources. In this way, governments
with higher GDPs are better able to recruit and train their military. Higher levels of
investment are expected to produce a more professional armed unit with more developed
institutional processes for enforcing behavior. Therefore, as GDP increases, we would
expect rape perpetrated by state soldiers to decline. To more directly account for the
power of the state, a measure of military size (i.e., military persons under foot) was used.
Similar to accounting for state population in conflict research, controlling for military
personnel by the states accounts for the effect of sheer size (i.e., volume of people). Just
19For a discussion of other approaches, please see Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 512-513.
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as there more deaths in highly populated areas, it would be expected that there would
be more rape in larger armies.
In addition, measures for oil and drugs were included to account for the perils of
the resource curse. For instance, Weinstein (2007) argues that insurgent groups with
access to material resources attract more violence-prone recruits than do groups relying
on ideology; thereby increasing the likelihood that resource-supported groups will commit
widespread civilian abuses. Furthermore, research suggests that the rampant use of drugs
and alcohol enables perpetrators to feel removed from a sense of agency and responsibility
(Kassimeris 2006; Baaz and Stern 2009, 498). Thus, an armed unit able to receive funding
from sources outside the citizen population is not reliant on civilians to exist and is,
therefore, less likely to be concerned about the relative costs of civilian treatment. This
is particularly true in territorial war where there is an effort to remove a population
from a contested territory. Thus, where leadership places a higher relative value on the
citizens, levels of rape are expected to be lower.
A tribal variable was also included to account for the relative distance between state
leadership and the civilian population. There are two inter-related logics that explain
the impact of a tribal state. First, to the extent that there is a presence of tribal politics
operating in cities and villages, there is a degree of relative autonomy from the govern-
ment. In an ethnic war, these locations become easily identifiable ‘out-groups’; both for
inter-tribal rivalries and for state-tribe conflicts. In turn, state-perpetrated rape in ethnic
war, would be expected to be higher in tribal areas. Alternately, as noted by Kalyvas
(1999), “A central feature of civil wars is the breakdown of the state monopoly of violence
and its replacement by locally segmented monopolies of violence” (259). In this regard,
an insurgent organization controlling an area operates as a counter-sovereign authority,
providing protection, administering justice, collecting taxes and implementing social pro-
grams. Such an organization also enjoys a monopoly on violence, which can be used to
punish enemies and sanction uncooperative behavior (Kalyvas 1999, 259). However, for
whatever incentives there may be to avoid rape of one’s own tribe, in many cases there
is heightened incentives to perpetrate rape against other tribes in order to accomplish
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larger objectives. Since many tribal areas still function as a pre-modern society, norms
regarding equal treatment for all may likely be absent or suspended.
Finally, a dummy variable measuring whether group leadership was unified or frac-
tured was used to account for the ability of a given armed group to enforce anti-rape
norms and punish defectors. In many ways, this reflects the primary logic of the op-
portunity arguments that posit state and institutional breakdown as a motivating force
in wartime rape (Wood 2006; Kalyvas 1999). As Wood (2006) argues, enforcement of
regulatory mechanisms var and those regulatory mechanisms that exist may break down
during war (321). In particular, if there are two competing leadership groups, it is pos-
sible that one group may be actively seeking to prevent wartime rape, while another
group is less concerned with extreme violence. Similarly, if there is a divide in leadership,
hierarchical disruption and communication problems are likely to prevent (or otherwise
sidetrack) the armed force from policing soldier behavior. Thus, as the ability to enforce
rules of warfare wane, rape levels are expected to be higher.
Status Quo. A high-democracy variable was constructed using the top of the polity2
measure. This measure accounts for three inter-related processes. First, the level of
democracy provides a general measure of state repression, civil liberties, inclusiveness
and corruption. In turn, democracy provides a baseline for existing grievances between
rebel groups and state leadership. A higher measure of democracy is expected to in-
dicate a greater contentment with the status quo, and therefore less of an interest in
more extreme violence. More broadly, democracy reflects the norms and values present
in society. Countries with experience in democracy are more likely to have more mod-
erate preferences in regards to the use of violence. Thus, we would expect rebels from
a democratic state to show greater restraint in their level of violence both against their
own and enemy populations. Finally, on the side of the government, it is expected that
leaders would have a greater interest in preserving citizen support for the leadership.
Thus, more moderate levels of violence and a more stringent set of active preferences
for the punishment and prevention of rape are expected in states with higher democracy
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scores. When democracy is coupled with Log-GDP, the combination offers insight in the
overall level of state development and the strength of existing institutions.20
Methods
This dissertation employs a variety of methods to answer the question, why rape? In
this effort, the first step was to determine whether rape is used differently than other
human rights abuses during conflict. Since the argument here suggests that rape is used
strategically for its symbolic properties, the expectation would be that rape does not
vary with other forms of non-combat violence. Thus, three primary methods were used
to assess the relationships between variables. Correlation checks were performed to avoid
interpretation distortions due to collinearity. Factor analysis was used to determine the
extent to which the variables shared the same underlying construct. Finally, Welch’s
two-sample t-tests (aka unequal variances t-tests) were used to test whether means for
the measures of rape were equal to the means for other human rights violations. Welch’s
t tests were selected over Student’s t-tests as they are more reliable in the face of unequal
sample sizes and do not assume equal variance. The results are also presented graphically
for ease of interpretation.
The dominant portion of the dissertation uses a combination of cross sectional and
time series analysis. A cross sectional dataset is created from the original time-series
data by taking the means of each variable during a conflict. Models are run using simple
linear regression is used. The benefit of this simplified cross sectional approach is that
one can be confident the results are not unduly inflated because of time-dependence.
Nevertheless, in order to assess differences in the outcomes, transition models were also
estimated for the time-series data. The use of transition modeling follows the direction of
Beck et al. (1998), Carter and Signorino (2010). However, results suggests that models
are not robust to changes in the type of analysis, form of variables (ordinal, dichotomous,
continuous, etc.) or the inclusion of of new variables. Subsequently, the reported results
are predominantly from the cross-sectional models as they represent the most conservative
20Log-GDP, given its relationship with democracy, can also be interpreted as a measure of state
development.
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estimates of significance.
0.6 Contributions
This dissertation offers four contributions to literature on wartime rape and the broader
spectrum of scholarship on sexual violence, ethnic conflict, and human rights violations
in war. First, this research provides evidence that rape is not ‘just another human rights
violation.’ Rather, this work presents support for the hypothesis that there is something
strategic and intentional about the use of rape. The results offered here make evident
that we need to move past passive acceptance of rape as an unfortunate side effect of
war and understand the use of rape as a specialized tactic to achieve larger political
objectives. Second, this project unites literature on sexual violence, ethnic conflict, and
state repression in order to rethink the way we understand and categorize rape. By ag-
gregating knowledge across areas of specialization, I argue for the need to modify existing
group-level theories of wartime rape. In address, this dissertation advances a preference-
based theory of wartime rape that suggests leadership preferences, conditioned by the
type of war explain variation in the use of rape across armed groups in conflict. Third,
the analyses conducted here show theories of wartime rape have different predictive ca-
pacities depending on the context of the war. Thus, this work argues that future research
must test theories of sexual violence separately in ethnic and non-ethnic war in order
to understand the predictive capacities of those theories. That is, it is not sufficient to
agree that ethnic war matters. Rather, scholarship must pursue deeper understandings
of the ways in which the type of war conditions the expression theories of rape and sexual
violence. Finally, multinomial probit analysis is used to highlight existing problems in
measurement and modeling that lead to flawed inferences. In turn, I propose the use of
transition modeling to better capture the causal relationship between variables seeking to
explain wartime rape. A preliminary exploration of transition modeling suggests promis-
ing avenues for future quantitative research. In sum, this dissertation seeks to advance
our understanding of the causal forces behind the use of rape in conflict and posit ways
in which we might overcome existing theoretical and methodological challenges.
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Chapter 2
Just Another Human Rights Violation?
Distinguishing Rape from Other Human Rights Abuses
“A ‘No’ uttered from the deepest
conviction is better than a ‘Yes’
merely uttered to please, or worse, to
avoid trouble.”
Mahatma Gandhi
Broadly, this dissertation asks, why rape? However, to ask why rape in the context of
civil war necessarily distinguishes it from other forms of violence. Should it be? Literature
seems to focus on ‘human rights violations’ or rape, but fails to address the relationship
between them. While variation in the scale of human rights violations across the world is
widely recognized, relatively little empirical research has been done to account for differ-
ences in the use of human rights violations (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Wood 2006,
2007; Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2005; Davenport 2007). In fact, despite public concern
and political importance, the theoretical contribution of political science to explaining
human rights violations has been modest at best (Mitchell and McCormick 1988, 477).
Historically, there has been general acceptance that the chaos of war unleashes a
freedom to commit human rights violations. However, if the mere presence of war was
sufficient to explain increases in human rights violations, then all human rights violations
should increase at the start of war, and worsening chaos should see all rights steadily
increase. But, do they? A vast body of literature posits considerable variation not only
in the use of rape, but in the use of a broad spectrum of human violations within and
between armed conflicts (Wood 2006, 2008, 2009). However, to date there have been
no large-N statistical tests that identify patterns in the use of sexual violence relative to
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other forms violence during war. In turn, this chapter makes two powerful contributions
wartime sexual violence literature. First, this work provides the first statistical compari-
son of the use of rape and other disaggregated measure of human rights violations across
civil wars. Beyond the methodological contribution, this chapter provides evidence that
patterns in the use of rape are distinctive from those of other human rights violations.
Specifically, the results detailed below support the hypothesis that rape is not merely a
side effect of conflict, but is the product of a much more complex mechanism; one that
differs considerably from more commonly analyzed human rights violations. The follow-
ing section offers a brief review of relevant research.
Literature
The research presented here is part of a larger work that seeks to better understand
the forces motivating and/or inhibiting the use of sexually violent tactics during civil
war. As the foundation of that inquiry, this chapter explores the extent to which the use
of rape rises and falls in the same patterns as do other types of extra-combat violence.
Asked simply, is there something different about the use of rape that distinguishes it from
other types of violence? Is it possible that the forces acting to encourage or control rape
differ from the forces operating in other, non-sexual violations of human rights? In this
effort, I engage human rights and sexual violence literature in two primary ways. First, I
address debates regarding the conceptualization of human rights. Namely, I highlight the
ways in which current conceptualizations impact measurement, results, and inferences.
Second, I examine the propositions and weaknesses in prominent opportunity arguments
that suggest human rights violations, as a broad category, are simply the product of (and
therefore inherent in) war.
Human Rights in Concept and Measurement
In part, the challenge of evaluating patterns in the use of human rights violations is a
product of the lack of consensus surrounding the definition and measurement of human
rights. While it does not excuse the slow integration of rape into human rights discourse,
36
even the concept of gender equality did not emerge in UN documents until 1975. The
specific use of rape as a weapon of war did not receive substantial recognition until the
mid-nineties, when it was foisted upon the world stage by the horrors of the Bosnian
genocide. Having spent the last forty years lobbying for the inclusion of sexual violence
in discussions of human rights, the outcome seems to be as much a blessing as a curse.
Although there is now widespread recognition that sexual violence qualifies as a violation
of human rights, the problem is that rape has become ‘just another’ violation. That is, our
efforts have finally succeeded in elevating rape to the status of a human rights violation,
but in so doing have added it to an umbrella concept that is already ambiguously defined
and conceptually stretched.
Following in the footprints of Sartori (1970), Jackman (1985) argues that variables
should be unidimensional rather than broad constellations of factors that may or may
not be empirically inter-related (169). Advocating for a more nuanced understanding of
state repression and state-committed human rights violations, Davenport (2007) argues
for the conceptual disaggregation of violence across type, time, and space. The author
contends that such an approach is not only essential for gauging the robustness of the
propositions developed in the literature, but is necessary to explore other arguments that
have previously been ignored. In particular, where aggregation presumes a certain degree
of coordination among coercive agents that might not exist, disaggregation is useful if
we expect actors to respond to different challenges with distinct strategies (Davenport
2007).
In fact, the issue of aggregation and human rights dimensionality has become a po-
larizing debate in the literature. On one side are those who assert that different types
of violations result from different structures of motivations, opportunities, and resources
(Davenport 2007; Wood 2008, 2009; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; McCormick and
Mitchell 1997). For these scholars, the very recognition of different forces underpinning
the expression of violence challenges (if not precludes) the notion that torture, disappear-
ances, killing, imprisonment, and other violations are equally rooted in a single concept.
Nevertheless, on the other side of the debate Cingranelli and Richards (1999) refute Mc-
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Cormick and Mitchell’s (1997) claim that government respect for physical integrity rights
is a multi-dimensional phenomenon.21 Arguing for unidimensionality, the authors use
Mokken scale analysis (MSA) to produce an additive measure ‘showing’ that the use of
state violence is hierarchical. In particular, the authors argue that human rights viola-
tions (specifically imprisonment, torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings) are
underscored by the same latent construct and can therefore be placed on an ordinal scale;
the touted benefits being that the measure captures the level, pattern, and sequence of
state-sponsored human rights violations.22 However, a single hierarchical scale of human
rights violations tacitly assumes that gendered or sexual violence and non-sexual violence
(like looting or disappearances) are caused by the same underlying construct. That is,
the latent motivation for stealing is the same as the motivation for rape.23 Summarily,
if Cingranelli and Richards’ (1999) proposition about the unidimensionality of human
rights is true, then we would expect to see covariation in the forms of violence used in
war.
Empirically, however, there is little support for the unidimensional argument. Cer-
tainly covariation occurs sometimes, but more often than not this is not the case (see
Wood 2006, 2009; Kalyvas 2006; Hayden 2000; Potts et al. 2011; Mitchell and McCormick
1988; McCormick and Mitchell 1997; Hill and Jones 2014). In fact, scholars argue that
there is no explicit reason why rape should increase proportionally with other forms of
violence. Still, perhaps because rape has always been assumed as a given during war, the
latent assumption is that it does. The analyses presented here respond directly to this
debate in three ways. First, focusing entirely on disaggregated measures of human rights,
I use factor analysis to explore the extent to which particular violations share the same
latent construct. Second, I employ statistical tests to provide a deeper understanding
21In this dissertation, as in most human rights literature, the phrases ‘human rights violations,’ ‘phys-
ical integrity rights,’ and ‘personal integrity rights’ are used interchangeably.
22Here, sequence refers to the order in which governments have a propensity to violate particular
physical integrity rights (Cingranelli and Richards 1999).
23Paradoxically, in an 11 page article published in 1999, three years after the fallout from atrocities
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in a discussion about the actions that define torture (i.e., ‘force, physical or
otherwise, that is cruel, inhumane and/or degrading’), the word ‘rape’ never appears. In fact, the phrase
‘sexual violence’ and any references or discussions relating to sexual or gendered violence are entirely
absent.
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of the relationships and patterns among differing human rights violations in ethnic and
non-ethnic civil war. Finally, this is the first large-N analysis to directly compare the
use of wartime rape with other disaggregated measures of physical integrity in order to
discern whether patterns in the use of sexual violence, and rape specifically, differ from
other (non-sexual) forms of violence within and across civil wars.
Beginning at Opportunity
Stated broadly, opportunity theories in conflict literature argue that a wartime envi-
ronment alters the social context of society such that there are increased opportunities
for individuals to express behavior that is otherwise outside of ‘normal’ social and legal
expectations. Thus, to ask whether the incidents of rape covary with increases in other
human rights violations is to evaluate whether the opportunity brought on by war effects
the expression of all human rights offenses equally. To this end, where Collier and Ho-
eﬄer (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that opportunities are the significant
factors in predicting civil war, theories of opportunity in sexual violence literature con-
tend that the presence of war increases the opportunity for rape through changes in social
norms, expressions of latent primitive desires brought on by wartime chaos, changes in
the willingness or ability to punish offenders, and increased contact with potential vic-
tims (Wood 2006; Siefert 1994, 1996; Gottschall 2004; Baaz and Stern 2009; Paglia 1993;
Thornhill and Palmer 2000). In turn, theories of opportunity expect sexual violence to
vary proportionally with other forms of violence.
The most obvious question is why? Certainly literature acknowledges that there are
substantial differences in the way governments and other armed groups use types and
levels of human right violations (McCormick and Mitchell 1988). Scholarship recognizes
that there is considerable distance between regimes that rely on imprisonment and those
that rely on torture and killing for political control (Mitchell and McCormick 1988).
Moreover, feminist literature has long argued that rape is a war instrument specifically
used because of its distinctive impact (Siefert 1994; MacKinnon 1994; Brownmiller 1975;
Melandri 2009; McGlynn 2009). While there are strong theoretical reasons and rigorous
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qualitative analyses evidencing the sharply contrasted way in which rape occurs against
civilians relative to other forms of violence (Wood 2009), the claim has yet to be statis-
tically evaluated. If we accept that violations vary and that rape is a distinctive type of
violation unto itself, then why would we expect these phenomena to follow identical pat-
terns of expression? Here again, we reach a theoretical head. While not entirely opposed,
the idea that human rights violations are a product of opportunity creates questions for
those who believe human rights violations are a purposeful result of the costs and bene-
fits calculated by leaders trying to achieve a desired outcome. What is the relationship
between opportunity and strategy? If, for instance, opportunity requires weakened insti-
tutions, then at what point do institutions become so weak that strategy can no longer
be implemented and opportunities can no longer be controlled? At this point, there are
more questions than answers.
Despite the obvious intersection between opportunity theories addressing (what are
considered) ‘common’ physical integrity violations (murder, torture, kidnapping, etc.),
and those exploring the forces behind and impact of war on rates of rape, investiga-
tive overlap is virtually absent.24 Currently, the majority of research evaluating violence
against noncombatants during civil war analyzes homicide to the exclusion of all other
violence (de Waal et al. 2014; Weinstein 2007; Kalyvas 1999, 2006; Valentino et al.
2004). To date, few studies focus on rape. Those that extend inquiry beyond murder
tend to consider only a small subset of non-sexual human rights violations. Thus, despite
broad agreement that theories developed to explain one type of violation cannot readily
be applied to other types of violence (Cohen 2013; Davenport 1995, 2007; McCormick
and Mitchell 1997; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Hill and Jones 2014), no large-N works
to date specifically evaluate the use of sexual violence relative to other forms of human
rights violations. In address, this research seeks to bring these literatures into direct
24Here, I refer only, and quite specifically to physical integrity rights. This distinction is important
as there is a substantial body of work examining the state repressive behaviors including the violations
of personal, property, civil and political rights. These broad scale analyses may or may not include
violations of human rights, but typically do so only in indexed form. If sexual violence is at all accounted
for it is only insofar as reports are considered for or integrated within definitions of ‘torture’; which is rare
and often unclear. For works evaluating state repression and human rights as well as those discussing
the construction or critique of aggregate measures of human rights, please see: Poe and Tate (1994),
Davenport (1995, 2007), Davenport and Armstrong (2004), and Armstrong (2011).
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conversation by comparing wartime patterns in the levels of common violations of human
rights, specifically torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings, to patterns in the
levels of wartime rape.
Hypotheses
Based on the positions in the aforementioned literature, this analysis tests two pri-
mary hypotheses. Given the substantive body of literature discussing the distinctiveness
as of rape as an instrument of war (Wood 2006, 2007, 2009; Cohen 2013a; Thomas and
Regan 1994; Hayden 2000; Diken and Lausten 2005; Anwary 2012; Kohn 1994; McKinnon
1994; Reid-Cunningham 2008; Strohmetz N.d.; Ttreault 1997; Wood 2006, 2008, 2009;
Alison 2007; Gottschall 2004; Enloe 1990, 2000), the first hypothesis tests whether the
level of rape covaries with other ‘common’ violations of human rights in the same way
these other violations correlate with each other.
H1: Rape is used differently than torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings and
therefore, I do not expect that rape will correlate with other human rights violations as
highly as the the ‘common’ violations correlate with each other.
The second hypothesis concerns the relationship between rape, ethnic war, mass
killing, and genocide. The issue here is whether rape is related to ethnic war (independent
of genocide), to genocide (independent of war-type), or to mass-killings (independent of
either) (see Mullins 2009; Cohen 2013a; Brown 2012, amongst others). However, debate
and confusion dominate in this already nebulous web, largely because of terminological
and measurement-based overlap. Although mass-killings and genocides are not the same
thing, it is true that they often coexist. In some cases these phrases are used in such
close relation that they appear interchangeable. However, where mass-killing refers to
a numerical outcome (50,000 or more civilians killed; see Valentino et al. 2004 for a
state-based account of mass-killing), genocide refers to the implementation of an inten-
tion. Thus, to ask about the relationship between rape and genocide is very different
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from asking whether rape is related mass-killing.25 Unfortunately, using mass-killings as
a measure of the presence of genocide conflates outcome with process/intent, increasing
the likelihood of type I error.
Fortunately, this research provides a platform on which to begin parsing out these re-
lationships. While state-perpetrated mass-killings are not technically measures of human
rights violations (in that they do not distinguish between non-combat and combat related
deaths), it is possible to assess the way in which patterns of rape compare to patterns of
mass-killing. All arguments made thus far postulate that rape is distinctive from other
human rights violations and does not covary with more traditional measures of human
rights violations in the same way those violations covary with one another. The broader
argument here is that rape is not expected to have the same correlation with mass killings
as mass killings have with other forms of human rights violations. In turn, hypothesis
two is:
H2: The use of rape is not merely a byproduct of massive-scale attacks and is not expected
to correlate with incidents of mass-killing as highly as mass killings correlates with other
measures of human rights violations.
Data and Methods
Data
Data for this research comprise an original dataset measuring annual variation in the
use of rape by armed groups for all civil war wars between 1980 and 2009. The core
of this dataset was taken from Cohen’s (2013a) data exploring the the impact of armed
25In addition, each of these questions has different implications for model structure. For instance, it
would be appropriate to inquire whether genocide (insofar as it is an execution of an intentional process)
is ‘causal’ in producing higher or lower levels of rape, assuming one had an appropriate measure of
genocide (ideally one that captures intent/sentiment/relationship between the parties and is distinct from
the number of deaths). (I.e., does the particular form or implementation strategy for a genocidal effort
impact the level of rape used in that effort?) In contrast, the same cannot be said for the relationship
between mass-killing and rape. That is, where the former supports the use of rape as a dependent
variable, the latter does not. Rather, evaluating the relationship between mass-killing and rape is
assessing whether the presence of one outcome varies with the presence of another outcome.
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group social cohesion on the level of rape used in conflict. Additional variables were gath-
ered from the World Bank, the Cingranelli-Richards CIRI dataset, the Correlates of War
dataset, and the U.S. State Department. For a total of 86 conflicts covering 983 conflict-
years, the analyses presented here compare individual measures of mass-killings, disap-
pearances, extra-judicial killings, torture, government-perpetrated rape, and conflict-level
rape. Each measure is explained in turn. First, the variable for mass-killing takes a value
of 1 of the state killed more than 50,000 civilians, and is otherwise a 0. The measure is
borrowed from Cohen’s (2013a) dataset, but is based on Valentino et al.’s (2004) measure.
The three human rights violations are taken from the 2013 update of the CIRI dataset.
Specific to government-perpetrated violations of rights, these data measure only those
violations committed by the state government or those sponsored by the state government.
The disappearance measure captures cases in which people have disappeared, political
motivation appears likely, and the victims have not been found. The original measure
was recoded such that a score of 0 indicates that no disappearances occurred in the year;
a score of 1 indicates that disappearances occurred occasionally; and a score of 2 indicates
that disappearances occurred frequently.
Extra-judicial killing measures the number of killings by government officials without
due process of law (excluding combat-deaths). This includes the deliberate, illegal, and
excessive use of lethal force by the police, security forces, or other agents of the state
whether against criminal suspects, detainees, prisoners or others as well as murders by
state-sponsored private groups. The original measure was recoded such that a score of 0
indicates that no extra-judicial killings occurred in the year; a score of 1 indicates that
extra-judicial killings occurred occasionally; and a score of 2 indicates that extra-judicial
killings occurred frequently.
Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical,
including the use of physical and other force by by government officials, police and prison
guards, and those sponsored/instigated by government officials that is cruel, inhuman,
or degrading (up to and including deaths in custody due to negligence). The original
measure was recoded such that a score of 0 indicates that no torture occurred in the
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year; a score of 1 indicates that torture occurred occasionally; and a score of 2 indicates
that torture occurred frequently.26
There are two ordinal measures of rape used for comparison, both of which come
from Cohen’s (2013a) data; these include a measure of rape perpetrated by govern-
ment/state forces, and a measure of conflict-level rape that records the highest level
of rape used/reached in the conflict regardless of the perpetrator.27 Cohen (2013a) coded
the rape measures using data from human rights organizations such as Amnesty Inter-
national, Human Rights Watch, and the American Red Cross (amongst others), as well
as information from original interviews. Both ordinal measures consist of 4 values in
which a score of 0 means no mention of rape; a score of 1 indicates infrequent or isolated
reports of rape; a score of 2 refers to not irregular use of rape, including reports in which
rape is described as ‘widespread,’ ‘common,’ extensive,’ ‘pattern,’ etc.; a score of 3 refers
to rape described as ‘systematic,’ ‘massive,’ ‘tool of war,’ etc.28 Within a given conflict
there is a measure for government-perpetrated and conflict-level rape. All conflicts are
divided down into dyads. If there are multiple conflicts within a state in a given year,
each conflict is coded separately.29
Three primary methods were used to assess the relationships between variables. First,
bivariate correlation tests were performed to assess the extent of covariance between vari-
ables. Second, logistic regressions were employed to address the relative ability of some
human rights violations to predict the use of others. Finally, factor analysis was used to
26Future research should also explore the relationship between CIRI’s political imprisonment measure
and the other human rights measures explored here. The measure was not included because it is also a
measure of civil and political rights, and the purpose here was to remain specifically focused on physical
violence. In addition, there is overlap between the political imprisonment measure and torture, as
torture includes deaths and abuse while in state custody. In this way, most of the information from the
imprisonment score is captured in the torture measure. Nevertheless, as research expands to investigate
human rights patterns on increasingly broad scales, the imprisonment measure is a good place to begin.
27As will be explained in later chapters, Cohen’s (2013a) data includes three rape variables:
government-perpetrated rape, rebel-perpetrated rape, and conflict-level rape. Thus conflict-level rape
records the highest level of rape reached in the conflict regardless of whether it was perpetrated by the
state or by a rebel group. Because the human rights violations from CIRI measure only those violations
committed by the state, the rebel-perpetrated rape variable is not used in this chapter. However, pre-
liminary statistical tests were initially conducted as a check and and the results for rebel-perpetrated
rape follow the same patterns as those for government-perpetrated and conflict-level rape.
28For a full list of coding rules, please refer to Table 14 in the appendix.
29Because the CIRI measures were developed with the expressed purpose of evaluating government
respect for physical integrity rights, only graphs for government-perpetrated rape and conflict-level rape
are displayed here.
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determine the extent to which the variables shared the same underlying construct. As an
added form of support, Welch’s two-sample t-tests (aka unequal variances t-tests) were
used to test whether means for the measures of rape were equal to the means for other
human rights violations (see Table 15 in the appendix).30
Data limitations
The data limitations inherent in studying rape are well documented and generally
understood across the literature (Baaz and Stern 2009; Enloe 2000; Sharlach 2000;
Gottschall 2004; Allen 1996; Barstow 2000; Hyuan-Kyung 2000; MacKinnon 1994; Salz-
man 2000; Rittner and Roth 2012; Koo 2002; Wood 2006, 2008, 2009; Ward and Marsh
2006; Russell-Brown 2003; Hayden 2000; Bloom 1999; Cohen 2013a; Farr 2009). Count-
less authors detail the challenges associated with collecting data on wartime rape as
it is a private, gendered, highly-stigmatized matter; often occurring in countries with
deep-seeded patriarchies in which raped women are seen as dirty, ruined, unworthy for
marriage, shameful, or even deserving of death. For this reason, reports on the number
of rapes in any conflict reflect only our best estimates to date given the information we
have available. and generally understood across the literature. However, Cohen (2013a)
and others note that while conflict rape seems to be on the rise, it is possible this up-
surge in reports has more to do with post-Bosnian issue salience and the increased media
attention and reporting practices.
Where possible missing data values were supplemented with updated measures from
the World Bank, CIA fact book, Human Rights Watch, the U.S. State Department,
Amnesty international and others. In other cases, data was imputed using other obser-
vations to calculated modal or averaged scores. For instance, Cohen’s (2013a) original
dataset contained a small number of missing observations for the rape variables. However,
relative to government rape, if the conflict-year prior to the NA value was coded 1, and the
conflict-year following the NA value was coded 1, the missing observation was coded 1.
30Welch’s t-tests were selected over Student’s t-tests as they are more reliable in the face of unequal
sample sizes and do not assume equal variance.
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Results
For descriptive purposes, the graphs in Figures 1 and 2 display the use of traditional
human rights violations at each level of rape, for both government-perpetrated rape
and conflict-level rape in ethnic and non-ethnic war. These distributions stand as a
basis from which to evaluate the relative covariation between rape, extra-judicial killings,
disappearances, and torture. 31 Tables 1-3 present the correlation matrices of all the
variables across all war types.
In particular, Table 1 provides a correlation matrix for all variables across all (aggre-
gated) war types, offering preliminary support for the first hypothesis. Understanding
that a score of 1 represents a perfect correlation between variables, arguably scores at or
below 0.5 (or conservatively, 0.4) represent variables with enough distinction that they
can be included in the same model (as they would be expected to measure/account for
different concepts). Notably, however, the highest correlation between rape and any of the
other human rights measures is 0.244 (between conflict-level rape and torture). Across the
matrix, the low correlations between rape and the other three human rights violations,
relative to the higher correlations between torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial
killings support the idea that there is something distinct about the use of rape. That is,
rape does not appear to have the same covariance with other human right violations as
these non-rape violations have with one another. In fact, the lowest correlation among
the three ‘common’ human rights violations, 0.312 between torture and disappearances,
is still higher than the highest correlation between any rape and non-rape correlation.
Still, the fact that the correlations between torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial
31There are 664 conflict-years in which there was at least an ‘occasional’ record of rape, 253 observations
perpetrated by rebels and 411 perpetrated by governments, leaving 319 conflict-years without any records
of rape. At the lowest level of government-leveraged rape (i.e., no rape / the absence of rape reports)
there were a total of 338 observations of frequent torture (486 observations with any level of torture,
occasional or frequent), 160 frequent disappearances (327 observations with any level of disappearances),
and 287 frequent extra-judicial killings (450 observations with any level of extra-judicial killings). At
the highest level of government-perpetrated rape (i.e., mass or tactical rape) there were 22 observations
of frequent torture, 11 observations of frequent disappearances, and 21 observations of frequent extra-
judicial killings. Across all wars there were 863 instances of torture; 190 observations of occasional
torture and 673 observations of frequent torture. There were 632 observations of disappearance; 274
observations of occasional disappearance and 358 observations of frequent disappearance. Finally, there
were 827 observations of extra-judicial killing; 250 observations of occasional extra-judicial killing and
577 observations of frequent extra-judicial killing.
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killings do not exceed 0.474 challenges Cingranelli and Richards (1999) assertions that
human rights measures exist on a unidimensional scale. With low-moderate correlation
values below 0.50, these results support the position that there may be different forces
underpinning the expression of different forms of violence.
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Figure 1: Government-perpetrated Rape versus Other
Violations in Ethnic and Non-ethnic War
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Figure 2: Conflict-level Rape versus Other Violations in Ethnic
and Non-ethnic War
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix of Human Rights Violations Across All Wars
Govt Rape Conflict Rape Torture Disappearance Extra-jud Killing Mass Killing
Govt Rape 1 0.856 0.220 0.206 0.212 -0.056
Conflict Rape 0.856 1 0.244 0.209 0.192 -0.058
Torture 0.220 0.244 1 0.312 0.342 0.001
Disappearance 0.206 0.209 0.312 1 0.474 0.105
Extra-jud Killing 0.212 0.192 0.342 0.474 1 0.133
Mass Killing -f0.056 -0.058 0.001 0.105 0.133 1
For added insight, Tables 2 and 3 present the correlation matrices for ethnic and
non-ethnic war respectively. Table 2 reveals slightly higher correlations between rape
and non-rape human rights violations than were in Table 1; though all remain under
0.30. A comparison of the two tables reveals that the relationship between rape, tor-
ture, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings is stronger during ethnic war than in
non-ethnic war. In fact, the correlations between rape and the other three human rights
violations decline substantially in non-ethnic war; where the highest correlation is 0.182
between government-perpetrated rape and disappearances. However, while the relation-
ship between rape and non-rape violations changes slightly depending on the type of war,
the correlations between torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings remain fairly
consistent across war types.
Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Human Rights Violations in Ethnic War
Govt Rape Conflict Rape Torture Disappearance Extra-jud Killing Mass Killing
Govt Rape 1 0.889 0.273 0.248 0.290 0.008
Conflict Rape 0.889 1 0.277 0.250 0.279 0.036
Torture 0.273 0.277 1 0.299 0.373 0.043
Disappearance 0.248 0.250 0.299 1 0.459 0.095
Extra-jud Killing 0.290 0.279 0.373 0.459 1 0.119
Mass Killing 0.008 0.036 0.043 0.095 0.119 1
Table 3: Correlation Matrix of Human Rights Violations in Non-ethnic War
Govt Rape Conflict Rape Torture Disappearance Extra-jud Killing Mass Killing
Govt Rape 1 0.718 0.052 0.182 -0.021 -0.153
Conflict Rape 0.718 1 0.146 0.143 -0.100 -0.230
Torture 0.052 0.146 1 0.359 0.249 -0.085
Disappearance 0.182 0.143 0.359 1 0.445 0.027
Extra-jud Killing -0.021 -0.100 0.249 0.445 1 0.094
Mass Killing -0.153 -0.230 -0.085 0.027 0.094 1
These differential changes suggest that the type of war has important implications
for the use of violence. Since the factors that produce and operate within the war vary
based on context (Sambanis 2001; Laitin 1995), these results support the notion that
rights violations emerging from different contexts follow different pairings and patterns.
Due to the fact that ethnic war engages notions of identity and thus, existential threat,
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scholars argue that ethnic conflict is prone to more human rights violations and extreme
violence, including rape (Tronvoll 2008, 66; Cohen 2013a; Horowitz 1985; Plmper and
Neumayer 2006; Bloom 1999). To this end, the strength of the correlations between
rape and non-rape human rights violations shown in Table 2 suggests that there may
be a specific connection between the use of rape and the context, characteristics of, or
goals within ethnic war. More specifically, since ethnic conflicts, more so than non-ethnic
conflicts, tend to involve disputes of over territory, it is reasonable to expect that there
is greater interest in removing or eliminating a population (from a land or otherwise),
and therefore a greater likelihood of using more extreme forms of violence.32 That is,
provided the characteristics (and usual goals) of ethnic war, these findings support femi-
nist literatures highlighting the conditions under which rape becomes a uniquely strong
method of warfare; as the consequences of rape (destruction of society and social fabric,
elimination of a population from a particular area, etc.) are precisely aligned with the
achievement of common goals in ethnic war. Speaking broadly, these findings reinforce
the idea that not all human rights violations are used equally and interchangeably across
all contexts.33
In addition to the bivariate correlation tests, a series of proportional odds logistic
regressions were used to assess the relationship between rape and non-rape human rights
violations. The regressions in Tables 4 and 5 investigate the extent to which ‘common’
violations of physical integrity predict the use of rape in conflict. Three models were esti-
32For instance, the dataset for this dissertation contains a total of 291 non-ethnic conflict-years, and
yet there is not a single territorial conflict among them. That is, across the 86 conflicts analyzed for this
project, territorial war only occurs in ethnic war.
33For reference, Table 15 in the appendix provides the results of Welch’s two-sample t-tests; exploring
the difference of means between rape and other human rights violations. For the vast majority of
comparisons we are able to reject the null; recognizing a statistically significant difference between the
means of rape compared with those of the other three types of human rights violation. Though it could
be the case that the means are always different, and at the same time, that rape and other violations
still increase with other, the comparison is provided as additional confirmation for the uniqueness and
distinction between the forms of violence. The exceptions to statistical significance are the pairwise
relationships between conflict-level rape and torture, and government-perpetrated rape and extra-judicial
killings in both ethnic and non-ethnic war. Only in these four cases do we fail to reject the null.
These four deviations are most likely explained by issues of data availability and measurement. The
lack of statistically different means between rape and torture, as well as extra-judicial killings and
government perpetrated rape reiterate the need for better specified (and thus distinguished) human
rights measurements.
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Table 4: Do Other Human Rights Violations Predict Government-perpetrated Rape?
DV: Government Rape across All War
(model 1) (model 2) (model 3)
Torture 0.907∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗ 0.995∗∗∗
(0.217) (0.213) (0.214)
Disappearances 0.289∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.101)
Extra-judicial Killing 0.507∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.156)
Observations 727 727 727
AIC 1306.8 1314.2 1311.7
PRE 0.000 0.000 0.000
ePRE 0.055 0.049 0.048
R-square 0.111 0.097 0.101
DV: Government Rape in Ethnic War
(model 1) (model 2) (model 3)
Torture 1.322∗∗∗ 1.506∗∗∗ 1.400∗∗∗
(0.294) (0.287) (0.291)
Disappearances 0.248∗ 0.462∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.116)
Extra-judicial Killing 0.818∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗
(0.204) (0.190)
Observations 513 513 513
AIC 926.4 942.0 928.2
PRE 0.000 0.000 0.000
ePRE 0.090 0.074 0.085
R-square 0.183 0.149 0.176
DV: Government Rape in Non-ethnic War
(model 1) (model 2) (model 3)
Torture −0.048 −0.100 0.264
(0.356) (0.353) (0.334)
Disappearances 0.781∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗
(0.259) (0.229)
Extra-judicial Killing −0.559 −0.105
(0.342) (0.300)
Observations 214 214 214
AIC 334.1 334.7 342.2
PRE 0.000 0.000 0.000
ePRE 0.034 0.027 0.002
R-square 0.062 0.047 0.004
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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mated for each of the rape variables.34 The first model contains all three ‘common’ human
rights violations. In order to account for any distortions due to collinearity, the second
and third models separate extra-judicial killings from disappearances, given that they are
correlated above a 0.4. Table 4 displays the regression results for non-rape human rights
violations on government-perpetrated rape. Here, three points become particularly im-
portant. At first glance, the statistical significance appears to contradict the information
from the correlation matrices. However, a closer review of the AIC, PRE and ePRE scores
reveals poor model fit and an overall lack of substantive significance. Specifically, across
all war types, the combination of torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings, at
best, allows us to predict 5.5% of the variation in government-perpetrated rape (based
on ePRE value). In probabilistic terms, the same variation could likely be explained by
error. Second, as was revealed in the correlation matrices, the picture changes somewhat
when we consider the impact of ethnic war. In ethnic war, the predictive capacity of
the non-rape variables on the use of government-perpetrated rape increases marginally.
All non-rape human rights violations retain statistical significance and have the potential
to explain 9% of the variation in the dependent variable (though again, at least half of
which could be attributable to error).
In the context of non-ethnic war, however, virtually all of the power of non-rape human
rights violations to predict the use of government-perpetrated rape vanishes. In fact,
torture and extra-judicial killings flip their signs and lose statistical significance, leaving
only disappearances with a statistically significant impact on the use of government-
leveraged rape. Though model fit scores improve slightly, the overall model is close to
powerless. With an ePRE score of 0.034, at best the non-rape variables might predict
roughly 3% of the variation in government-leveraged rape. Table 5 shows the same
34Notably, in non-ethnic war, the use of rape never reached the highest ordinal value. That is, rape
never reached the level of being “tactical.” Relative to government perpetrated rape in non-ethnic war,
there were 142 observations of no rape reports, 61 observations of infrequent rape, 11 observations of
frequent rape, and 0 observations of tactical rape. For conflict-level rape in non-ethnic war, there were
120 observations of no rape reports, 64 observations of infrequent rape, and 30 observations of frequent
rape. In ethnic war, the distribution of government-perpetrated rape included 329 observations of no
rape reports, 95 observations of infrequent rape, 75 observations of frequent rape, and 14 observations
of tactical rape. For conflict-level rape in ethnic war there were 303 observations of no rape reports, 92
observations of infrequent rape, 96 observations of frequent rape, and 22 observations of tactical rape.
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Table 5: Do Other Human Rights Violations Predict Conflict-level Rape?
DV: Conflict-Level Rape across All War
(model 1) (model 2) (model 3)
Torture 0.965∗∗∗ 1.032∗∗∗ 1.054∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.195) (0.195)
Disappearances 0.292∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.096)
Extra-judicial Killing 0.319∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.140)
Observations 727 727 727
AIC 1474.0 1476.4 1479.8
PRE 0.000 0.000 0.000
ePRE 0.050 0.048 0.044
R-square 0.107 0.101 0.096
DV: Conflict-level Rape in Ethnic War
(model 1) (model 2) (model 3)
Torture 1.110∗∗∗ 1.270∗∗∗ 1.187∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.247) (0.250)
Disappearances 0.256∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.112)
Extra-judicial Killing 0.665∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.171)
Observations 513 513 513
AIC 1029.3 1041.2 1031.7
PRE 0.000 0.000 0.000
ePRE 0.075 0.063 0.071
R-square 0.161 0.134 0.152
DV: Conflict-level Rape in Non-ethnic War
(model 1) (model 2) (model 3)
Torture 0.570∗ 0.474 0.817∗∗
(0.343) (0.336) (0.328)
Disappearances 0.622∗∗∗ 0.360∗
(0.232) (0.205)
Extra-judicial Killing −0.888∗∗∗ −0.531∗
(0.319) (0.283)
Observations 214 214 214
AIC 405.3 411.2 410.9
PRE -0.021 0.000 -0.011
ePRE 0.041 0.024 0.020
R-square 0.084 0.043 0.045
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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series of regression results for the three non-rape human rights violations on conflict-
level rape. Following a similar pattern as that evidenced in Table 4, we see the broad
statistical significance accompanied by poor model fit scores and low predictive capacity.35
Finally, the output for models in non-ethnic war suggests that models are not robust
to changes. Here, extra-judicial killings appears to be necessary for torture to reach
statistical significant and also seems to augment the significance of the disappearances
variable. While torture retains a positive sign, the extra-judicial killings variable becomes
negative in non-ethnic war, just as it did in the government-perpetrated rape models.
Here, the negative sign would seem to suggest that increases in extra-judicial killings
result in decreases in conflict-level rape. One plausible explanation is that murder is
place of rape, as has been noted in the Sri Lankan civil war (see Wood 2009). However,
at this stage an equally likely explanation is that the unexpected sign is a product of the
lack of controls and errors in data and measurement. That said, Tables 4 and 5 reiterate
the conclusions drawn from the correlation matrices, offering broad support of the first
hypothesis. Specifically, results indicate that the use of rape does not covary with more
‘common’ human rights violations in the same way they correlate with each other. Here,
war context matters. The relationship between rape and other violations is strongest in
the context of ethnic war. In non-ethnic war, there is virtually no relationship between
the use of rape and the use of other human rights violations.36
Directly addressing the relationships between variables, exploratory factor analysis
was used to assess the relative multidimensionality of the human rights measures. To
briefly explain, exploratory factor analysis is a method for analyzing covariation among a
set of observed variables in which the researcher makes no a priori assumptions about the
relationships among factors. Factor analysis searches for joint variations in the observed
35In fact, relative to the levels of rape, models reveal that if one were to guess a value of zero, the
guess would be correct more than 50% of the time, regardless of the type of war or the type of rape. In
particular, relative to non-ethnic war, if 0 was assumed for government-perpetrated rape, the estimate
would be right 66.4% of the time; for conflict-level rape, 0 would be correct 56% of the time. In ethnic
war, a 0 estimate for government-perpetrated rape would be correct 64% of the time; for conflict-level
rape, 0 would be right 59.1% of the time. Across all war, an estimate of 0 for government-perpetrated
rape would be correct 64.8% of the time; for conflict-level rape, 0 would be right 58.2% of the time.
36Here, models are presented for purely exploratory purposes. While these regressions can be illus-
trative for understanding general relationships, the results must be interpreted cautiously as full models
(complete with controls) were not specified.
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variables that may be ‘caused’ or motivated by unobserved, latent variables. That is,
interdependencies between observed variables are used to reduce the set of variables in
the dataset to reflect a smaller number of underlying constructs. Thus, a factor refers to
a latent construct that ‘causes’ variation in the observed variables. Algebraically, factors
are estimated using linear combinations of observed variables. In turn, the set weight
for each factor gives the factor score coefficients for that factor. Subsequently, analogous
to Pearson’s r, factor loading is the percent of variance in the observed variables that is
explained by the latent factor. So, where the uniqueness of an observed variable is the
variance unexplained by latent factors (and is therefore unique to that variable), commu-
nality refers to the variance within the observed variable that is accounted for by all the
factors (i.e., Uniqueness = 1-communality).
Table 6: Factor Analysis: Uniqueness and Loadings Scores
Uniqueness Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Conflict-level Rape 0.02 0.80 0.29
Government Rape 0.15 1.00
Rebel Rape 0.07 0.97
Torture 0.77 0.43
Disappearances 0.58 0.65
Extra-judicial Killing 0.45 0.75
Mass Killing 0.96
SS loadings 1.66 1.20 1.05
Proportion Var 0.24 0.17 0.15
Cumulative Var 0.24 0.41 0.56
Note: p = 0.165; using promax rotation
Table 6 shows the results of factor analysis performed on all variables, including rebel-
perpetrated rape (for comparative purposes) and mass killing. The low uniqueness, high
commonality, and high loadings scores of conflict-level rape and government-perpetrated
rape indicate that the same underlying construct motivates variance in both measures of
rape. In contrast, the force underlying rebel-perpetrated rape stands largely on its own.
Equally, note that measures of rape are not represented by the same factor as are the
three CIRI human rights violations. This finding further supports the first hypothesis
suggesting that rape does not covary in the same way as do other forms of violence;
adding credence to the idea that rape is used tactically or symbolically to accomplisher
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larger, strategic objectives.
Relative to the unidimensionality of the CIRI measures, the factor analysis output is
consistent with the earlier results from the bivariate correlation tests. Here, the output
suggests that the construct underlying torture may be different than the latent force un-
derlying extra-judicial killings and disappearances. The high uniqueness score for the tor-
ture measure (0.77) and relatively lower loading score on the second factor (0.43) indicates
that torture may have a more unique, independent motivator than do disappearances and
extra-judicial killings. This is, in many ways, expected as many who are disappeared are
later found to be dead. Nevertheless, these scores indicate that Cingranelli and Richard’s
(1999) unidimensional scale of human rights may not be appropriate; as scores are not
high enough across all three CIRI measures to suggest a single latent factor.
At the bottom of Table 6, the proportional variance score gives the proportion of
variance accounted for by the factor, while the cumulative variances gives the cumulative
proportion of variance accounted for by this factor in combination with all previous
factors. At best, the cumulative variance explained by all three factors accounts for
roughly 56% of the variation in the observed variables. To this end, the fact that the
mass killing variable did not load on any of the three factors, and instead retained a
uniqueness score of 0.96, suggests that mass killing is distinct from all other human
rights violations accounted for here. Certainly, in support of the second hypothesis, these
results provide some confirmation that mass killings do not share a strongly causal force
with occurrences of rape in conflict. However, it is equally important to note that while
rape is not strongly aligned with mass killings, mass killings are not strongly aligned
with other human rights violations. That is, not only is rape distinct from mass killing,
but mass killings are distinct unto themselves. Overall, provided the low proportional
variance scores, there is cause to reject the idea that human rights violations exist on a
unidimensional scale. Rather, misalignment remains, and greater efforts to disaggregate
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(and potentially re-aggregate) human rights violations are necessary.37
Speaking to the second hypothesis, Tables 2, 3, and 7 provide some interesting in-
sights. Comparing the correlation matrix of variables in ethnic war presented in Table 2
with the correlations from non-ethnic war in Table 3, the sign change in the mass killing
variable becomes particularly important.38 That is, where rape and mass killing evidence
a positive relationship in ethnic war, there appears to be a negative relationship between
the two variables in non-ethnic war. Noted earlier, there is a stronger (positive) relation-
ship between all human rights violations in ethnic war than in non-ethnic war. Coupled
with the evidenced negative relationship in non-ethnic war, the results here have two
important implications. First, these findings challenge Mullins’ (2009) assertions that
rape is more so a product of mass killings than it is a characteristic of ethnic war. In
fact, the output presented here directly contradicts that assertion; showing a positive
relationship between rape and ethnic war, and a relationship between mass killing and
rape with is specifically conditioned by ethnic war. Second, to the extent that rape is
prohibited or avoided in non-ethnic war, there is support for the idea that the distinctive
characteristics and/or outcomes of rape make it a particularly attractive weapon in eth-
nic conflicts. While more research is necessary, this finding provides a particularly strong
platform from which to investigate strategic uses of rape in war.
Table 7 identifies the number of mass-killings that occurred at each level of the rape
variables for which rape was present. The numbers not only indicate that rape is inde-
pendent of mass-killings, but that mass-killings typically happen when there are lower
37While it is outside the scope of this research to provide a full discussion on the pros and cons of
the factor analysis technique, it is fair to say that factor analysis is only as good as data allow. The
method is not flawless and it is possible that more than one interpretation can be made of the same
data factored in the same way. Nevertheless, factor analysis provides yet another tool to understand the
interrelationships and covariation among human rights measures. While no one method provides a de-
terminative conclusion, understanding the ways in which different instruments interpret and relate these
complex constructs can only aid in creating a more complete picture of their relative interdependence.
38There are 108 instances of mass-killing in the dataset, and 733 instances of no mass-killing. Of the
108 observations, 54 of them occurred in ethnic war and 54 occurred in non-ethnic war.
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levels of rape.39 The Welch t-test for mass-killings and government rape revealed a statis-
tically significant difference between means at the alpha 0.05 level. A subsequent Welch
test between mass-killings and conflict-level rape also revealed a statistically significant
relationship. These results provide additional confirmation that rape is not merely a
byproduct of mass-killings and should not be expected to covary with mass killings in
the same way that other, ‘common’ human rights violations covary with one another.40
Though the tests presented here are simple, they are consistent and sufficient to establish
broad relational patterns between rape and other types of human rights violations.
Table 7: Distribution of Mass-killings Relative to Rape in Civil War
Rape Source Level of Rape Incidents of Mass-killing
Ethnic War
Conflict-Level Rape Occasional Rape 10
Frequent Rape 11
Mass Rape 6
Government Rape Occasional Rape 9
Frequent Rape 8
Mass Rape 2
Rebel Rape Occasional Rape 6
Frequent Rape 7
Mass Rape 5
Non-Ethnic War
Conflict-Level Rape Occasional Rape 11
Frequent Rape 2
Mass Rape 0
Government Rape Occasional Rape 9
Frequent Rape 2
Mass Rape 0
Rebel Rape Occasional Rape 4
Frequent Rape 0
Mass Rape 0
39Here, it is important to keep in mind the weaknesses in the data. It is entirely possible, and even
likely in some cases that victims of mass-killings were raped prior to their murder. Often, in these
instances, reports of those rapes would only occur if a witness or combatant reported the experience. In
fact, there are many qualitative studies that detail interviews with and personal narratives from former
combatants who reveal the violent tactics and processes they (and their compatriots / commanders) used
in the conflicts (for instance, see Cain 1999; Alexandra 2010). However, much of the data on rape relies
on the self-reporting that occurs at the NGOs and/or medical facilities in which the rape victims seek
care. Since murdered rape victims do not seek care or self report, there are no data available that can
truly reveal the extent to which rape occurs at mass-killings. At present, however, this research uses the
data that are available to make the most-informed, albeit far from flawless, inferences. For an innovative
approach to dealing with data challenges challenges, see Potts et al. (2011).
40For reference, relational patterns were also explored between the rape variables and the presence
of genocide. In all three war categories (all war, ethnic war only, and non-ethnic war only), the lowest
number observations for genocide occurred at the highest levels of rape. Once again, this is particularly
relevant for non-ethnic wars, in which the highest level of rape is never achieved. Thus, the lowest
number of genocide observations occurred at rape level 2 (“frequent rape”). Correlation tests were also
performed using the number of conflict deaths. Across all wars, mass-killing correlates with genocide at
0.60 and with deaths at 0.40; deaths and genocide correlate at 0.33. In ethnic war, mass-killing correlates
with genocide at 0.54 and with deaths at 0.30. In non-ethnic war, mass-killing correlates with genocide
at 0.66 and with deaths at 0.46.
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Conclusion
This chapter explored broad-scale patterns in the use of rape compared to other
forms of violence; specifically, other violations against physical integrity. In support
of both hypotheses, findings from this research suggest three important points. First,
the results here challenge literature advocating for a unidimensional concept of human
rights (Cingranelli and Richards 1999). Preliminary evidence highlights that human
rights violations may not be strictly scalar, nor unidimensional. In fact, the comparisons
presented here show that forms of violence are not used equally and interchangeably
across all types of war, as levels of rape do not covary in the same way as other common
‘side effects’ of war. Rather, data from this chapter reveal that wartime rape may be
used instead of other forms of violence. In turn, several potentialities exist. First, using
Mokken scale analysis to test rape with other forms of human rights violence will provide
valuable insights into the unidimensionality argument. Additionally, it is plausible that
relationships between forms of violence, and the extent to which they are scalar or inter-
related may differ across war-types.
As well, further exploration into the connections between the symbolic meanings and
strategic use of rape is imperative. Here, it is possible that armed groups committing
tactical and mass rapes are focused on imposing the kind of outcomes typical of (if not
unique to) wartime rape. Alternately, it could be that the mechanisms allowing armed
groups to control combatant behavior are different for differing types of human rights
violations. Where institutional arrangements or group dynamics may allow for some
behavior modification among combatants, it is likely that not all behaviors are so easily
modified. That is, the ability and incentives to promote and/or inhibit certain combatant
behaviors are likely to change not only within the context of the conflict, but among the
armed groups within that conflict. Subsequently, in support of McCormick and Mitchell
(1997), these analyses extend advocations to better differentiate between measures of
human rights, and therefore better understand the complex mechanisms that motivate
or inhibit the violation of those rights.
Second, this research buttresses arguments emphasizing the differences between ethnic
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and non-ethnic war and the impact of those differences on the expression, length, and
processes of conflict. The results here lay groundwork for the argument that the goals
and problems that characterize ethnic war also have a determinative impact on the types
of violence used by armed groups within the war. As much, the changing relationship
between rape and mass killing (and to a lesser extent between extra-judicial killing and
rape) based on the type of war suggests that war type may condition the choice and level
of violence used in conflict. By using the differences between ethnic and non-ethnic war
as a point of entry, this work extends the work of Wood (2006, 2008, 2009), Mitchell and
McCormick (1988), Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) and others emphasizing the politics
of violence. In particular, the form of violence depend on its meaning to social actors in
a cultural context (Ellis 1995; Wood 2008). More than a mere side-effect of mass-killings,
genocides, institutional weakness or conflict induced chaos, the social nature of violence,
and of rape more specifically, forces it into the political bargaining space. In this way,
rape is just as likely to be used as a coercive means to achieve a goal.
Finally, the analyses here and the challenges presented reiterate the need to focus
on concept development and appropriately operationalized measurement instruments.
Future research should expand efforts to disaggregate human rights violations and deter-
mine the extent of the relationships between different forms of violence and the conditions
under which certain (seemingly) prescriptive combinations emerge. Only with sensitive
measurement instruments can we avoid the problems of collinearity that confound an
accurate assessment of the differential patterns in human rights violations. Additionally,
with the vast majority of research focusing on human rights abuses by state governments,
efforts to better record and understand rebel violations are paramount to a holistic un-
derstanding of dyadic (or polyadic) conflict. We necessarily, though unintentionally, limit
our own progression by continuing to examine human rights abuses from a single side of
the conflict. In this sense, data collection, issues of conceptualization and measurement,
and increasing the number of two-sided large-N analyses is imperative.
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Chapter 3
Explaining Rebel-leveraged Rape
“Those who can make you believe
absurdities can make you commit
atrocities.”
Voltaire
Why do some insurgent groups use rape pervasively while others hardly use it all? What
explains variation in the use of rape across rebels groups? While there is broad consensus
that patterns of violence vary across conflicts and armed groups (de Waal et al. 2014;
Suhrke 2010; Valentino et al. 2004; Wood 2006, 2008, 2009; Sann and Wood 2014; Cohen
2013a; Leiby 2009; Bourke 2007), there is a paucity of information and theory specific
to violent patterns by rebel groups (Davenport 2007). Yet, there is no reason to expect
that non-state insurgencies have the same resources, motivations, goals or strategies as
the state. That is, if violent means are used to pursue a particular end, and we know
that states and insurgencies often seek different ends, it is only logical that they would
employ different means. In turn, the purpose of this research is to better understand the
factors that explain variance in rebel use of wartime rape. The objectives of this chapter
are three-fold. First, the presented literature will highlight theoretical weaknesses in
existing theories of wartime rape, with particular focus on group-level theories. Next, a
preference-based theory of wartime rape will be offered as a way of addressing theoretical
weaknesses. Finally, the preference-based theory will be applied separately to ethnic and
non-ethnic war in order to determine how the type of war impacts the explanatory power
of the models.
In turn, this analysis makes three contributions to existing literature on sexual vi-
olence in conflict. Most broadly, this research contributes to a body of work seeking
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to understand sexually violent patterns exemplified by non-state armed groups. While
there is a rich qualitative literature evaluating rebel motivations for wartime rape (Wood
2009; Bloom 1999; Leiby 2009; Sharlach 2000), quantitative analyses are only beginning
to emerge. In turn, the analyses here offer statistical insights into broad patterns in rebel
violence. To that end, this work represents the first large-N study of rebel group leader-
ship preferences for rape in civil war. In all, this research examines leadership preferences
across 86 civil conflicts between 1980 and 2009. Finally, this study illustrates that an
appropriate account of the type of war is paramount to understanding the strength and
weaknesses of new and existing theories. That is, the explanatory power of theoretical
models varies considerably based on whether they are applied in ethnic versus non-ethnic
war.
Theories of Wartime Rape
Individual-level Theories
Generally speaking, theories of wartime rape can be classified by the level of anal-
ysis. Bio-determinist and bio-social theories sit at the individual-level, social cohesion
and other sociological theories sit at the group-level, and cultural or institutional theories
largely exist at the state-level. While psychological theories offered some of the earliest
explanations for rape (Amir 1971), these and other biology-based explanations struggle
to explain group-level patterns in the use of sexual violence. Where bio-determinism ex-
plains rape as a product of genetics, biosocial theories argue that the motive for wartime
rape is the innate sexual desire of individual fighters, but that the phenomena cannot
be distinguished from sociocultural context (Gottschall 2004, 134). While the biologi-
cal motivators range from hormone levels (Wood 2006) and primal drives for reproduc-
tion (Thornhill and Palmer 2000; Wood 2006, 2008), to socio-chemical (mal)adaptations
(Gould and Lewontin 1979) and illness (Amir 1971), or to an intrinsic heterosexuality
‘unleashed’ by war (Sierfert 1996; Baaz and Stern 2009; Goldstein 2001), the conclusions
are the same. If rape is a product of some primal or otherwise genetic need within males,
why don’t all men rape? If there is a need to propagate the species, why do we see the
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extreme violence (rape with objects, mutilations, murder, etc.) that so often accompanies
wartime rape? Simply stated, these biology-based individual-level explanations cannot
explain variation in the levels of rape within and between conflicts or among groups.
State-level Theories
On the other side of the spectrum are state-level explanations. Feminist literature has
made the most significant contributions to the development of state-level theories. To
this end, there are three broad arguments. First, citing both conscious and unconscious
expressions of dominance, scholars argue that wartime rape is a product of rape cultures
or rape-prone societies (Siefert 1992, 1993; Sanday 2003). In particular, higher levels of
rape would be expected in societies in which male power has been destabilized, women
have subordinate status and are held in low esteem, and in the presence of rigid definitions
of “masculine” and “feminine” that define a gendered hierarchy (Siefert 1993, 2). Citing
the example of the United States with its strong women’s movement and correspondingly
unstable male power, nearly all modern Western societies would be expected to experience
more frequent occurrences of rape (Siefert 1993, 1996). In contrast, rape free societies
are those in which male supremacy is completely unchallenged (Siefert 1992, 1993).
However, Siefert’s (1992) hypotheses challenge another prominent state-level argu-
ment; namely that gender inequality facilitates the acceptance of violence against women
(Cohen 2013a). Here, customs, practices, institutions, and various legislation serve as
forces that discriminate against women (Heit 2009; Brown 2012, Alison 2007). Siefert’s
(1992) argument implies that a greater power-disparity, so long as it isn’t challenged,
should translate to low levels or the absence of rape.41 In contrast, proponents of the
gender equality argument emphasize that a patriarchal social order reinforces the dehu-
manization of women, contributes to male beliefs about sexual privilege, and conditions
41Siefert’s (1992, 1993, 1994, and 1996) works are far more complex than this singular, simplified
hypothesis. However, it merits mention that the notion of rape free societies is difficult to accept.
For instance, if the argument is that rape-free societies are those in which existing arrangements are
unchallenged, this would be akin to arguing that war-free societies are those in which there is no conflict.
While true, the argument is endogenous. As much, it would be erroneous to believe that there are no
challenges to women’s right in Islamic countries (argued to be rape-free societies); in which case the
argument rests on the degree of challenge or unrest, which is also quite problematic.
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men to distrust, despise, and dominate women (Brown 2012). Thus, the greater the
inequality between men and women, the more likely we are to witness “warrior rapists”
acting out their contempt for women while reifying male-dominant gendered arrange-
ments (Brownmiller 1975; Siefert 1994; Gottschall 2004; Wood 2006, 326). In this way,
rape becomes a strategy for men to dominate and suppress women.
Despite the logic of the arguments, there is little very empirical support linking the
use of widespread rape to patriarchal societies (Gottschall 2004; Wood 2009). These,
as well as more broad cultural arguments, struggle to explain why wartime rape is per-
petrated similarly in areas with vastly different socialization experiences, or why rape
is used at different rates within conflicts between culturally homogenous groups (Sann
and Wood 2014; Gottschall 2004). That is, theories measured at the state level cannot
explain variation among armed groups. While there are likely very important and ap-
plicable theoretical points, measurements are too insensitive to capture variation at the
group-level. Thus, to truly understand the use of rape, theories must capture changes
and elements within and between armed units at the group-level.
Group-level Theories
Group-level theories resolve the primary weakness of individual-level and state-level
theories in that they are able to explain the varying use of rape by culturally homogeneous
groups within the same conflict and similarities between heterogeneous groups across
time and conflicts. There are two dominant theoretical camps that explain rape at the
group-level of analysis; these include theories of social cohesion, and theories based in the
symbolic meaning of rape. Most recently, supported by literature suggesting that gang
rape builds social bonds, camaraderie, induces feelings of power or victory, improves
morale, and can offer a way to build intra-group social status (Benard 1994; Card 1996;
Sanday 2007; Franklin 2004; Morrow 1993; Wood 2008, 2009; Groth 1979), Cohen (2013a)
offered a social cohesion theory of wartime rape. The author argues that that a central
challenge for armed forces is creating a coherent fighting unit out of a group of frightened
strangers who have no existing loyalties to the group. In these cases, rape can be a tool
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for creating social bonds among unfamiliar combatants. Since cohesion among fighters
who have been abducted or otherwise forcibly recruited by their peers is unlikely to form
spontaneously, Cohen (2013a) argues that gang rape becomes an important instrument
of socialization that is used solidify bonds among group members; ultimately creating
a sense of cohesion and loyalty among members. Thus, when trapped in a group of
hostile strangers, individuals are likely to choose participation in (potentially) costly
group behavior over continued estrangement from their new peers (Cohen 2013a, 465).42
Simply stated, the central hypothesis is that levels of rape should be higher where there
are greater rates of abduction.
Both theoretically and empirically, however, there are significant weaknesses in Co-
hen’s (2013a) theory. Most centrally, Cohen’s (2013a) social cohesion hypothesis doesn’t
address why rape (or more specifically, gang rape), as opposed to other forms of vio-
lence, is used as a bonding exercise. There are substantial literatures in criminal justice
(particularly those dealing in gang violence), as well as sports and military sciences that
discuss the relationship between violence and social bonds within groups. The crucial
point is that while rape can be a bonding experience, it is by no means the strongest
or modal method of bond creation. In fact, scholars cite football, beatings, non-rape
forms of terrorist violence, ritualistic physical abuse (routine sleep deprivation, succes-
sive bouts of physical exertions - i.e., drills, etc.) and academic hazing, as well as songs,
slang, customs and ceremonies as forces that create social cohesion between current (and
often past) group members (see Sageman 2004; McCoy 1995; Athens 1992; Kruglanski
et al. 2014). So, why rape? Cohen’s (2013a) theory of social cohesion fails to make a
convincing argument for the use of rape, specifically, in building social bonds between
combatants.
In a related vein, Cohen (2013a) argues that gang rape is a form of performative
violence that signals combatants are willing to take risks to remain in the group. However,
it is difficult to believe that all, or even most rapes in war are performances. Plus, while
42For clarification, the author notes that rape carries grave risks to the perpetrator, including the
potential for contracting sexually transmitted infections, the emotional toll experienced because of the
physical contact required, and the fact that rape takes longer to commit than other acts of violence
(thereby increasing risk to personal safety from would-be defenders of the victim).
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scholars cite general increases in gang rapes during war, there is widespread recognition
that the use of rape in all forms increases during conflict. Certainly it would be a
stretch to argue that the preponderance of wartime rapes are gang rapes. Yet, if the
rape is a performative act used to gain social standing and acceptance in a group, then
what explains the broad scale increase in individually-perpetrated rapes? Are these also
performative? Furthermore, if the act of rape (gang or otherwise) serves the purpose of
social bonding, then it would suggest that all women have an equal chance of becoming
victims. If the point is to commit rape for the sake of rape, then what explains the
selection of the victims? Arguably demonstrating that you are willing to rape a member
of your own group would suggest that it is all the easier to rape a member of an out-
group. In the end, the theory of social cohesion raises more questions than it answers.
To boot, it would seem that whether a soldier voluntarily joined a group of strangers or
was abducted into a group of strangers, the same problem persists: an individual is now
a member of a group with whom s/he has no familiarity or bond. As the same underlying
logic applies, this suggests that social cohesion would be a necessary construct across all
new recruits in all militaries. Once again, we are left unable to explain empirical variation
in the use of rape across groups and conflicts.
While Cohen’s (2013a) use of social cohesion as a motivating force faces significant
challenges, her supposition that group-level theories promise the strongest explanations
for wartime rape and her original dataset bring us ever-closer to an answer. In fact, Wood
(2009) and Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) argue that groups with low cohesion are
unable to effectively police combatants and enforce standards of behavior. Is it possible
that low social cohesion is a byproduct of motivating force responsible for the use of
rape? That is, to what extent do the power, purpose, and preferences of the armed group
impact the forms of violence used by that group? If group leadership is more radical, and
thus more willing to use abduction and other violent methods against its own group, then
it is logical to assume that cadres are at once less socially cohesive and more likely to use
rape against an enemy out-group. That is, based on Cohen’s (2013a) analysis, it seems
that social cohesion matters in some cases, but not across all cases and perhaps not in
66
the originally theorized way. To that end, this work seeks to develop a new theory that
relates, but ultimately redirects and repackages ‘social cohesion’ variables into measures
of organizational control and preferences. To do so, however, assumes that there is a
shared understanding about the distinctiveness of rape as a weapon of war. To this end,
an account of the meaning of rape is necessary.
At the root of symbolism-based arguments is the relationship between gender inequal-
ity and the conflict in which wartime rape occurs (Siefert 1992, 1993; Hansen 2001; HRW
2004; Koo 2002; Cohen 2013a; MacKinnon 1994; Baron and Straus 1989). For instance,
discussing the militarization of women’s lives, Enloe (2000) points out that women are
stereotypically associated with a need for protection, peacefulness, and life-giving. In
contrast, men are associated with protecting, warring, and killing (Enloe 1990, 2000;
Goldstein 2001; Higate and Hopton 2005; Pin-Fat and Stern 2005). These associations
render women and girls particularly vulnerable to the logics of rape as a weapon of war
(Enloe 2000). In this way, rape can be used as an affront to those seen as her protectors;
namely, men. Thus, mass rape becomes an assault against manhood and national honor
as it shames not just the victim, but her husband and other male relatives who failed to
protect her (Cohen 2013a; Benard 1994; Green 2006; Seifert 1996; Baaz and Stern 2009;
Bastick et al. 2007; Hansen 2001; Wood 2006, 2009; Brownmiller 1975; Kohn 1994).
More broadly, a woman’s body becomes the symbolic representation of the body politic
and rape of women is the symbolic rape of the national or communal body (Mookherjee
2008; Siefert 1994). This can also explain why ‘enemy’ women are targeted for sexual
violence, as women are both literally and symbolically at the core of maintaining an
ethno-national group (Alison 2007). Stated plainly, the gendered-nature of rape deter-
mines (in large part) the symbolic meanings of rape in a given context, which in turn
helps to define the costs and benefits associated with the use of rape in war.
The idea of symbolism as a weapon, expressed here through rape, is supported by
Siefert (1992) who argues that rape does not have the same function across time or
societies. Rather, the purpose of rape depends on the respective historical and cultural
context. The symbolic understanding of rape makes it a particularly powerful weapon in
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ethnic war. For instance, Hayden (2000) notes that in secessionist wars, rape increases
hatred and fosters the idea that life together is finished (32). Given that many ethnic wars
are territorial, the use of sexual violence serves not only to accomplish tangible objectives,
but to reify (or destroy) group identities and boundaries. In fact, just as ethnic war
is characterized by an ideology the encompasses an understanding of identity, Kalyvas
(1999), Roux (2011), and McCormick and Mitchell (1997) argue that the ideology within a
conflict justifies (if not predicts) the means of violence. This, however, is where literature
on the symbolic use of rape stalls. While the symbolic meaning of rape suggests contexts
in which rape may be used, there is no specific mechanism that can explain variation
in the use of rape between groups or conflicts. Although symbolism is important for
building a more complete theory of wartime rape, in and of itself it is not sufficient to
explain the phenomenon on a larger scale.
Here I offer the ‘missing link’ that connects group-level theories discussing characteris-
tics of the armed group with literature on the symbolic meaning behind rape as a weapon
of war; namely, leadership intention. The contention in this research is that the same
factors that impact an understanding of identity and assign meaning to various modes of
violence, also define the set of violent alternatives available to armed leadership. Already
scholars widely recognize the political alignment between leadership ideology, goals, and
modalities of violence (Wood 2006, 2008, 2009; Bloom 1999; Sharlach 2000; Farr 2009;
Hayden 2000). However, the relationship between rape, identity, and political objectives
has far-reaching implications that have yet to be explored. Whether the intention is to
use a specific form of violence in the hopes of accomplishing a goal, or to inhibit a partic-
ular form of violence in order to prevent undesirable consequences, the point is that the
intention drives the expression of violence. Thus, insofar as armed group leaders have
knowledge of conflict goals and an awareness of the effects of different violent tactics,
leadership has incentives to perpetrate or control certain tactics based on their objec-
tives. Otherwise stated, this work argues that there is an alignment between the political
objectives of leadership and the modalities of war. To develop this line of thought more
thoroughly, a preference-based theory of wartime rape is proffered below.
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Preference-based Theory of Wartime Rape
The preference-based theory of wartime rape (PTWR) advanced in the first chapter
argues that violence is a form of social and political action; a deliberate choice within
a bargaining model of conflict. Here, it is assumed that violence is the outcome of an
elite calculous of costs and benefits based on the leadership preferences. In turn, wartime
rape is seen as the coherent, coordinated, and logical means of prosecuting warfare in a
given context, to a strategic end (Allen 1996; Wood 2006, 2008, 2009; Littlewood 1997;
Thomas and Regan 1994; Enloe 2000).
There are three interrelated logics that shape the expression of violence, and in par-
ticular, rape; these include leadership ideology, leadership goals, and leadership capacity.
The impact of leadership ideology on conflict is widely recognized (Kalyvas 1999, 2006;
Hayden 2000; Wood 2006, 2008, 2009; McCormick and Mitchell 1997; Mitchell and Mc-
Cormick 1988), albeit under-studied. In her discussion of the three phases of gross human
rights violations, Roux (2011) explains the second phase as the ideological phase. During
this phase, leadership formulates the ideology guiding the war (653). Using historical
examples, Roux (2011) argues that varying facets of state authority serve to generate
an appropriate ideology in order to perform the necessary nationalist dirty work. Subse-
quently, human rights violations are the implementation of the formulated theory, belief,
or ideology and the victims are part of, and located within, the perpetrators’ societies
(Roux 2011, 654). Here there is space for an armed force to create an ideology that
encourages and advises the use of rape, as well as the creation of an ideology in which
rape is prohibited and punished (Hayden 2000; Kalyvas 1999).
Seeking to formally develop a way of measuring ideology, Horowitz and Ye (2013a)
devised a two-dimensional typology of leadership preferences based on nationalist goals
and principled-versus-unprincipled behavior. Relative to nationalism, the authors argue
that ideologically extreme leaders are more likely to place greater value on achieving
the ideal upside goals of war, and lesser value upon the downside risks and costs of war
(Horowitz and Ye 2014, 3). Thus, as leaders move toward the more extreme nationalist
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end of the spectrum, they become more likely to use unconventional forms of (terrorist)
violence. Where the nationalist dimension captures the ideology of the leadership, the
power-seeking dimension of the typology accounts for leadership goals. Here it is assumed
that highly power-seeking (i.e., unprincipled) leaders are more likely to care about the
political consequences for retaining power and less likely to value the intrinsic outcomes
of war (Horowitz and Ye 2013a). To this end, Wood (2008) notes that wartimes patterns
of violence, including the indiscriminate or selective targeting of individuals / civilians, as
well as the intensity and diversity of violence, are products of the strategies of armed ac-
tors. Subsequently, violence becomes permissible in one of several ways. Leadership may
make active decisions about the targeting and timing of particular populations or may
make explicit choices to prohibit or promote specific forms of violence against particular
groups; this can include delegating certain forms of violence to particular groups (i.e.,
death squads, etc.). Alternately, leaders who have not made explicit decisions on the use
of violence may be forced into making a choice or may passively accept its occurrence.
Finally, it is possible for leaders to signal to combatants that they will not be punished
for perpetrating particular acts (i.e., “atrocities by connivance”) (Osiel 1999).
One can think of the expression of leadership goals as having two components. First,
leadership goals are simultaneously a product of and a causal force behind the type of
war. Otherwise stated, leadership goals are conditioned by and reflected in the context
of the war. For instance, when leaders anticipate post-war relations with the warring
party, they are not likely tolerate sexual violence against civilians for fear of eroding
their base of support (Wood 2006, 2008, 2009). This may also be true in cases where
leadership is under international pressure to follow norms, where new leadership seeks
to establish a new social order, or where there is fear of reciprocal offenses. Provided
the goals and nature of ethnic wars, it becomes clear why particular forms of violence
(i.e., genocide, ethnic cleansing) become more common in an ethnic context. For this
reason, many scholars argue that rape is more likely in ethnic wars than in non-ethnic
wars (Bloom 1999; Plmper and Neumayer 2006). Additionally, rape can depend on the
pre-existing relationship betweens state and sub-state elites. For example, in his analysis
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state failure and fragility in West, Central, and North-East African states, de Waal (2009)
discusses a relative spectrum of patrimonialism in greater or lesser degrees as it relates
to and integrates with existing state institutions. As few institutions are capable of
exercising the monopoly on organized violence, the author argues that a political life
akin to an ‘auction of loyalties’ emerges. Here, provincial elites seek to extract from one
or other metropolitan centres the best price for their allegiance (de Waal 2009, 103). This
marketplace of loyalties becomes the space for political bargaining where local-level elites
seek to maximize the price they can obtain for their loyalty from state (government) elites
using the resources available to them (including votes, finances, guns, and/or the use of
violence), while minimizing the cost they need to pay (de Wall 2009, 103-104). In turn,
violence is less a product of formal military encounters between governments and rebels,
but more an expression of bargaining within the political marketplace; whereby fear or
threats of change result in increased violence by an order of magnitude (de Waal 2009,
105). Here, emphasis is on short term agreements, lasting 2-3 years at most, subject to
renegotiation every time conditions change. In short, existing social relationships and
institutional arrangements both define and are conditioned by the context of war. Thus,
to the extent that leadership preferences emerge from, they are also conditioned by the
wartime context. As a result, the expressed violence is a product of the interaction
between the goals and existing social and institutional arrangements. This brings us to
the second component.
The second component shaping the expression of leadership goals, and the final logic
active in the expression of preferences, is leadership capacity. Here, capacity refers to the
leaders’ abilities to work within existing institutional and social structures to fulfill goals.
That is, while it is possible that an armed group may desire to prohibit the use of sexual
violence, it is possible that fractured leadership, institutional or hierarchical weaknesses,
economic conditions, or even geography (lack of centralization) can impact the capacity of
a leader to implement or enforce an effective strategy. To this end, characteristics of the
armed group, including organizational structure and relative power become particularly
influential in conditioning the expression of violence. In short, leadership preferences,
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including ideology and strategic objectives, conditioned by the wartime context, are ex-
pected to have a determinative impact on the level of rape used by armed rebels in civil
conflict.
Variables
The dependent variable in this analysis is the level of rape perpetrated by rebel groups
in a given conflict-year. Originally developed by Cohen (2013a), rebel-perpetrated rape
is a four-level ordinal variable constructed using data from human rights organizations
such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the American Red Cross
(amongst others), as well as information from original interviews (see Cohen 2013a). The
measure consists of 4 values in which a score of 0 means no mention of rape; a score of 1
indicates infrequent or isolated reports of rape; a score of 2 refers to not irregular use of
rape, including reports in which rape is described as ‘widespread,’ ‘common,’ extensive,’
‘pattern,’ etc.; a score of 3 refers to rape described as ‘systematic,’ ‘massive,’ ‘tool of
war,’ etc.43 For purposes of comparison, the dependent variable is measured two ways;
first using the original, 4-category, ordinal scale, and second, as a dichotomous measure.
The dichotomous measure was created by collapsing the latter three ordinal categories.
Thus, 0 remains a measure of no rape reports, and levels 1, 2, and 3, are combined into
a single rape-is-used category.44
The independent variables fall into four broad categories: organizational variables,
state capacity measures, control variables, and preferences. The two organizational vari-
ables refer to factors specific to the composition and nature of the armed group. The
first organizational measure is Rebel Fracture. A dichotomous measure, rebel fracture
assumes a value of 1 when the leadership of the armed group is divided or factional, and
a value of 0 when the leadership is unified. Here, it is expected that divided leadership
43For a full list of coding rules, please refer to Table 14 in the appendix. For clarity, it should also be
noted that a coding of zero does not mean that no rape occurred in a particular conflict, only that the
State Department received no reports of its occurrence (Cohen 2013a, 466).
44The minimum value for rebel-perpetrated rape was 0 (no reports of rape), the maximum was 3
(tactical rape), and the mean was 0.44. In total there are 731 observations at 0 (519 of which are in
ethnic war); 112 observations at 1 (73 of which are in ethnic war); 102 observations at 2 (70 of which are
in ethnic war); and 39 observations at 3 (31 of which are in ethnic war).
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involves dissenting opinions (if not directly oppositional orders), uncertainty on behalf
of the cadres, and some degree of loss of control. As the hierarchy fractures, the ability
of leadership to control deviant behavior declines and there are greater opportunities for
soldiers or individual units to increase civilian abuse without fear of consequences. In
this way, it is also possible for one or more radical (“splinter”) factions to implement
increasingly violent tactics where moderate leadership would have been more restrained.
The Recruitment Index variable is an indexed measure created from Cohen’s (2013a)
rebel abduction and rebel forced variables. The abduction measure is a dummy variable
based on data gathered from State Department reports. The variable is coded a 1 if
abduction by the rebel groups was reported in a given conflict. The forced measure
indicates whether the insurgent group used coercive recruitment more generally in the
conflict (Cohen 2013a, 467).45 Both variables were scaled prior to creating the index so
as to assure the measures were equally weighted. Once scaled, the measures were added
together.46 Moving away from the weakness of the social cohesion argument, the logic here
is that rebel groups who are forcing otherwise unwilling participants into their ranks are
less professional. This lack of professionalism is evident in three ways. First, abducted
soldiers are less likely to share the same commitment to the armed group’s ideology.
Second, abductees are expected to have greater uncertainty regarding (and less overall)
trust in the leadership hierarchy, and may therefore be less likely to adhere to behavioral
regulations or restrictions. Finally, forcibly recruited individual are likely to spend less
time training and in turn, may use less conventional military tactics. Summarily, less
professional militaries are expected to be less disciplined and therefore higher levels of
45Cohen (2013a) offers examples of each of these measures. For instance, where reports included: “The
LRA regularly abducted children,” the variable was coded for abduction. In contrast, where reports
used phrases such as “ ...committed human rights violations including...forced labor and recruitment,”
the variable was coded as forced. For more detailed information on variable construction and coding
practices, please see Cohen 2013a, 467-468; 2013b.
46The recruitment measure was indexed primarily for theoretical reasons. First, Cohen’s (2013a) social
cohesion argument contends that armed groups having to abduct or ‘force’ individuals into their ranks
are more likely to have low social cohesion and are, therefore, more likely to rape. If this were true,
the same theoretical mechanism would be expected to underlie both the abduction and forced measures.
Prior to creating the index, correlation tests were performed. The rebel abduct and rebel forced variables
were correlated at 0.47.
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rape are expected.47 Additionally, an alternate index was created in the same fashion
using dummy variables that captured whether the rebel group had ever used abduction
or forced recruitment methods. Thus, where the recruitment index measures recruitment
practices within the given conflict, the Recruitment Ever variable measures whether that
rebel group has ever used such practices.48
Following prominent cross-national analyses (Fearon and Laitin 2003), the Log GDP
was included as a measure of state capacity. This is supported by a wealth of work that
finds repression decreases and economic standing increases (Poe and Tate 1994; Mitchell
and McCormick 1988). While GDP is an imperfect and much-debated measure of state
capacity, it is sufficient to provide a rough estimate of overall state resource availability
and function. To this end, three control variables are included in the models. In order
to address some of the weaknesses of log GDP as a measure of state capacity, a dummy
variable for Oil is included to account for those instance in which GDP may be ‘artificially’
inflated. A Tribal variable is also included as there is an expectation that tribal areas
operate with some autonomy; formally or informally so. As much, where governments are
perceived as illegitimate, tribal laws and customs can usurp state-stipulated practices.
Here, rebels may not fear reprisals for deviant behavior, particularly if the tribe against
whom the offenses are committed is considered an out-group. In general, the maintenance
of tribal politics suggests less control by the central state apparatus. Thus, where tribal
areas are present, levels of rape are expected to be higher.49
Finally, several variables are included to capture preferences. Following common prac-
tices in conflict literature (Chiozza and Goemans 2004), a Democracy dummy variable
was created from the polity 2 regime classification scale. Countries scoring a 6 or above
were considered democracies and coded a 1, while all others were coded as 0. Litera-
47It can also be argued that these recruitment practices are indirect reflections of radical leadership
preferences. That is, more violent recruitment processes suggest a more radicalized leadership that is
willing to use violent tactics against their in-group. Where leaders are willing to use more violent tactics
against their in-group, one would also expect increasingly violent tactics to be used against the enemy
out-group.
48The recruitment ever variable is only used to demonstrate the variability of the regression results,
and is not central to the primary analysis.
49Given that tribes are often defined by ethnic group, this follows the same rationale that motivates
rape in ethnic war. That is, ethnic rivalries are expected to produce greater levels of overall violence,
and more specifically, higher levels of terrorist-based (otherwise unconventional) violence.
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ture detailing the relationship between democracy and levels of repression is quite clear.
Higher levels of democracy are consistently associated with lower levels of repression and
human rights violations (Davenport 1995, 2007; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). While
democracy may be an indirect measure of wealth, it provides a more direct measure of
social norms, including civil and political liberties. To the extent that rebels are part
of a democratic society, it is expected that they will have more moderate preferences
that will, in turn, translate into lower levels of rape.50 A second indirect measure of rebel
preferences is the dichotomous Drugs variable. The measure is coded a 1 if there is a drug
economy present, and a 0 otherwise. The expectation is that the availability of a drug
economy provides political distance between the armed group leadership and the civil-
ians. Where leaders are not dependent on the population for votes, taxes, or other forms
of support, there are fewer incentives for leaders to actively preserve the armed group-
civilian relationship. Thus, rebel group leaders are less likely to stipulate restraints on or
enforce punishments for soldier behavior, therefore leading to higher levels of rape.
The primary preference variables used in this analysis are based on the leadership
preference typology put forth by Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 2013b). The two dimensional
typology codes leadership preferences according to the leader’s level (espousal) of nation-
alism and the level of power-seeking behavior (i.e., principled or unprincipled behavior).
Specifically, the nationalist goals dimension assesses how strongly nationalist goals are
valued relative to the conflict costs and outcome risks that may result from pursuing
them. A more extreme nationalist position is defined as more highly valuing risks of
crisis-induced concessions and victory relative to the downside risk of defeat as well as
crisis and conflict costs. Nationalist preferences are coded on a five-category ordinal scale
beginning at non-nationalist (0), and ending at extreme nationalist (4). In contrast, the
power-seeking dimension assesses how much pursuing and maintaining political power is
valued relative to intrinsic nationalist and other political goals (Horowitz and Ye 2013a,
50Given their consistent collinearity, it can be argued that democracy and log GDP measure devel-
opment, state capacity, and preferences. While there are slightly different theoretical logics motivating
the inclusion of each of these variables, ultimately the relationships between rape and these variables is
expected to be in the same direction. As GDP increases, rape is expected to decrease. This is consistent
with the expectation that where there are higher levels of democracy, levels of rape are expected to be
lower.
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527). Power-seeking preferences are measured using a three-level ordinal scale; where 0
represents low power-seeking individuals (ideologues), 1 identifies mid-level power-seekers
(typical career politicians), and 2 refers to high power-seekers, (opportunists with no con-
vincing commitment to any political goals).51 The nationalist and power-seeking mea-
sures were indexed in the same manner as the recruitment variables. Variables were
scaled in order to make sure weights were distributed equally, and then added together;
providing a single score, Preference Index, for each rebel group in a given conflict-year.
Hypotheses
Recall that this analysis endeavors to understand why some rebel groups use rape
tactically while others hardly use it at all. Based on the discussions above, the following
hypotheses are used to test the explanatory strength of the PTWR. Relative to the or-
ganizational variables, the following hypotheses are proffered:
H1: Rape is more likely where armed group leadership is fractured.
H2: Armed groups composed of abducted and/or forced individuals are assumed to be less
disciplined. Thus, where there are forcible methods of recruitment, rape is expected to be
higher.
Regarding state capacity and control, there is reason to expect that greater state
capacity and greater centralized control will result in higher levels of behavioral enforce-
ment. That is, where the state lacks control, levels of rape are expect to be higher. To
this end:
H3: Higher state capacity reflected through higher log GDP values is expected to be asso-
ciated with lower levels of rape.
51A more detailed explanation of each dimension as well as the coding considerations is provided in
the appendix. Also see Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 2013b).
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H4: Levels of rape are expected to be higher in conflict where there are tribal areas and
politics present.
Finally, with respect to preferences, three hypotheses follow:
H5: Where democracy is higher, levels of rape are expected to be lower.
H6: Where drugs are present, levels of rape are expected to be higher.
H7: Rape is more likely where leaders are more radical. Thus, where there are higher
values for the preference index, levels of rape are also expected to be higher.
Additionally, one of the contributions of this research is to test models of rape sep-
arately in ethnic and non-ethnic war. As noted by Davenport (2007), it is erroneous
to assume that motivations and perceptions are universal and equally applicable across
different types of political contexts. Seeking to account for these differences and capture
their relative impact on the outcome, the following broad hypothesis is offered:
H8: Given the theoretical relationship between the symbolic use of rape and the typical
leadership goals in ethnic war, models are expected to have greater predictive power in
ethnic war when compared to non-ethnic war.
Data and Methods
The data used to assess the aforementioned hypotheses come from an original time
series dataset covering all civil wars from 1980 to 2009. In the time period under inves-
tigation, there are a total of 86 wars. All conflicts are divided down into dyads. If there
are multiple conflicts within a state in a given year, each conflict is coded separately. As
Cohen (2013a) notes, in addition to a rich body of qualitative literature, there have been
several efforts to create datasets and lists of wartime rape and sexual violence (Bastick et
77
al. 2007; Farr 2009; Green 2006). However the scope of these analyses tended to focus on
a specific subset on conflict and therefore did not capture significant variation in wartime
rape. In turn, Cohen’s (2013a) time series dataset marks the first systematic effort to
record instances of limited and widespread rape by armed groups, across conflicts, over
time. Building on this effort, I expand Cohen’s (2013a) original dataset to include annual
measures of leadership preferences for each party in the conflict dyad as well as other
organizational measures (i.e., fracture).
Methodologically, statistical choices were shaped by an interest in providing reliable
inferences that were not confounded by time dependence. To ensure that time was not an
issue, the time series data was transformed into a purely cross-sectional sample by taking
the mean of variables across each conflict. Thus, each conflict was condensed into a sin-
gle row of data. Using the cross-sectional data, two models were estimated. Each model
contains the same theoretical distribution of variables, but due to issues with collinear-
ity, it was not possible to keep both organizational variables (rebel fracture and rebel
recruitment) in a single model. Thus, model 1 uses rebel fracture as the organizational
variable and model 2 uses rebel recruitment as the organizational variable. Both models
are specified below.
Model 1
Level of Rebel-Leveraged Rape = α + β1Rebel Fracture + β2Rebel Preferences
+ β3Democracy + β4Log GDP + β5Oil
+ β6Drugs + β7Tribal + 
Model 2
Level of Rebel-Leveraged Rape = α + β1Rebel Recruitment + β2Rebel Preferences
+ β3Log GDP + β4Oil
+ β5Drugs + β6Tribal + 
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Linear regressions were performed on both models using three different samples: all
war (aggregated ethnic and non-ethnic war), ethnic war only, and non-ethnic war only.
In addition, models were estimated using two different forms of the dependent variable.52
Tabled below are the results using the mean calculated from the 4 category, ordinal de-
pendent variable. In the appendix are the tabled results of the models using the mean
of a dichotomous dependent variable.53 A final series of linear regressions was estimated
in order to evaluate the extent to which preferences predict recruitment practices. While
primarily exploratory, this regression used non-standardized data (i.e., original values
rather than means) so as to preserve the maximum number of observations.
Data Limitations
The data limitations inherent in studying rape are well documented and generally
understood across the literature (Baaz and Stern 2009; Enloe 2000; Sharlach 2000;
Gottschall 2004; Allen 1996; Barstow 2000; Hyuan-Kyung 2000; MacKinnon 1994; Salz-
man 2000; Rittner and Roth 2012; Koo 2002; Wood 2006, 2008, 2009; Ward and Marsh
2006; Russell-Brown 2003; Hayden 2000; Bloom 1999; Farr 2009; Cohen 2013a). Three
problems become particularly important for this analysis; these include data availability,
data reliability, and coding challenges. Relative to the availability of data, Gottschall
(2004) draws attention to “the mushiness of rape statistics” (130).In fact, it is nearly
impossible to get information on the real number of rape cases (Baaz and Stern 2009).
Collecting data on rape is particularly challenging for a multitude of reasons, not the
least of which is that it is a form of violence often leaving no visible scars. Additional
52Correlation tests were performed prior to model specification in order to avoid results confounded
by issues with collinearity.
53Initially, efforts were made to account for time dependence using transition modeling. However,
missing data and variation in sample sizes posed unforeseen challenges. First, since correlation tests are
impacted by changes in the sample, the variation in the sample sizes between ethnic and non-ethnic wars
effectively prevented the same models from being compared across samples. That is, where variables
were not collinear in ethnic war, a substantially reduced sample meant that the same variables were often
collinear in non-ethnic war. Thus, model specifications were different and subsequently not comparable
across samples. The lack of robustness in the results was also a concern. As an important part of this
analysis was predicated on the ability to make meaningful inferences about the differences between ethnic
and non-ethnic war, a more conservative approach was favored in this first iteration of the research. In the
future, a broad effort to impute data from existing values and/or expanding the dataset and increasing
the sample size across both ethnic and non-ethnic war will help alleviate this problem.
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reasons for the limited availability of data include fear of stigma (Cohen 2013a; Wood
2006; Ertrk 2008; Gottschall 2004), dishonor and shame (Baaz and Stern 2009; Cohen
2013a; Horwood 2007), fear of consequences (i.e., divorce, honour killings, etc.), fear of
revenge from the perpetrators (Ertrk 2008; Wood 2006), failure to recollect events (Wood
2006), inaccessibility of victims in remote areas (also resulting in sampling bias) or re-
sources available to create/gather reports (Wood 2006), overall taboo (Baaz and Stern
2009), general lack of data during war, and/or difficulties estimating rapes associated
with death or massacres (Wood 2006). For these reasons, the available data reflect only
our best estimates to date given the information we have.
Where possible missing data values in this analysis were supplemented with updated
measures from the World Bank, CIA fact book, Human Rights Watch, the U.S. State
Department, Amnesty international and NGOs. In some cases, data was imputed using
other observations to calculate modal or averaged scores. For instance, Cohen’s (2013a)
original dataset contained a small number of missing observations for the rape variables.
In such cases, if the conflict-year prior to the NA value was coded 1, and the conflict-year
following the NA value was coded 1, the missing observation was coded 1. Nevertheless,
some missing data remain in cases where there was no reasonable or reliable basis on
which to impute, supplement, or otherwise calculate the missing values.
A second problem with data on wartime rape concerns the relative reliability of rape
data; specifically with respect to the increase in the conflict-rape phenomenon. Over the
last 10 years, statistics reveal a substantial increase in levels and use of war rape (Ertruk
2007; Baaz and Stern 2009; Cohen 2013a). Still, scholars are left to question whether
those statistics truly reflect an increase in the number of rapes, or whether these data are
products of increased reporting, heightened interest and attention, intensities of domestic
and international monitoring, different reporting techniques producing variation in qual-
ity and focus, and/or politically motivated under- or over-reporting (Cohen 2013a; Ertrk
2008; Baaz and Stern 2009; Gottschall 2004; Wood 2006, 2008, 2009). Certainly these
issues would pose challenges to data collection on a well-defined phenomenon, so one can
imagine their effect on an already ambiguous definition of sexual violence. Additionally,
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variation in the description of sexual violence as “widespread” or “systematic” may vary
between researchers and organizations as may the distinction between rape and other
sexually violent phenomena. As Cohen (2013a) notes, because there are no precise mea-
sures of the number of victims, coding for the rape variable was based on verbal/written
descriptors (466). In the end, however, it is unlikely that such hurdles could occlude
the potential to extract meaningful information. Error, though prevalent, is likely to be
distributed equally enough that broad scale patterns remain discernible.
Finally, a brief mention of coding-related challenges is necessary. This research rep-
resents the first large-N implementation of Horowitz and Ye’s (2013a) two dimensional
leadership typology. While illuminative, this inaugural effort presented a number of
trials. First, there were several conflicts in which multiple rebel groups were active si-
multaneously. Relative to the dependent variable, rebel rape, Cohen (2013a) notes that
“while the specific armed group, rather than the aggregated group-type, may be the ideal
unit of analysis, it is challenging to code accurately conflict-year data on wartime rape
by individual armed groups on the cross-national level because reports are not always
specific about the identities of the perpetrators” (466). Thus, while reports document
“widespread” rape, it is not clear which particular rebel groups were perpetrating the
offenses. Coding rebel leadership preferences in the face of multiple rebel groups was
similarly challenging (i.e., Afghanistan, Burma, etc.). In these cases, choices had to be
made about which rebel leader to code. Decisions were based on the size and impact
of the group; where still opaque, the salience of the group. In parallel, many public ac-
counts of the rhetoric and pre-war behaviors of rebel leaders (particularly those leading
smaller or factional groups, or from less salient conflicts) are absent. In very few cases,
preferences were uncodable.54
Ultimately, the difficulties related to the coding of leadership preferences are born out
of efforts to avoid issues of endogeneity. As Horowitz and Ye (2013a) caution, the princi-
ple challenge of coding preferences is to avoid conflating the dependent variable (in this
54Every effort was made to corroborate information used to code the leadership variables. If data on
the individual were not available, efforts were made to understand the platform of the group or political
party from which that individual was a part/member/leader. Arguably, as a member of that party, there
is a reasonable expectation of ideological similarity.
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case, rape, the behavioral outcome of the preferences), with the preference itself. That
is, one must avoid coding leadership preferences by using the dependent variable (i.e.,
the leader was an extreme nationalist because they committed extreme and widespread
violence during the war). Though there were few instances in which the level of rape was
a clear consequence, particular care was taken to avoid highly correlated data, such as
conflict intensity, level of violence, broad measures of human rights violations, massacres,
etc. Rather, public statements, rhetoric, writings, and past experiences were used to code
leadership preferences.55
Results
The regression results for model 1 are displayed in Table 8. Two versions of the model
are displayed in the table. The first version contains a variable for democracy, while the
second version contains a variable for Log GDP. Due to collinearity, democracy and Log
GDP were modeled separately. Each version of the model was run on three separate
samples; these included all war (aggregated ethnic and non-ethnic war), ethnic war only,
and non-ethnic war only.56
The most striking results are the differences in the explanatory power of the models
across ethnic war and non-ethnic war. While the results in ethnic war and all war
are reasonably consistent, all variables lose significance in non-ethnic war. In the first
iteration of the model, rebel fracture, democracy and drugs are significant across all wars
and within the ethnic war sample. Notice, however, that the level of significance increases
when the model is run on the sample of only ethnic wars. The more moderate results
evidenced in the aggregated war sample make sense given that there are particularly
strong results in ethnic war and an absence of significant variables in non-ethnic war.
Consistent with the expectation outlined in hypothesis 8, models have greater explanatory
55In some cases, this too was challenging as media reports can contain considerable biases. As an
exemplar, this was the case with the second insurrection of the JVP in Sir Lanka. Media reports and
personal accounts were heavily biased toward one side or the other. In these cases, the researcher sought
to prevent coding biases by corroborating media with scholarly or historical analyses.
56For reference, in the appendix, Table 18 has regression results with models that contain both Log
GDP and democracy. Table 19 has regression results for the full models (including all organizational,
preference, and state capacity variables).
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power in ethnic war when compared to non-ethnic war. To this end, it is imperative to
point out that the ethnic war dummy variable never achieves significance despite the
considerable differences in the explanatory power of the models across ethnic and non-
ethnic war. This finding provides evidence that simply including a dummy variable
for ethnic war is insufficient to capture the importance of the wartime context or to
understand how the explanatory power of models change given changes in the type of
war. Despite the lack of statistical significance, the results in Table 8 make clear that
a considerable amount of information is lost when ethnic war is relegated to a dummy
variable.
The significance of the rebel fracture variable in the first iteration (first three columns)
of model 1 provides preliminary support for the first hypothesis. That is, where leadership
is fractured, there is expected to be a loss of control and an increase in uncertainty. This
is expected to disrupt leadership’s ability to enforce punishments for deviant behavior
and weaken the ability of the hierarchy to disseminate unified orders and control the
cadres. Here, the sign is in the expected direction; where leadership is fractured, the level
of rape increases.
The significance of democracy in the first iteration of model 1 is also in the expected
direction. That is, consistent with the findings of Davenport (1995, 2007), Davenport and
Armstrong (2004), and in support of hypothesis 5, increases in democracy are associated
with lower human rights abuses. Here, the presence of democracy results in lower levels
of rape. In terms of preferences, leaders coming from within a democracy are expected
to have more moderate preferences (favoring non-violent modes of conflict resolution,
etc.) and are therefore expected to be more averse to the use of rape during conflict.
Additionally, democratically motivated leaders are expected to place greater value on the
citizen population and are, in turn, less likely to select overt forms of civilian abuse. In
contrast, however, the preference index does not achieve statistical significance in either
iteration of the model, regardless of the sample. In fact, in non-ethnic war, the sign of
preference index is also in an unexpected direction. This unexpected result runs counter
to the expectation detailed in hypothesis 7.
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In support of hypothesis 6, the results in Table 8 indicate that rape is higher in areas
where drugs are present. One plausible mechanism to explain this positive relationship is
that the presence of drugs offers an illicit secondary economy, and therefore independent
access to resources. In places where rebel groups do not need to rely on the population
for support (financial, political or otherwise), there are fewer incentives for rebel leaders
to maintain positive relations with the population. In this way, it may be that leaders
are not concerned with the negative effects of drugs on the populous, and are therefore
willing to turn a blind eye to sexually violent behavior. Overall, less elite dependence on
the population increases the likelihood of civilian abuse. This finding echoes support for
Weinstein’s (2007) argument that resource-supported groups are more likely to commit
widespread abuses against civilians. Still, despite a similar underlying logic, the tribal
variable never achieves statistical significance. In fact, in the second iteration of the
model, the sign for the tribal variable becomes negative across the aggregated and ethnic
war samples; in the opposite direction of the expected relationship.
The second iteration of model 1 (i.e., the latter three columns in Table 8), presents
mixed results. First, like democracy, Log GDP is significant across aggregated and ethnic-
only war with the sign in the expected direction. Drugs is also significant and in the
expected direction. Similar to the first iteration, variables achieve significance in aggre-
gated and ethnic war samples, but lose significance in non-ethnic war. However, unlike
the first iteration, rebel fracture is no longer significant in any of the samples.
Here, two primary points become important. First, Log GDP achieves statistical
significance in the aggregated war and ethnic war samples, but loses significance in non-
ethnic war. With the sign in the expected direction, these results provide support for
the third hypothesis. Here, a higher GDP is expected to produce lower levels of rape.
In particular, where state capacity is higher, and there is greater contentment with the
status quo, levels of rape are expected to be lower. Second, given the sign changes, the
loss of significance in the rebel fracture variable with the addition of Log GDP (in place
of democracy), and the fluctuations in the R-squared and adjusted R-squared values, the
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results indicate that models are not robust to changes. 57
Table 9 displays the regression results for both iterations of model 2. Specifically,
model 2 provides a test for the second hypothesis, positing an increase in rape where
forcible methods of recruitment are used. The results in Table 9 support the notion that
less discipline within the rebel groups results in higher levels of rape.
57Further evidence of this sensitivity is provided in the appendix. Table 16 displays the same two
iterations of model 1 using the mean of a binary dependent variable (rather than the mean of a 4
category dependent variable). Despite being substantively identical, this more blunt measure of the rape
variable results in changes in independent variable significance and added variation in R-squared and
adjusted R-squared scores. Most notably, the rebel fracture variable loses significance in the first iteration
of the model across all samples, while democracy loses significance in the aggregated war sample. The
addition of Table 16 is intended to provide additional evidence of model sensitivity and an overall lack
of robustness.
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Table 8: Ordinal Rebel-leveraged Rape in Civil War: Group Fracture (model 1)
All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War
Rebel Fracture 0.351∗ 0.482∗ 0.209 0.205 0.201 0.209
(0.194) (0.251) (0.282) (0.184) (0.249) (0.278)
Rebel Preferences 0.036 0.038 −0.026 0.012 0.017 −0.026
(0.044) (0.046) (0.203) (0.042) (0.046) (0.200)
Democracy −0.367∗ −0.651∗∗ 0.004
(0.199) (0.248) (0.308)
Log GDP −0.290∗∗∗ −0.307∗∗∗ −0.018
(0.081) (0.100) (0.181)
Oil −0.165 −0.115 −0.167 0.019 0.037 −0.150
(0.139) (0.169) (0.227) (0.142) (0.173) (0.278)
Drugs 0.450∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗ −0.009 0.327∗∗ 0.465∗∗ −0.003
(0.171) (0.228) (0.257) (0.160) (0.223) (0.262)
Tribal 0.134 0.068 0.192 −0.005 −0.041 0.181
(0.140) (0.171) (0.224) (0.140) (0.176) (0.244)
Ethnic War Dummy 0.116 0.192
(0.158) (0.150)
Constant 0.015 0.018 0.183 2.293∗∗∗ 2.607∗∗∗ 0.317
(0.201) (0.248) (0.239) (0.680) (0.890) (1.370)
Observations 85 63 22 85 63 22
R2 0.198 0.305 0.150 0.282 0.332 0.150
Adjusted R2 0.125 0.231 −0.190 0.217 0.261 −0.189
Residual Std. Error 0.605 (df = 77) 0.619 (df = 56) 0.486 (df = 15) 0.573 (df = 77) 0.607 (df = 56) 0.486 (df = 15)
F Statistic 2.721∗∗ (df = 7; 77) 4.102∗∗∗ (df = 6; 56) 0.441 (df = 6; 15) 4.317∗∗∗ (df = 7; 77) 4.648∗∗∗ (df = 6; 56) 0.443 (df = 6; 15)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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The rebel recruitment variable achieves significance in the expected direction in the ag-
gregated war and the ethnic war samples, across both iterations of the model (regardless
of whether democracy or Log GDP is included). In fact, between the two models only
the rebel recruitment and Log GDP variables appear to be robust to changes in variable
inclusion and sample. Unlike model 1, democracy is no longer significant across any of
the samples once the rebel recruitment variable is added. Additionally, the drugs variable
is only significant at the .05 level in the first iteration of the model run on the ethnic war
sample.
Overall, R-squared and adjusted R-squared scores show fairly dramatic increases com-
pared to those from model 1. This result suggests that the measure of discipline has
greater explanatory power over the level of rape than does armed group fracture. How-
ever, similar to the first model, model 2 holds considerably less explanatory power in
non-ethnic war than in ethnic war, as all variables lose statistical significance. At the
bottom of Table 9 are R-squared and adjusted R-squared scores for the rebel-recruit-ever
variable. Recall from the earlier discussion that the rebel recruitment measure captures
whether a rebel group used abduction or forced recruitment practices within the given
conflict. In contrast, the rebel-recruit-ever variable captures whether the rebel group has
ever used such practices. Briefly, consider the changes in the R-squared values with the
rebel-recruit-ever variable in non-ethnic war. The the number and level of significance
among the variables did not change with the substitution of the rebel-recruit-ever vari-
able, the discrepancies presented here highlight two important points. First, the changes
in the R-square values reiterate the sensitivity of the models to alterations in the form
of the variables. Second, such fluctuations confirm the need for greater precision in the
measurements of human rights violations. While this call is not easily answered, the
results presented here showcase the variability of output (and in turn inference) that can
stem from slight changes in measurement. In turn, a more complete understanding of
the use of human rights violations and the forces that explain variation in the use of rape
specifically are directly related to more precisely capture and represent these concepts in
theoretical and operational form.
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Table 9: Ordinal Rebel-leveraged Rape in Civil War: Recruitment Tactics (model 2)
All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War
Rebel Recruit 0.208∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.028 0.201∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.031
(0.058) (0.076) (0.073) (0.053) (0.074) (0.075)
Rebel Preferences 0.029 0.023 −0.053 0.004 0.005 −0.049
(0.042) (0.040) (0.202) (0.039) (0.040) (0.200)
Democracy −0.215 −0.342 0.044
(0.189) (0.218) (0.308)
Log GDP −0.278∗∗∗ −0.231∗∗∗ −0.038
(0.075) (0.085) (0.187)
Oil −0.123 −0.030 −0.156 0.047 0.065 −0.116
(0.131) (0.146) (0.229) (0.130) (0.145) (0.283)
Drugs 0.324∗ 0.554∗∗ 0.029 0.212 0.302 0.034
(0.167) (0.209) (0.257) (0.151) (0.193) (0.259)
Tribal 0.159 0.082 0.240 0.004 −0.008 0.213
(0.132) (0.149) (0.217) (0.130) (0.149) (0.242)
Ethnic War Dummy 0.350∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.143)
Constant 0.125 0.519∗∗∗ 0.271 2.259∗∗∗ 2.313∗∗∗ 0.561
(0.160) (0.132) (0.204) (0.604) (0.697) (1.404)
Observations 85 63 22 85 63 22
R2 0.284 0.474 0.127 0.384 0.514 0.128
Adjusted R2 0.219 0.417 −0.222 0.328 0.462 −0.220
Residual Std. Error 0.572 (df = 77) 0.539 (df = 56) 0.493 (df = 15) 0.531 (df = 77) 0.518 (df = 56) 0.492 (df = 15)
F Statistic 4.372∗∗∗ (df = 7; 77) 8.405∗∗∗ (df = 6; 56) 0.365 (df = 6; 15) 6.844∗∗∗ (df = 7; 77) 9.868∗∗∗ (df = 6; 56) 0.369 (df = 6; 15)
R2 Rebel Rec. Ever 0.264 0.353 0.181 0.345 0.399 0.177
Adjusted R2 Rebel Rec. Ever 0.198 0.284 −0.147 0.285 0.335 −0.153
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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While both ethnic war dummy variables in the second model achieve statistical sig-
nificance, it is essential to point out that this significance does not provide an increase
in substantive knowledge. In the first model, the ethnic dummy did not achieve statis-
tical significance despite considerable differences in variable significance and explanatory
power across samples. Here the ethnic dummy achieves significance, despite consider-
able differences in variable significance and explanatory power across samples. Otherwise
stated, while it is clear that there are differences between models 1 and 2, the conditions
under which ethnic war becomes significant are not clear; particularly when both models
evidence distinct differences in their applications across ethnic and non-ethnic war. These
ambiguous findings reiterate the need for future research to disaggregate types of war in
order to test models separately in different wartime contexts.58
Finally, this section concludes with a discussion of the contradictory leadership pref-
erence results. That is, despite the statistical significance of democracy in the first model
(Table 8), the rebel preference measure did not achieve significance in any either model
across any of the samples. Furthermore, democracy lost significance in the second model
with the addition of the rebel recruitment variable (in place of the rebel fracture mea-
sure). What explains these results? Is it possible that rebel preferences don’t matter at
all?
The argument made in the first chapter of this dissertation posited that it is possible
to examine existing variables (assigned to pre-existing constructs) in new ways. More
specifically, the contention in this chapter is that previously defined “social cohesion”
variables (abduction and forced recruitment) can be redefined as reflections of the armed
group organization and/or leadership preferences. As an organizational variable, the
logic is that armed groups resorting to methods of forced recruitment are creating ad hoc
fighting units that receive less training, are less ideologically attached to the parent group,
have greater uncertainty, and ultimately less discipline. In this way, it is expected that
cadres have fewer incentives to follow orders from commanders stipulating regulations on
58In the full model presented in Table 19 in the appendix, only rebel recruitment, Log GDP, and the
ethnic war dummy variables are significant. However, the results are consistent across aggregated and
ethnic war and appear to be robust to changes in the form of the dependent variable. Still, all variables
lose significance in non-ethnic war.
89
behavior and commanders have less control over their combatants. In turn, levels of rape
are expected to be higher where these forcible recruitment methods are used.
Table 10: Preferences Predicting Recruitment
Dependent variable:
(Rebel Recruitment Index (current conflict) Rebel Recruitment Index (any conflict)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rebel Preference Index 0.118∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036)
Rebel Nationalism 0.058 0.236∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.073)
Rebel Power-seeking 0.303∗∗∗ 0.155∗
(0.093) (0.094)
Constant 0.026 −0.419∗ 0.054 −0.801∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.221) (0.057) (0.222)
Observations 942 942 943 943
R2 0.012 0.014 0.017 0.018
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.012 0.016 0.016
Residual Std. Error 1.732 (df = 940) 1.731 (df = 939) 1.739 (df = 941) 1.739 (df = 940)
F Statistic 11.101∗∗∗ (df = 1; 940) 6.744∗∗∗ (df = 2; 939) 16.277∗∗∗ (df = 1; 941) 8.645∗∗∗ (df = 2; 940)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
However, what logic explains recruitment as a leadership preference? Here, the argu-
ment is that radical leaders are more likely to use radical methods (violence) against their
own group and are, in turn, all the more likely to use more extreme forms of violence
against an out-group. In this way, methods of forcible recruitment become proxies for
radical preferences. Despite the logic, transposing a preference argument onto an out-
come variable can be complicated by issues of endogeneity. Nevertheless, the viability of
the argument, given its centrality to this research effort, deserves consideration.
One way of clarifying the relationship between rebel preferences and rebel recruitment
is to determine the extent to which preferences predict the use of recruitment tactics. That
is, if recruitment practices are predicted by (and therefore an outcome of) leadership
preferences, then there would be support for the argument that, beyond discipline, rebel
recruitment provides a proxy for radicalized preferences. Table 10 shows the results of
the linear regression used to assess the relationship between preferences and recruitment.
Specifically, the indexed recruitment variables as dependent variables, a total of 4 models
were estimated; two models for each dependent variable. Thus, for each recruitment
variable, the first model uses the preference index to predict variation in recruitment
while the second model uses disaggregated preference measures (individual measure of
nationalism and power-seeking).
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The results in Table 10 provide preliminary support for the use of rebel recruitment
practices as a proxy for rebel preferences.59 In particular, both the rebel preference index
and rebel power-seeking variables have a statistically significant relationship with rebel
recruitment in a given conflict. Using the rebel-recruit-ever measure as the dependent
variable, we see that all preference measures, including the rebel preference index, nation-
alism, and power-seeking measures, have a statistically significant relationship with the
occurrence of rebel forced recruitment practices. While these results provide a platform
for a more in-depth inquiry, they are far from conclusive. Without appropriate controls
or assurances that time has been appropriately accounted for, these data suggest only
general patterns for further investigation. Nevertheless, the broad patterns presented
here buttress the advocations for ongoing research into rebel preferences.
Conclusion
The analysis presented tested hypotheses relevant to a preference-based theory of
wartime rape as it applied to rape perpetrated by rebel groups in ethnic and non-ethnic
civil conflict. Results from the analysis are mixed, but support three broad conclusions.
First, relative to the division of ethnic and non-ethnic war, this work confirms the need for
future studies to test models of wartime separately in differing wartime contexts. Here,
the results indicate that models of wartimes rape have markedly different explanatory
power based on the wartime context in which they are applied. Specifically, while the
variables tested here achieve statistical significance in ethnic war and (largely) across
aggregated war, there are no statistically significant results in non-ethnic war.60 Clearly
future research ought to explore the reasons behind the drastic differences in model power.
Could it be that the forces motivating or inhibiting rape in non-ethnic war are entirely
distinct from those forces operating within ethnic war? Is it possible that the enforcement
mechanisms in ethnic war are more difficult to implement given the characteristics of
59For reference, preliminary efforts in transition modeling also produced statistically significant re-
sults for preference variables. However, in order to be certain those results were not distorted due to
methodological errors, time dependence, or collinearity, more refinements are necessary.
60Here it is important to acknowledge the role that limited data play in contributing to the lack of
results. In particular, the absence of significant results could be a product of low N in the non-ethnic
war sample.
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ethnic conflict? Could the differential results be the result of measurement error? While
this analysis provides a platform from which to construct new inquiries and hypotheses,
the answers remain elusive.
Second, the results from the statistical analyses cloud a clear understanding of the
strengths and weaknesses of the preference-based theory of war. While it is unlikely that
there is a single reason for this confusion, the two primary culprits are issues of mea-
surement and method. Across all models, the indices specifically capturing leadership
preferences along nationalist and power-seeking dimensions failed to achieve significance.
However, a preliminary examination of the relationship between leadership preferences
and recruitment techniques suggests that preferences are able to predict the use of forcible
recruitment. While more research is needed, the results indicate that measures of forced
recruitment, like democracy (and plausibly Log GDP), may provide proxies for leader-
ship preferences. Yet, where both recruitment and democracy were statistically significant
across aggregated and ethnic war samples, what explains the failure of the nationalist-
power-seeking index to reach statistical significance? Furthermore, in support of Wein-
stein (2007), the drugs variable was statistically significant across aggregated and ethnic
war samples. As this also has leadership implications, to what extent is measurement er-
ror or conceptual opacity obstructing the real relationship between leadership preferences
and levels of wartime rape?
While the creation of a large-N dataset containing annual data for leadership pref-
erences across armed groups in civil dyads provides a foundation for ongoing research,
it also serves as a note of caution. In particular, while significant care was taken to
preserve rigor and reliability when measuring leadership preferences, future efforts would
do well to employ multiple coders and perform checks for inter-coder reliability. While
measurement error is unlikely to be completely eliminated, such a step would certainly
limit un-necessary variance (and error) in preference measurements.
In parallel, a priority of this work was to err on the side of conservative inference.
Thus, cross-sectional analyses were used at the expense of information preservation. Ad-
ditionally, such small sample sizes led to problems with robustness. The models presented
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here are not robust to changes in model specification or the form of included variables;
making inferences all the more difficult. In addition, although the presented statistical
approach has avoided distortions due to time dependence, what nuances and relational
data have been lost in the process? What relationships lie uncovered within the rows
of collapsed observations? Here, two points become particularly important. First, the
issue of time dependence is more complicated than previous research admits (see Beck
et al. 2002; and Beck et al. 1998 for more information.) In fact, just as the inclusion of
an ethnic dummy variable is insufficient to provide meaningful insight into ethnic war,
the problem of accounting for time extends well beyond the inclusion of a ‘year’ variable.
Second, there is cause to question the validity of previous inferences and conclusions.
That is, as statistical methods advance, it is not enough to pick up with ‘current’ under-
standings and move forward. Rather, we must revisit the steps that led us to our current
understandings and question whether new approaches can offer insights that may redirect
or entirely alter our pre-existing conclusions.
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Chapter 4
Explaining Government-leveraged Rape
‘Violence is not just a degree of
conflict but a form of conflict, or a
form of social and political action in
its own right.’
Brubaker and Laitin (1998)
Why do some governments use rape pervasively in civil conflict while other government
do not? As Davenport (2007) notes, to date, researchers have paid far more attention to
the evils done against governments (and citizens) by dissidents, rebels, and terrorists than
to the evils done by presidents, the police, military, secret service, national guard, and
death squads against those within their territorial jurisdiction (1). Not only do we know
that rape varies, but we know that the willingness of the state to constrain variation in the
use of rape also varies. Why do some states seek to punish sexually deviant behavior while
others do not? The concern is ever more relevant as scholars point out that since World
War II, military practices increasingly include massacres, genocide, politicide, democide
and ethnic cleansing and not just by officially constituted national and armed forced,
but by paramilitaries, death squads, secret police and other irregulars (Tilly 2003). In
no uncertain terms, there has been an increase in state-seeking violence against civilians,
especially as entire categories of the population are stigmatized for their religious, ethnic
or political identities (Tilly 2003, 57). Why explains these trends? Are the conditions
under which civilian abuse becoming more prevalent? What forces work in concert to
determine the types of violence by the state? More specifically, under what conditions
the state use rape as a military tactic?
Speaking broadly, the literature recognizes three inter-related logics that purport to
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explain the state use of violence. These include ideological norms, identity chasms, that
state capacity. Literature discussing ideological norms is largely based in bodies of work
exploring the relationship between democracy and repression. In fact, there is a consid-
erable body of literature that finds a link between democratic political institutions and
declines in state repressive behavior (Davenport 1995, 2007; Russett 1993; Davenport and
Armstrong 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005; Tilly 2003; McCormick and Mitchell
1988). In fact, on the whole Mitchell and McCormick (1988) find that liberal regimes are
superior protectors of human rights (including individual measures of killing, torture, and
political imprisonment). On the other side of the spectrum, Abraham (2003a) argues that
totalitarian states use the indoctrination of child soldiers (through repetitive beatings,
forced human rights abuses, sex slavery, and isolation from their families) as a means
of consolidating power, maintaining control, and militarizing society. Still, most agree
that regime type is not sufficient to explain patterns in violence. That is, while ideology
of the regime matters, what remains unaccounted for is the ideology of the individual
acting within (or on behalf of the regime). Otherwise explained, to assume that regime
is sufficient is to assume that individuals don’t have goals outside of the regime. That
is, while the regime may condition individual objectives, it cannot replace them. So wile
regime is an important consideration (primarily for its conditional effects), what remains
absent is an account of the individual preferences of the group leaders.
The second logic refers to identity chasms. Here, identity chasms refer to internal, po-
larized divisions that activate boundaries (physical, identity-based or otherwise) between
an in-group and an out-group. As Tilly (2003) explains this increased polarization results
in a social space between claimants (combatants). To the extent that internal division
can provide the basis for civil war (Heo and DeRouen 2007),“boundary activation” (i.e.,
process of creating or solidifying an in-group and an out-group) can raise or lower the
stakes of political bargaining (Tilly 2003). That is, the sharper the boundary, the higher
the stakes, and the higher the likelihood that violence will either become a part of or
escalate within the bargaining space. In most wars, and specifically in ethnic war, the
concept of identity is inextricably linked to the conflict. In this way, accounting for the
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wartime context is one war of accounting for the extent to which these identity chasms
exist (or are activated) within society. Finally, the last logic is state capacity. Here,
state capacity refers to the relative ability of the state to enforce discipline. And yet,
given war-driven changes in state institutional structures, and specifically the well-known
breakdown of hierarchical structures, there is no reason to expect that all states have the
same capacity or will to enforce prohibitions on rape or other sexual violence.
Though each of the aforementioned logics provides some theoretical insight, what is
missing from the literature is a unified theory capable of bringing those logics into concert.
That is, firmly grounded in the bargaining model of war, the PTWR recognizes three
critical linkages between the aforementioned arguments. First, the PTWR recognizes
that state violence is a from of bargaining used to achieve political objective (Tilly 2003;
de Waal 2009). In this way, collective destruction can be a choice born out of broken
negotiations; wherein violence becomes the political continuation of a social process (Tilly
2003). Second, dominant beliefs within society have a determinative impact on the choice
of methods of political control and the relative propensity of governments to violate
human rights (Mitchell and McCormick 1988, 479-480). Here, the dominant beliefs are
assumed to be the product of a marriage between an ideology and a set of strategic
objectives. That is, an armed could leader could have an ideology, but lack an objective
that would motivate some ideological action. In contrast, a leader could have an objective,
but the pursuit of that objective would take very different forms depending on the ideology
of the leader. In turn, the marriage between these two social forces become a dominant
belief. This belief, otherwise named, is simply the preference of the leader. In sum,
violence is an output of an ideology, guided by preferences in pursuit of an objective.
The final link recognizes the connection between the capabilities and objectives. For
instance, McCormick and Mitchell (1997) argue that as opposed to imprisonment, the use
of torture requires a different set of government activities, involving different resources
and capabilities at different costs for the government, and with differing consequences for
the victims (513). In fact, relative to resources, Tilly (2003) notes that historically, the
inability (lack of capacity) to capture most criminals meant that those who were captured
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were subjected to public violent rituals. That is, where resources were scares, violence
was used strategically to produce the maximum benefit (behavior modification) at the
lowest cost. Others suggest that a similar calculous is used to determine the the victims
of violence. Namely, Azam and Hoeﬄer (2002) argue that civilians become targets ei-
ther because of the extortive activities of the parties to the conflict or because targeting
civilians serves a direct military purpose. Additional support for this idea comes from
Achvarina and Reich (2006) who suggest that significant poverty has little impact on the
government’s choice to use of child soldiers. Rather, the authors find that the only statis-
tically significant predictor of increases in the use of child soldiers is access to refugee and
IDP camps. These results indicate that use that government brutalization of the popu-
lation is not so much a matter of need, but a matter of strategy. Summarily, where the
first two linkages pave the way for measures of nationalism and power-seeking behavior
that shape a multidimensional set of preferences, the final link relates those preferences
to the set of constraints in which they operate.
Preference-based Theory of Wartime Rape
Filling gaps in the literature, the PTWR unites state-level factors (war type, con-
text, etc.) with group-level factors in order to explain variation among armed groups
(include armed groups shaped by and acting on behalf of the state). In particular, the
PTWR concerns itself with predicting the how of warfare; as conflict modalities have
important consequences for the political landscape of the post-war environment. Just
as contemporary bargaining models argue that war is costly, the PTWR recognizes that
the tactics used in war also have significant political costs. Thus, it is expected that
post-conflict leadership goals inform leadership preferences on wartime tactics. Where
an organization aspires to govern the civilian population, leaders are more likely to take
strides restrain combatants? use of rape against those civilians for fear of undermin-
ing support for the coming revolution. That is, if the present ?enemy? is expected to
make up the future constituency, leaders will be less likely to risk their political power
by pursing terror strategies. Similarly, if an armed group is dependent on civilians (for
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tax revenue, etc.), leaders have greater incentives to prevent wartime rape (Wood 2006,
328-329; Wood 2009). In contrast, if the purpose of the war is genocide and/or forcible
removal of a population from a given territory, leadership is less likely to be concerned
with the post-conflict sentiments of the enemy and therefore more likely to exhibit passive
preferences of indifferences toward sexual violence or active preferences for the strategic
use of rape.
The ability to capture and measure leadership preferences is made possible using
Horowitz and Ye’s (2013a, 2013b) two-dimensional leadership preference typology. Within
a bargaining framework, the authors select two central concepts repetitive across interna-
tional relations and specifically conflict, literature: Nationalism and Power-seeking behav-
ior. Applied to the study of wartime rape, the nationalist dimension assesses how strongly
maximum nationalist goals are valued relative to the cost of using a given war tactic. In
contrast, the power-seeking dimension assesses how much pursuing and maintaining po-
litical power is valued relative to other political goals (509). Particularly relevant, the
authors find evidence that leaders use civilian targeting in ways that reflect their varying
emphasis on nationalist and power-seeking goals (388). Axiomatically, if accounting for
nationalist and power-seeking preferences holds explanatory power over the selection of
targets in conflict, then it is reasonable to expect that those same preferences are able to
provide insight into leadership decisions regarding wartime strategy.
Variables
The dependent variable in this analysis is the level of rape perpetrated by the gov-
ernment (state forces) in a given conflict-year. Originally developed by Cohen (2013a),
government-perpetrated rape is a four-level ordinal variable constructed using data from
human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and
the American Red Cross (amongst others), as well as information from original inter-
views (see Cohen 2013a). The measure consists of 4 values in which a score of 0 means
no mention of rape; a score of 1 indicates infrequent or isolated reports of rape; a score
of 2 refers to not irregular use of rape, including reports in which rape is described as
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‘widespread,’ ‘common,’ extensive,’ ‘pattern,’ etc.; a score of 3 refers to rape described as
‘systematic,’ ‘massive,’ ‘tool of war,’ etc.61 For purposes of comparison, the dependent
variable is measured two ways; first using the original, 4-category, ordinal scale, and sec-
ond, as a dichotomous measure. The dichotomous measure was created by collapsing the
latter three ordinal categories. Thus, 0 remains a measure of no rape reports, and levels
1, 2, and 3, are combined into a single rape-is-used category.62
The independent variables fall into four broad categories: organizational variables,
state capacity measures, control variables, and preferences. The organizational variables
refers to the factor capturing the composition and nature of the armed group. For the
state, the organizational measure is Government Fracture. A dichotomous measure, gov-
ernment fracture assumes a value of 1 when the leadership of the armed group is divided
or factional, and a value of 0 when the leadership is unified. Here, it is expected that
divided leadership involves dissenting opinions (if not directly oppositional orders), un-
certainty on behalf of the cadres, and some degree of loss of control. With a decline
in the the ability to effectively discipline defectors, rape would be expected to increase.
More specifically, as the hierarchy fractures, the ability of leadership to control deviant
behavior declines and there are greater opportunities for soldiers or individual units to
increase civilian abuse without fear of consequences. In this way, it is also possible for
one or more radical (“splinter”) factions to implement increasingly violent tactics where
moderate leadership would have been more restrained.
Two measures of state capacity are included for analysis. First, an estimate of Mil-
itary Personnel (in thousands) is taken from the Correlates of War dataset. Here, it is
important to note the digression from traditional opportunity arguments. To this end,
one such opportunity argument suggests that increased contact between military person-
nel and civilians will likely lead to increases in rape via increased contact with potential
victims (see Wood 2006). However, as a measure of state capacity, the contention here
61For a full list of coding rules, please refer to Table 14 in the appendix.
62The minimum value for government-perpetrated rape was 0 (no reports of rape), the maximum was
3 (tactical rape), and the mean was 0.597. In total there are 573 observations at 0 (398 of which are in
ethnic war); 261 observations at 1 (162 of which are in ethnic war); 124 observations at 2 (108 of which
are in ethnic war); and 26 observations at 3 (25 of which are in ethnic war).
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is that larger militaries are a sign of power powerful states. Thus, it is expected that
powerful states are more likely to have professionalized militaries with solidified hier-
archies that will be more capable of enforcing punishments for deviant behavior. In
turn, increases in military personnel are expected to be associated with lower levels of
government-perpetrated rape.
Supported by a wealth of work that finds repression decreases and economic standing
increases (Poe and Tate 1994; Mitchell and McCormick 1988), Log GDP was included
as a second measure of state capacity. Although GDP is an imperfect measure of state
capacity, it is sufficient to provide a rough estimate of overall state resource availability
and function. To this end, three control variables are included in the models. In order
to address some of the weaknesses of log GDP as a measure of state capacity, a dummy
variable for Oil is included to account for those instance in which GDP may be ‘artificially’
inflated. A Tribal variable is also included as there is an expectation that tribal areas
operate with some autonomy; formally or informally so. Thus, where tribal areas remain
active, it is expected that the state has less control. Here, soldiers may not fear reprisals
for deviant behavior, particularly if the tribe against whom the offenses are committed is
considered an out-group. Thus, where tribal areas are present, levels of rape are expected
to be higher.
Finally, several variables are included to capture preferences. Following common prac-
tices in conflict literature (Chiozza and Goemans 2004), a Democracy dummy variable
was created from the polity 2 regime classification scale. Countries scoring a 6 or above
were considered democracies and coded a 1, while all others were coded as 0.63 Litera-
ture detailing the relationship between democracy and levels of repression is quite clear.
Higher levels of democracy are consistently associated with lower levels of state repres-
sion and human rights violations (Davenport 1995, 2007; Davenport and Armstrong 2004;
Mitchell and McCormick 1988). While democracy may be an indirect measure of wealth,
it provides a more direct measure of social norms, including civil and political liberties.
To the extent that state leadership is part of a democratic society, it is expected that
63There were 218 observations of high democracy in ethnic war and 102 observations of high democracy
in non-ethnic war.
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they will have more moderate preferences that will, in turn, translate into lower levels of
rape.64 A second indirect measure of rebel preferences is the dichotomous Drugs variable.
The measure is coded a 1 if there is a drug economy present, and a 0 otherwise. The
expectation is that the availability of a drug economy provides political distance between
the armed group leadership and the civilians. Where leaders are not dependent on the
population for votes, taxes, or other forms of support, there are fewer incentives for lead-
ers to actively preserve the armed group-civilian relationship. Thus, state leaders are
less likely to stipulate restraints on or enforce punishments for soldier behavior, therefore
leading to higher levels of rape.65
Additionally, the Recruitment Index variable provides a proxy for leadership prefer-
ences. The recruitment variable is an indexed measure created from Cohen’s (2013a)
government pressgang and government conscription variables. The pressgang measure
is coded a 1 if pressganging by the government was reported in a given conflict. Con-
scription is a dichotomous measure by year that indicates whether the government had
a policy of military conscription (Cohen 2013a, 468). Both variables were scaled prior to
creating the index so as to assure the measures were equally weighted. Once scaled, the
measures were added together.66
Social cohesion arguments assert that forcing otherwise unwilling participants into
the ranks leads to low social cohesion and thus, higher levels of rape. However, for the
state it can be argued that these recruitment practices are indirect reflections of radical
64Given their consistent collinearity, it can be argued that democracy and log GDP measure develop-
ment, state capacity, and preferences.
65There were a total of 296 conflict-years containing the presence of drugs and 688 conflict years
without the presence of drugs.There were 175 conflict-years in ethnic war containing drugs and 121
conflict-years in non-ethnic war containing drugs.
66The recruitment measure was indexed primarily for theoretical reasons. First, Cohen’s (2013a)
social cohesion argument contends that armed groups having to ‘force’ individuals into their ranks
are more likely to have low social cohesion and are, therefore, more likely to rape. If this were true,
the same theoretical mechanism would be expected to underlie both the pressgang and conscription
measures. Prior to creating the index, correlation tests were performed. conscription and pressganging
were correlated at a 0.18.
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leadership preferences.67 That is, more violent recruitment processes suggest a more rad-
icalized leadership. Where leaders are willing to use more violent tactics against their
in-group, one would also expect increasingly violent tactics to be used against the enemy
out-group. Additional support for this hypothesis comes from literature on child soldiers.
In particular, Abraham (2003a) notes that the use of child soldiers is characterized by
violent, excessive brutalization, including repetitive beatings during training, forced hu-
man rights abuses against civilians, sex slavery, isolation from their families. The author
argues that this type of indoctrination is a means for totalitarian regimes to consolidate
power, maintain control, and militarize society (Abraham 2010, 18). As the the author
suggests, the use of violence against the in-group represents a concerted effort to radi-
calize society and indoctrinate members of society into a more radical ideology. In this
way, we can think of the use of this brutality as an expression of radical preferences.68
Additionally, an alternate index was created in the same fashion using dummy variable
that captures whether the government had ever used pressganging. Thus, where the
recruitment index measures pressganging (plus conscription) within the given conflict,
the Recruitment Ever variable measures whether the state ever used the pressganging
approach (plus conscription).69
The primary preference variables used in this analysis are based on the leadership
preference typology put forth by Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 2013b). The two dimensional
67This differs from the discipline and control-based logic that was presented in the preceding chapter.
While it would make sense that a non-state army would use abduction and forced recruitment to set up ad
hoc militias without formal training, state training regimens don’t change based on recruitment tactics.
That is, a recruit is subjected to the same training whether they join voluntarily or are conscripted.
Thus, there is no theoretical reason to expect that the level of discipline changes based on the type of
recruitment. A similar logic exists for ideological differences. Where lack of formal training could leave
ideological gaps between new recruit and indoctrinated members of an insurgency, the state military
training regime also take care of ideological conditioning. Thus, there are fewer reasons to expect
ideological differences between voluntarily joined military members and conscripted or otherwise forced
military members.
68For this argument to be strongest, it would be ideal to include independent measures of pressganging
and conscription. While it makes sense for the two measures to be indexed according to the social
cohesion argument, one would not expect the same degree of leadership radicalization to be expressed
in conscription as it would in pressganging. Unfortunately, however, once data were collapsed at their
mean (based on conflict), there were not enough observations of either pressganging or conscription for
the variables to run independently the models. Given the statistical approach, the existing index, while
far from ideal, was the only available way of capturing recruitment.
69The recruitment ever variable is only used to demonstrate the variability of the regression results,
and is not central to the primary analysis.
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typology codes leadership preferences according to the leader’s level (espousal) of nation-
alism and the level of power-seeking behavior (i.e., principled or unprincipled behavior).
Specifically, the nationalist goals dimension assesses how strongly nationalist goals are
valued relative to the conflict costs and outcome risks that may result from pursuing
them. A more extreme nationalist position is defined as more highly valuing risks of
crisis-induced concessions and victory relative to the downside risk of defeat as well as
crisis and conflict costs. Nationalist preferences are coded on a five-category ordinal scale
beginning at non-nationalist (0), and ending at extreme nationalist (4). In contrast, the
power-seeking dimension assesses how much pursuing and maintaining political power is
valued relative to intrinsic nationalist and other political goals (Horowitz and Ye 2013a,
527). Power-seeking preferences are measured using a three-level ordinal scale; where 0
represents low power-seeking individuals (ideologues), 1 identifies mid-level power-seekers
(typical career politicians), and 2 refers to high power-seekers, (opportunists with no con-
vincing commitment to any political goals).70 The nationalist and power-seeking mea-
sures were indexed in the same manner as the recruitment variables. Variables were
scaled in order to make sure weights were distributed equally, and then added together;
providing a single score, Preference Index, for each rebel group in a given conflict-year.
Hypotheses
Recall that this analysis endeavors to understand why some governments use rape
tactically while others hardly use it at all. Based on the discussions above, the following
hypotheses are used to test the explanatory strength of the PTWR. Relative to the or-
ganizational variables, the following hypotheses are proffered:
H1: Rape is more likely where state leadership is fractured.
Regarding state capacity and control, there is reason to expect that greater state
capacity and greater centralized control will result in higher levels of behavioral enforce-
70A more detailed explanation of each dimension as well as the coding considerations is provided in
the appendix. Also see Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 2013b).
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ment. That is, where the state lacks control, levels of rape are expect to be higher. To
this end:
H2: Higher state capacity reflected through higher log GDP and military personnel values
is expected to be associated with lower levels of rape.
H3: Levels of rape are expected to be higher in conflict where there are tribal areas and
politics present.
Finally, with respect to preferences, three hypotheses follow:
H4: Where democracy is higher, levels of rape are expected to be lower.
H5: Where drugs are present, levels of rape are expected to be higher.
H6: Rape is more likely where leaders are more radical. Thus, where there are higher
values for the preference index and higher displays of radical behavior via increasingly
violent recruitment practices, levels of rape are also expected to be higher.
Additionally, one of the contributions of this research is to test models of rape sep-
arately in ethnic and non-ethnic war. As noted by Davenport (2007), it is erroneous
to assume that motivations and perceptions are universal and equally applicable across
different types of political contexts. Seeking to account for these differences and capture
their relative impact on the outcome, the following broad hypothesis is offered:
H7: Given the theoretical relationship between the symbolic use of rape and the typical
leadership goals in ethnic war, models are expected to have greater predictive power in
ethnic war when compared to non-ethnic war.
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Data and Methods
The data used to evaluate the posited hypotheses come from Cohen’s (2013a) original
time series dataset covering all 86 civil wars from 1980 to 2009. All conflicts are divided
down into dyads. If there are multiple conflicts within a state in a given year, each conflict
is coded separately. Building on this effort, I expand Cohen’s (2013a) original dataset to
include annual measures of leadership preferences for each party in the conflict dyad as
well as other organizational measures (i.e., fracture).
The methods used here are consistent with those employed in the previous chapter.
To ensure that time was not an issue, the time series data was transformed into a purely
cross-sectional sample by taking the mean of variables across each conflict. Using the
cross-sectional data, two models were estimated. Model 1 uses government fracture as
the organizational variable and model 2 uses government recruitment as the organizational
variable. Both models are specified below.
Government-Leveraged Rape = α + β1Government Fracture
+ β2Government Preferences
+ β3Democracy + β4Log GDP + β5Oil
+ β6Drugs + β7Tribal
+ β8Military Personnel + 
Government-Leveraged Rape = α + β1Government Recruitment
+ β2Government Preferences
+ β3Democracy + β4Log GDP + β5Oil
+ β6Drugs + β7Tribal
+ β8Military Personnel + 
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Linear regressions were performed on both models using three different samples: all
war (aggregated ethnic and non-ethnic war), ethnic war only, and non-ethnic war only.
In addition, models were estimated using two different forms of the dependent variable.
Tabled below are the results using the mean calculated from the 4 category, ordinal de-
pendent variable. In the appendix are the tabled results of the models using the mean
of a dichotomous dependent variable. A final series of linear regressions was estimated
in order to evaluate the extent to which preferences predict recruitment practices. While
primarily exploratory, this regression used non-standardized data (i.e., original values
rather than means) so as to preserve the maximum number of observations.71
Results
Tables 11 and 12 display the regression output for models 1 and 2 respectively. Each
table contains two versions of the model. The first version (evident in the first 3 columns)
contains a variable for democracy, while the second version (in the latter 3 columns)
contains a variable for Log GDP. Due to collinearity, democracy and Log GDP were
modeled separately. Each version of the model was run on three separate samples; these
included all war (aggregated ethnic and non-ethnic war), ethnic war only, and non-ethnic
war only.72
71As has been discussed in previous chapters, the data limitations inherent in studying rape are well
documented (Baaz and Stern 2009; Enloe 2000; Sharlach 2000; Gottschall 2004; Allen 1996; Barstow
2000; Hyuan-Kyung 2000; MacKinnon 1994; Salzman 2000; Rittner and Roth 2012; Koo 2002; Wood
2006, 2008, 2009; Ward and Marsh 2006; Russell-Brown 2003; Hayden 2000; Bloom 1999; Farr 2009;
Cohen 2013a). Collecting data on rape is particularly challenging for a multitude of reasons, not the least
of which is that rape represents a form of violence that often leaves no visible scars. Additional obstacles
to estimating the real numbers for rape include fear of stigma (Cohen 2013a; Wood 2006; Ertrk 2008;
Gottschall 2004), shame and dishonor (Baaz and Stern 2009; Horwood 2007), fear of consequences or
revenge (i.e., divorce, honour killings, etc.) (Ertrk 2008; Wood 2006), failure to recollect events (Wood
2006), sampling bias due to inaccessible victims in remote areas, fluctuations in salience and media
attention (Ertruk 2007; Baaz and Stern 2009; Cohen 2013a), political incentives by organizations and/or
governments to misrepresent statistics, insufficient resources available to create reports (Wood 2006),
overall taboo (Baaz and Stern 2009), general lack of data during war, and/or difficulties estimating
rapes associated with death or massacres (Wood 2006). Precisely for these reasons, the available data
reflect only our best estimates to date given the information we have. Nevertheless, it is assumed that
data-based deficiencies are not significant as to prevent insights into broad patterns in the variation of
sexual violence.
72For reference, in the appendix, Tables 20 and 21 contain the output for each model using mean from
the bivariate dependent variable. Table 22 has regression results with models that contain both Log
GDP and democracy. Table 23 has regression results for the full models (including all organizational,
preference, and state capacity variables).
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Of the seven hypotheses proffered in this chapter, the results offer only low-level sup-
port for the fifth hypothesis. Namely, where drugs are present, rape increases. Still, the
regression outputs indicate that dugs only reach statistical significance in ethnic war;
and only reach significance at the .05 level when the government recruitment variable
is included in the model (despite the fact that the recruitment variable does not reach
statistical significance). The results for government-perpetrated rape are otherwise con-
founding. There is no support for any of the other 7 hypotheses and no other significant
variables.
Equally surprising, these findings contradict well established literatures discussing the
relationships between democracy and state repression (Davenport 1995, 2007; Davenport
and Armstrong 2004; Mitchell and McCormick 1988). Instead of following the typical
patterns of violence evidenced by other works (i.e., Davenport and Stam 2003), the
regression outputs do not suggest any relationship between liberal or democratic regimes
and the level of violence in war. That is, where Mitchel and McCormick (1988) argue
that liberal regimes should be more concerned with protecting human rights, the empirics
offered here fail to support this assertion. That is, not only do Tables 11 and 12 fail to
provide any kind of support for the preference-based theory of wartime rape, but the
results seemingly contradict the otherwise consistent relationships noted in the wider
literature.
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Table 11: Ordinal Government-leveraged Rape in Civil War: Group Fracture (model 1)
All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War
Govt. Fracture 0.163 0.316 −0.254 0.156 0.305 −0.280
(0.179) (0.239) (0.218) (0.178) (0.237) (0.236)
Govt. Preferences 0.025 0.019 −0.092 0.018 0.015 −0.125
(0.034) (0.038) (0.119) (0.035) (0.039) (0.125)
Democracy 0.163 0.068 0.280
(0.201) (0.259) (0.267)
Log GDP −0.090 −0.040 0.090
(0.084) (0.102) (0.178)
Oil 0.131 0.255 −0.118 0.175 0.265 −0.173
(0.137) (0.173) (0.189) (0.143) (0.176) (0.242)
Drugs 0.218 0.447∗ −0.150 0.219 0.437∗ −0.195
(0.163) (0.231) (0.190) (0.161) (0.232) (0.213)
Tribal 0.216 0.206 0.156 0.146 0.180 0.168
(0.139) (0.180) (0.190) (0.145) (0.183) (0.227)
Military Persons −0.00002 −0.00003 0.00002 0.0001 −0.00000 0.00004
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Ethnic War Dummy 0.204 0.211
(0.151) (0.151)
Constant 0.156 0.256 0.518∗∗ 0.891 0.586 −0.067
(0.172) (0.171) (0.184) (0.668) (0.829) (1.294)
Observations 85 63 22 85 63 22
R2 0.130 0.199 0.245 0.136 0.200 0.200
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.097 −0.132 0.045 0.098 −0.199
Residual Std. Error 0.588 (df = 76) 0.624 (df = 55) 0.401 (df = 14) 0.586 (df = 76) 0.624 (df = 55) 0.413 (df = 14)
F Statistic 1.425 (df = 8; 76) 1.952∗ (df = 7; 55) 0.650 (df = 7; 14) 1.498 (df = 8; 76) 1.967∗ (df = 7; 55) 0.501 (df = 7; 14)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 12: Ordinal Government-leveraged Rape in Civil War: Recruitment Tactics (model 2)
All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War
Govt. Recruit −0.002 0.042 −0.106 −0.007 0.043 −0.120
(0.058) (0.071) (0.088) (0.056) (0.070) (0.088)
Govt. Preferences 0.028 0.020 −0.054 0.021 0.015 −0.062
(0.035) (0.039) (0.122) (0.036) (0.040) (0.127)
Democracy 0.153 0.065 0.192
(0.210) (0.269) (0.272)
Log GDP −0.090 −0.054 0.008
(0.085) (0.104) (0.167)
Oil 0.127 0.240 −0.127 0.173 0.254 −0.121
(0.138) (0.177) (0.188) (0.144) (0.179) (0.235)
Drugs 0.226 0.500∗∗ −0.036 0.226 0.477∗∗ −0.032
(0.165) (0.230) (0.198) (0.162) (0.232) (0.214)
Tribal 0.220 0.199 0.109 0.150 0.167 0.083
(0.140) (0.183) (0.184) (0.145) (0.185) (0.208)
Military Persons −0.00004 −0.0001 0.00001 0.00003 −0.00005 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Ethnic War Dummy 0.192 0.199
(0.152) (0.152)
Constant 0.208 0.337∗∗ 0.468∗∗ 0.932 0.777 0.459
(0.165) (0.159) (0.176) (0.673) (0.841) (1.227)
Observations 85 63 22 85 63 22
R2 0.121 0.179 0.249 0.128 0.182 0.223
Adjusted R2 0.028 0.074 −0.126 0.036 0.078 −0.166
Residual Std. Error 0.591 (df = 76) 0.632 (df = 55) 0.400 (df = 14) 0.589 (df = 76) 0.631 (df = 55) 0.407 (df = 14)
F Statistic 1.307 (df = 8; 76) 1.709 (df = 7; 55) 0.664 (df = 7; 14) 1.390 (df = 8; 76) 1.746 (df = 7; 55) 0.573 (df = 7; 14)
R2 Govt. Rec. Ever 0.121 0.182 0.224 0.128 0.183 0.180
Adjusted R2 Govt. Rec. Ever 0.028 0.078 −0.163 0.036 0.079 −0.230
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Finally, the results in Table 13 provide support for the idea that state recruitment
tactics can be indirectly interpreted as leadership preferences. Here, the argument is that
radical leaders are more likely to use radical methods (violence) against their own group
and are, in turn, all the more likely to use more extreme forms of violence against an out-
group. In this way, methods of forcible recruitment become proxies for radical preferences.
Despite the logic, transposing a preference argument onto an outcome variable can be
complicated by issues of endogeneity. Nevertheless, the viability of the argument, given
its centrality to this research effort, deserves consideration.
One way of clarifying the relationship between rebel preferences and rebel recruitment
is to determine the extent to which preferences predict the use of recruitment tactics. That
is, if recruitment practices are predicted by (and therefore an outcome of) leadership
preferences, then there would be support for the argument that government recruitment
techniques function as a proxy for radicalized preferences. Table 13 shows the results of
the linear regression used to assess the relationship between preferences and recruitment.
Specifically, the indexed recruitment variables as dependent variables, a total of 4 models
were estimated; two models for each dependent variable. Thus, for each recruitment
variable, the first model uses the preference index to predict variation in recruitment
while the second model uses disaggregated preference measures (individual measure of
nationalism and power-seeking).
The results in Table 13 provide preliminary support for the use of government recruit-
ment practices as a proxy for government preferences.73 In particular, both the preference
index and state nationalism variables have a statistically significant relationship with gov-
ernment recruitment in a given conflict. Using the Government-recruit-ever measure as
the dependent variable, we see the same pattern of significance; wherein the preference
index and state nationalism have a statistically significant relationship with the occur-
rence of government recruitment practices. While these results provide a platform for a
73For reference, preliminary efforts in transition modeling also produced statistically significant results
for preference variables. In particular, while the conscription variable was never significant, the pressgang
variable was significant and in the expected direction. However, in order to be certain those results
were not distorted due to methodological errors, time dependence, or collinearity, more refinements are
necessary.
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more in-depth inquiry, they are far from conclusive. Without appropriate controls or as-
surances that time has been appropriately accounted for, these data suggest only general
patterns for further investigation.
Table 13: Preferences Predicting Recruitment
Dependent variable:
Government Recruitment Index (current conflict) Government Recruitment Index (any conflict)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Govt. Preference Index 0.216∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.028)
State Naitonalism 0.612∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.060)
State Power −0.111 0.072
(0.091) (0.087)
Constant 0.012 −1.611∗∗∗ 0.019 −2.255∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.185) (0.046) (0.178)
Observations 971 971 972 972
R2 0.055 0.096 0.120 0.163
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.094 0.120 0.161
Residual Std. Error 1.491 (df = 969) 1.458 (df = 968) 1.438 (df = 970) 1.404 (df = 969)
F Statistic 56.059∗∗∗ (df = 1; 969) 51.405∗∗∗ (df = 2; 968) 132.866∗∗∗ (df = 1; 970) 94.269∗∗∗ (df = 2; 969)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Conclusions
This analysis applied a preference-based theory of wartime to the instances of govern-
ment perpetrated rape during ethnic and non-ethnic civil conflict. The purpose of this
study was to evaluate to extent to which leadership preferences affected levels of wartime
rape perpetrated by government armed groups. However, the results presented here con-
found easy interpretation. With the exception of the drugs variable in ethnic war, none
of the variables in either of the models are statistically significant across any of the sam-
ples. Thus, while there is support for the assertion that the presence of illicit resources
provides enough political distance between leadership and citizens (such that leadership
is relatively unconcerned with civilian support and therefore more likely to active engage
in or ignore civilian abuse), we fail to reject the seven remaining null hypotheses.
Nevertheless, implications for the future direction of research are clear. Summarily
these results reiterate that models possess different explanatory powers in ethnic versus
non-ethnic war. Most profoundly, the results here suggest that theories do not apply to
the broad spectrum of wartime rape ‘equally.’ It is possible that the forces motivating
or inhibiting rape are not the same across groups. To this end, it is equally possible
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that leadership preferences, institutions, and social networks work together in ways we
have not yet captured. Certainly the evidence from this chapter implies the need for
new variables, or at the very least new measurements. In addition, this work suggests
that the strategic use of rape may be limited to certain contexts. That is, despite the
occasional outliers, tactical rape may not be a strategy of career politicians but may be
a tool or radical criminal groups. Otherwise stated, the tactical use of rape may be a
strategy among only a small subset of groups, and may not have the same explanatory
power across all groups in conflict.
Relative to future research, Wood (2009) notes that survivors of the Sri Lankan civil
war discussed how the the preference of the armed group was to kill enemies immediately
rather than waste time with more involve methods of brutality (i.e., rape). In addition,
de Waal et al. (2014) find that while rebel armed movements mostly killed government
soldiers and militia men, pro-government forces mostly killed civilians (374). Given the
empirics, an interesting avenue for future research would be to evaluate the extent of
covariation among human rights violations (similar to the approach taken in the second
chapter) by specifying a particular group-environment context. That is, bring the exami-
nation of covariation down the group level. While this would undoubtedly be an involved
effort in data collection, there is potential that certain groups, conditioned by particular
contexts demonstration similar patterns in the use of violence.
112
Chapter 5
Conclusion
“Clearly, one cannot overestimate the
part played by individual actors in
defining the nature of the threats
posed to their respective communities,
framing strategies designed to counter
such threats, rallying support for their
cause, bringing pressure to bear on
key decision makers, and, in short,
politicizing ethnoregional identities.”
Rene Lemarchand
This dissertation asks, why rape? Investigating this question, the research presented
here aggregates literature on sexual violence, psychology, feminist studies, sociology, eth-
nic conflict, and state repression to analyze variation in the use of rape across armed
groups in ethnic and non-ethnic civil conflict. Across these literatures, scholars agree:
rape varies (Wood 2006, 2008, 2009; Gottschall 2004; Cohen 2013a; Alison 2007; Brown
2012; Siefert 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996; Sanday 2003; Bond 2003; Reid- Cunningham 2008;
Russell-Brown 2003; Enloe 2000; Anwary 2012; Cook 1994; Kim 2012; Kohn 1994; MacK-
innon 1994; Melandri 2009; Richey 2009; Schott 2011; Ttreault 1997; Baaz and Stern
2009; Cerretti 2016; Tompkins 1995; Brownmiller 1975; Koo 2002; Goldstein 2001; Hi-
gate and Hopton 2005; Pin-Fat and Stern 2005; Wing and Merchan 1993; Thornhill and
Palmer 2000). As an instrument of war rape varies across time, conflicts, regions, cultures,
and groups. More specifically, the chapters contained here endeavored to understand the
factors motivating the variation in the use of rape within and across civil conflict.
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In contribution to the literature, this work proffers a preference-based theory of
wartime rape. Grounded among other strategic theories of rape, the PTWR addresses
four problems in extant literature. First, the PTWR focuses on the leadership of each
armed group within a dyad and can therefore explain variation at the armed group-level.
Second, ideological differences between leaders can identify why armed groups in oth-
erwise homogeneous cultures use rape differently. Additionally, since the ideology of a
leader defines both the in-group and the enemy group, the PTWR can also predict which
population is most likely to be victimized by a rape strategy. Finally, the theory proffered
here argues that the gendered, symbolic meanings of rape set it apart from other human
rights violations. Provided the characteristics (and particularly tragic) outcomes of rape,
the PTWR contends that rape is a product of strategic leadership decisions conditioned
by the wartime context; including the social and institutional arrangements that both
create and constrain leadership preferences. That is, the level of rape in war is a violent
expression of an effort to meet some political objective within a given context. Thus,
based in the bargaining model of war, the PTWR argues that armed group leaders make
decisions about the use of rape (to institute, promote, prohibit, ignore, etc.) based on a
rational calculous that favors some desired outcome.
The unique contribution of the PTWR is the construction of an original dataset that
marks the first large-N effort to measure group-level leadership preferences for sexual
violence in civil conflict. Measurements were coded using Horowitz and Ye’s (2013a)
two dimensional leadership typology that scores preferences along nationalist and power-
seeking dimensions. In order to determine its relative utility in explaining the level of
rape used in conflict, the PTWR was applied across 86 civil wars between 1980 and 2009
to independent samples of ethnic, non-ethnic, and aggregated wars. Expanding Cohen’s
(2013a) original wartime rape dataset, preferences were coded annually for the leader of
each armed group within a conflict dyad.
Summary of Results
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The application of the PTWR occurred in three phases. First, a foundational analysis
sought to determine whether rape covaried with more ‘common’ violations of human rights
in the same way those violations covaried with each other. That is, at the core of the
PTWR is the assumption that there is something distinct about the use of rape that makes
it a particularly powerful instrument of war given in a particular context, given certain
strategic objectives. Thus, the first substantive chapter of this dissertation examined the
extent to which rape was correlated with measures of human rights. Results revealed that
rape is a distinct phenomenon that does not share a latent construct with other human
rights violations and that does not correlate with other human rights measures in the same
way they correlate with each other. Not only does this finding reiterate the importance of
the parent research question (why rape), but it also poses a passive challenge to existing
existing explanations that fail to identify what it is about rape, distinct from other forms
of violence, that motivates its use. That is, across the spectrum of violent modalities,
what predicts the use of rape over other forms of civilian abuse?
Next, The PTWR was applied to rebel-perpetrated rape. The results from this ap-
plication were three fold. First, findings indicate that there is a marked difference in the
predictive power of the PTWR in ethnic versus non-ethnic war. In fact, this research
makes clear that future analyses can benefit from separately applying theories to samples
of ethnic and non-ethnic war. In order to fully understand the strengths and weaknesses
of a given theory, it is imperative to see how that theory behaves in different wartime
contexts.
Relative to explaining variation in rebel-perpetrated rape, the results suggest that
democracy and Log GDP have a statistically significant, negative relationship with the
use of rape in civil war. More specifically, as democracy and Log GDP increase, the level
of rape within a conflict declines. Here, findings are consistent with more broad human
rights literatures, providing additional confirmation that democracy, higher quality of
life, and greater contentment with the status quo decrease the likelihood of human rights
violations during war (see Davenport 2007; Davenport 1995). Interpreted through the
PTWR, the results are consistent with the expectation that experiences with democracy
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(i.e., leaders emerging from democracies) are more likely to have moderate preferences
and therefore less likely to use rape as a military tactic. In contrast, the presence of
an illicit drug economy has a statistically significant (and largely robust) positive rela-
tionship with the level of rebel-perpetrated rape. That is, in areas with an active drug
economy, levels of rape are higher. Here, the expectation is that the availability of a drug
economy decreases the reliance of armed group (and specifically, leadership) on the civil-
ian population for resources (i.e., votes, taxes, etc.). Subsequently, leadership has fewer
incentives to maintain positive relationships with civilians and is therefore more willing
to use, or ignore the use of wartime rape. Finally, though not as robust as the other vari-
ables, there is some support for the notion that the condition of the armed organization
matters for the use of rape. In this way, a fractured leadership resulted in increases in
rebel-perpetrated rape. To this end, it is possible that the splintered hierarchy has lost
enough control of the organization so as to make enforcing punishments or disseminating
information more challenging, thereby results in higher levels of rape. Still, none of the
variables achieved significance in non-ethnic war, suggesting that factors within ethnic
war predispose a conflict to the use of rape.
Finally, when applied to government-perpetrated rape, the only significant variable
across any of the models was drugs. Even so, the only time the drugs variable reached
significance at the .05 level was in a sample of ethnic war when the government recruit-
ment variable was included in the model. Across all other samples and model itera-
tions there were no statistically significant results. The findings highlight two important
points. First, the level of explanatory power non-ethnic war and across the spectrum
of government-perpetrated rape suggests that one model of wartime rape cannot be as-
sumed to be uniformly applicable across all groups and all contexts. Broadly, this work
provides support for the idea that the theories of wartime rape are conditioned by the
type of group and the type of war. Second, the lack of significant results across state-run
armed groups suggests that the use of rape may be largely relegated to criminalized or-
ganizations. That is, echoing the logic of the PTWR, it may be that career politicians
are more cognizant of the costliness of rape and therefore more likely to take strides to
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prevent its use. Certainly, however, more research is necessary to confirm this hypothesis.
Going Forward
The challenges encountered in this research provide important implications for the di-
rection of future research. In particular, there are three foci moving forward. Perhaps the
most dominant issue concerns concept development, specification, and operationalization.
The largest hurdles to this research were issues of measurement. While data availability
will always be a problem, conceptual stretching surrounding the already ambiguously
defined “human rights violations” necessitates clarification. If we are to understand the
specific relationship among types of violence, and the relationships between forms of
violence and wars, groups, and strategic objectives, we must disaggregate and clarify ex-
isting constructs; making sure that any proposed theoretical combinations are supported
empirically, not just heuristically. Most immediately however, we must return to basics;
disaggregating long-combined concepts in order to appropriately test their relationships
to one another. Here, it will beneficial to better integrate rape into existing repression
literature; broadening the use of Mokken scale analysis in order to better understand the
relationships among violations of physical integrity.
Additionally, there is a need to better account for the symbolic meanings of rape
within a given war context. In order to understand the conditions under which tactical
rape is employed by a group, then an account of what rape may mean to that group must
be considered. To this end, understanding the role and symbolism of women within a
given society must translate into an operational measurement that captures how a leader
may view (and therefore weigh) the use of rape. Similarly, research should continue
to develop and refine coding schemes and standards for leadership preferences. Here,
the use of multiple coders and inter-coder reliability checks will be particularly helpful.
Ultimately, time and continued use will help specify new tools that can assist in developing
a more standardized implementation.
The second area concerns a push toward increasing the number of quantitative anal-
yses. The rich body of qualitative case studies has provided a wealth of detail and
innumerable hypotheses. Testing these hypotheses across broad samples of cases and
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fully specifying theories is the next step in understanding the boundaries of existing
knowledge. Following in the tradition of Cohen (2013a), research in wartime rape must
ensure that samples/data capture sufficient variation in order to be able to explain that
variation. Extending analyses of civil conflict to include inter-state conflicts is a good
place to begin.
Finally, methodological innovations will also be imperative moving forward. We must
take seriously the need to accurately account for issues like wartime context and time.
Despite an occasionally daunting learning curve, the techniques are available. We have
no excuses not to learn them. Methodological complacency comes at the expense of
information. While there is much to be learned through incremental progression and a
commitment to conservative and and reliable inference, we must continue to extract new
information out of old data; particularly in areas where new data are exponentially more
difficult to come by.
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Appendix
Discussion of Isikozlu and Millard’s (2010) Typology
To date, one of the most detailed typologies is offered by Isikozlu and Millard (2010).
Based on their in-depth analyses of El Salvador and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the authors
posit a three category typology based on the perpetrator-raped individual relationship.
This consequence-driven typological effort identifies six themes that surround and influ-
ence the perpetration of wartime rape (Isikozlu and Millard 2010, 27). It is from these
themes that three categories emerge. Themes include: (1) type of conflict (intra-state
versus inter-state, etc.); (2) characteristics of the armed group (group hierarchical struc-
ture, level of discipline, chain of command, etc.); (3) motivations for the rape (considers
motivations of the individual actively perpetrating the rape); (4) characteristics of the
rapist (background and experiential factors, psychological considerations, marital status,
etc.); (5) characteristics of the raped person (age, sex ethnicity, general background infor-
mation, etc.); and (6) characteristics of the rape (location, frequency, the use of weapons
or objects, etc.) (Isikozlu and Millard 2010, 27-28). Each category is further divided
into multiple types of wartime rape. Categories include: (1) Rape perpetrated by mem-
bers of an armed group toward members of the same armed group or armed force. (2)
Rape perpetrated by an armed group or armed force against a member of the civilian
population. (3) Rape perpetrated by an armed group or armed force against members of
another armed group (Isikozlu and Millard 2010, 42). Exploring rape perpetrated against
civilians in more depth, the authors specify eight types of rape within this category: rape
by an ally, sexual slavery, rape as a military strategy, rape by a neighbor, rape camps,
rape in detention, opportunistic rape, and targeted rape. The authors further divide the
‘sexual slavery’ type into 4 additional subtypes (Isikozlu and Millard 2010, 47).
While are many advantages to a typology of this specificity, its practical use in research
is questionable. For instance, the eight subtypes in the category of civilian rape are not
mutually exclusive. Particularly problematic are situations in which individuals have
multiple roles during a conflict. Certainly it is possible to imagine a scenario in which a
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neighbor, who was once an ally, kidnapped the victim, committed rape, and sold her into
sex slavery where she later escaped to a camp. If more than one rape happened during
that time, then classification of the rape becomes impossible. In fact, it is possible that a
rape victim could fit into each of the eight subtypes over the course of the conflict. Even
so, nothing in our hypothetical scenario precludes rape being used as a military strategy
by one side or the other.
Furthermore, the reporting of rape in any given conflict is rarely (if ever) broken down
into such narrow categories. In reality, the numbers of reported rape in a conflict are
already subject to so many sources of error that practitioners and scholars are lucky if any
numbers exist at all (Wood 2008, 2009; Cohen 2013a; Gottschall 2004; Baaz and Stern
2009). In addition, while Isikozlu and Millard (2010) offer a brief review of scholarly
literature on rape during war, there appears to be no theoretical consideration given to
the construction of the typology itself. That is, although the authors present important
ethnographic research, the typology is based on 37 interviews in two countries. While
the explanation explores a single subtype, that subtype is the product of 30 separate
classifications. Given that there are 6 themes, 3 categories, each with 3 types of rape,
potentially 8 or more sub-types in each type, and further divisions on each subtype, the
number of variations far exceed the 37 interviews on which the typology is based. While
the authors make an effort to corroborate their categorization with excerpts from shadow
cases, there is no methodological rigor on which to control for exogenous factors, identify
patterns, or apply theory. Despite its bold exploratory effort, the very construction of
this typology prohibits its use in questions of causal inference.
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Figure 3: Descriptive Statistics from Cohen (2013a, 12-13)
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Dependent Variable Coding Scheme
Table 14: Summary of Coding Rules: Levels of Wartime Rape
Level of Rape Coding Rules
3 Rape likely related to the civil conflict: described as “systematic,” or “massive;”
used as a “means of intimidation,” an “instrument of control and
punishment,” a “weapon,” a “tactic to terrorize the populace,”
a “terror tactic,” a “tool of war,” on a “massive scale.”
2 Rape likely related to the civil conflict, but did not meet the requirements
for a 3 coding: described as “widespread,” “common,”
“commonplace,” “extensive,” “frequent,” “often,” “innumerable,” “persistent,”
“recurring,” a “pattern,” a “common pattern,” or a “spree;”
occurred “commonly,” “frequently,” in “large numbers,” “periodically,”
“regularly,” “routinely,” “widely,” or on a “number of occasions;”
there were “many” or “numerous” instances.
1 Rape likely related to the civil conflict, but did not meet the requirements
for a 2 or 3 coding: instances were described as “isolated reports,”
“some reports,” “reports,” or “there continued to be reports.”
0 No mention of rape or other sexual violence related to the civil conflict.
Note: For more information, please see Cohen 2013a
Independent Variables: Description
There are three groups of variables that describe the PTWR. These groups include
leadership preferences, the status quo, and relative power. Below, variables are presented
and discussed by group.
Leadership Preferences: Power-Seeking Dimension. Leadership preferences were coded
using Horowitz and Ye’s (2013) two dimensional typology. A principled-unprincipled (or
power-seeking) dimension assesses how much pursuing and maintaining political power is
valued relative to intrinsic nationalist and other political goals (Horowitz and Ye 2013a,
527). Power-seeking preferences are measured using a three-level ordinal scale. Each level
is divided into four categories that capture evidence of the preference in terms of level of
commitment, consistency and risk acceptance, political organization, and corruption. The
first level captures the lowest form of power-seeking (i.e., strongly principled behavior).
This level represents the ideologues; those with near-absolute commitment to one or
more political goals. In particular, one would expect to see an absolute consistency in
the pursuit of core goals, using strategies that are consistent with the stated goals and
priorities. Furthermore, commitment is reflected by a frequent willingness to risk power
loss or personal safety in pursuit of goals. Within the organization, the leader is expected
to value other purely principled leaders, independent of their political stature. Here, no
personal corruption is expected and client corruption is strongly discouraged but tolerated
if perceived as a necessary-evil in service of substantive goals.
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The mid-level power-seekers (i.e., balanced behavior) are kindred to typical career
politicians. There is evidence of significant commitment to one or more substantive po-
litical goals, but an expectation that these goals will be subverted for a large enough
political advantage. Balanced leaders are expected to be generally risk avoidant, evi-
dencing moderate strategies and consistency in pursuit of stated core goals. Within the
organization, there is a strong emphasis on principled and effective leaders, with little
personal and client corruption expected. However, client corruption will be viewed as
acceptable if and when it serves the larger political goals.
Finally, the highly power-seeking leaders (i.e., strongly unprincipled behavior) are op-
portunists with no convincing commitment to any substantive political goals. Any stated
goals will be sacrificed for a significant political advantage. Here, leaders are expected
to be risk-avoidant, personally and professionally, in pursuit of goals. This behavior is
characterized by a pronounced inconsistency in pursuance of goals, with strategies incon-
sistent with efforts to achieve stated objectives; particularly where inconsistency brings
political advantage. The organization is expected to be dominated by the presence of
“yes-men”, drawn from personal networks in order to preserve the emphasis on loyalty,
though often at the expense of political efficacy. In general, corruption is the primary
mechanism used to achieve goals, unless that corruption threatens power.74
Leadership Preferences: Nationalist Dimension. A nationalist goals dimension assesses
how strongly nationalist goals are valued relative to the conflict costs and outcome risks
that may result from pursuing them. A more extreme nationalist position is defined
as more highly valuing risks of crisis-induced concessions and victory relative to the
74For a thorough explanation of coding and a detailed example of the application of this coding to
several case studies, please see Horowitz and Ye (2013b, 2013c).
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downside risk of defeat as well as crisis and conflict costs.75 Nationalist preferences
are coded on a five-category ordinal scale beginning at non-nationalist, and ending at
extreme nationalist. Non-nationalists are those whose statements and actions convey
little to no interest in collective political goals. That is, non-nationalists place very little
emphasis on expulsion or assimilation of the outsider group, and no strong feelings toward
independence, or institutional and/or cultural autonomy. Thus, there is no significant
effort to elicit civilian support for collective goals and the individual rights of ethnic others
are strictly respected. In general, non-nationalists are expected to discourage collective
goals of own and other groups.
Moderate nationalists are those in which independence or assimilation goals may ex-
ist theoretically, but the dominant emphasis is on coexistence and improvement under
existing conditions. Moderate nationalists have a strong attachment to the status quo,
avoiding political confrontations and economic disruptions. Political pressures may be
used for bargaining for institutional or policy changes, but are expected to be confined
within the current legal and political framework. Though the leader may prioritize col-
lective goals of his own group, there is general acceptance of the collective goals of other
groups. These groups tend to collect other moderate nationalists but identical view are
not enforced.
The third level of nationalism is that of the ordinary nationalist. Here, there is an
active policy agenda aimed at one or more specific political objectives (i.e., independence,
autonomy, or state-sponsored assimilation, etc.), but compromise is acceptable if the costs
of pursing maximal goals cause significant disruption of the current system. Thus, more
disruptive measures are only likely to occur under conditions in which there is a very
strong possibility of success or a possibility of success at a relatively low cost. While the
75Here, it is important to clarify that Horowitz and Ye (2013a) originally developed this two-
dimensional typology following Fearon’s (1995) bargaining model of war. Fearon (1995) argued that
if states could agree on the outcome of possible war, then they could also avoid war. Given the con-
centrated costs of war for both sides, regardless of the winner, war is rarely the rational option. The
authors show that the greater relative power and a smaller share of the status quo goods make it more
likely that a given side will initiate a crisis (i.e., take a risk, exhibit more extreme behavior) (Horowitz
and Ye 2013a, 510). Thus, in the original work, ‘crisis’ refers to the action that marks the start of the
war. In this research, the word crisis is used infrequently, but is meant to convey the severity of terrorist
tactics and more extreme human rights violations overall.
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collective goals of his own group are prioritized and collective goals of the other group are
discouraged, the individual rights of the other-group members are defended. In pursuit
of core goals, some extraordinary tactics are plausible, but are likely limited to activities
that maintain the defense of others’ individual rights. However, if attacked, moderate
nationalists are expected to reciprocate in kind where it is likely to advance core goals.
Within the group, ordinary nationalist views are encouraged but not enforced.
The next nationalist level represents strong nationalists. Strong nationalists are ex-
pected to have an active policy agenda consisting of one or more (and most likely more)
political goals. Goals tend to be ranked hierarchically such that intermediate goals can
be discount or sacrificed in pursuit of maximal goals. The intermediate goals offer room
for bargaining, high costs are acceptable only if there is a significant chance of victory. In
pursuit of goals, the individual rights of the other-group are likely to be restricted where
they can be viewed as threatening own-group goals. Violence is possible, but targets are
limited to other-group civil society organizations, military operatives, and political insti-
tutions. So long as violence is in pursuit of goals, there is likely to be passive support for
or indifference to violence against out-groups. Within the organization, strong nationalist
views are a pre-requisite for high positions and incumbent leadership goals are prioritized
over ‘institutional protocol.’
Finally, the extreme nationalist is one that demonstrates an active interest and policy
agenda in pursuit of one or more goals. Maximal goals are preferanced over intermediate
goals are pursued almost any cost, even with little short-term prospects for success. As
is expected, the collective goals of own-group are prioritized and the collective goals
of the other group are completely excluded. In general, the individual rights of the
other-group are generally viewed as threatening own-group goals and are likely restricted.
An extreme nationalist demands that extreme views are enforced in all positions, and
violence is therefore directed not only at political institutions, the military, and civil
society organizations of other-group, but also of own-group where differing views are
perceived as threats either power or ideology.76
76Tables explaining each of the dimensions are contained in the appendix. However, for further infor-
mation, please see Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 2013b, 2013c).
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One of the particular challenges of coding leadership preferences is to make sure mea-
sures are distinct from the independent variable. To this end, Horowitz and Ye (2013)
highlight ways through which to ensure that preferences are not conflated with out-
comes. The authors recommend collecting information on both actions and statements
and evaluating them over a long period of time (to the extent possible). In this work,
particular care was taken to implement Horowitz and Ye’s (2013a) recommended strategy
of separating actors’ statements from their actions. This is vital, as actions indicating
preferences may include elements of the dependent variable. Thus, to implement the
two-dimensional typology, information about actions indicating the nature and extent of
power-seeking and nationalist goals, as well as the costs and risks in pursuing them was
excluded. While this also excludes information on other types of action, the approach
minimizes the chance that information on the dependent variable might contaminate the
measurement of leadership preferences. NOTE: Poe and Tate (1994) also talk about
keeping genocides and massacres distinct from repression (i.e., personal integrity abuse)
as a DV 77
Relative Power. There are five relative power variables included in the models. Log-GDP
is used to provide a broad measure of the resources available to both state and rebel
groups. For rebel groups, Log-GDP measures the level of resources available to rebel
groups at the time of the conflict. Rebel groups with more resources are expected to be
more powerful, and therefore better able to enforce norms and distribute punishments
to defectors. For the state, Log-GDP is a measure of the relative prosperity of state
leadership. That is, a higher GDP suggests that state leadership has more available money
and therefore greater liquidity to use on military resources. In this way, governments
with higher GDPs are better able to recruit and train their military. Higher levels of
investment are expected to produce a more professional armed unit with more developed
institutional processes for enforcing behavior. Therefore, as GDP increases, we would
expect rape perpetrated by state soldiers to decline. To more directly account for the
77For a discussion of other approaches, please see Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 512-513.
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power of the state, a measure of military size (i.e., military persons under foot) was used.
Similar to accounting for state population in conflict research, controlling for military
personnel by the states accounts for the effect of sheer size (i.e., volume of people). Just
as there more deaths in highly populated areas, it would be expected that there would
be more rape in larger armies.
In addition, measures for oil and drugs were included to account for the resource curse.
The presence of illicit economies can be influential in both state and rebel behavior. An
armed unit able to receive funding from sources outside the citizen population is not
reliant on civilians to exist and is, therefore, less likely to be concerned about the relative
costs of civilian treatment. This is particularly true in territorial war where there is an
effort to remove a population from a contested territory. Thus, where leadership places
a higher relative value on the citizens, levels of rape are expected to be lower.
A tribal variable was also included to account for the relative distance between state
leadership and the civilian population. There are two inter-related logics that explain
the impact of a tribal state. First, to the extent that there is a presence of tribal politics
operating in cities and villages, there is a degree of relative autonomy from the govern-
ment. In an ethnic war, these locations become easily identifiable ‘out-groups.’ In turn,
state-perpetrated rape in ethnic war, would be expected to be higher in tribal areas. Al-
ternately, as noted by Kalyvas (1999), “A central feature of civil wars is the breakdown
of the state monopoly of violence and its replacement by locally segmented monopolies
of violence” (259). In this regard, an insurgent organization controlling an area operates
as a counter-sovereign authority, providing protection, administering justice, collecting
taxes and implementing social programs. Such an organization also enjoys a monopoly
on violence, which can be used to punish enemies and sanction uncooperative behavior
(Kalyvas 1999, 259). ?? Rebels wouldn’t ant to rape in these areas as they would not
want to risk alienating public support. In many ways, tribal regions are still living in a
pre-modern society, without the same norms for treating everyone according to a unifying
set of standards. Government isn’t there, so soldiers have a free for all. Tribal variable
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is particularly strong in ethnic war.78
Finally, a dummy variable measuring whether group leadership was unified or frac-
tured was used to account for the ability of a given armed group to enforce anti-rape
norms and punish defectors. In many ways, this reflects the primary logic of the op-
portunity arguments that posit state and institutional breakdown as a motivating force
in wartime rape (Wood 2006; Kalyvas 1999). As Wood (2006) argues, enforcement of
regulatory mechanisms var and those regulatory mechanisms that exist may break down
during war (321). In particular, if there are two competing leadership groups, it is pos-
sible that one group may be actively seeking to prevent wartime rape, while another
group is less concerned with extreme violence. Similarly, if there is a divide in leadership,
hierarchical disruption and communication problems are likely to prevent (or otherwise
sidetrack) the armed force from policing soldier behavior. Thus, as the ability to enforce
rules of warfare wane, rape levels are expected to be higher.
Status Quo. A high-democracy variable was constructed using the top of the polity2
measure. This measure accounts for three inter-related processes. First, the level of
democracy provides a general measure of state repression, civil liberties, inclusiveness
and corruption. In turn, democracy provides a baseline for existing grievances between
rebel groups and state leadership. A higher measure of democracy is expected to in-
dicate a greater contentment with the status quo, and therefore less of an interest in
more extreme violence. More broadly, democracy reflects the norms and values present
in society. Countries with experience in democracy are more likely to have more mod-
erate preferences in regards to the use of violence. Thus, we would expect rebels from
a democratic state to show greater restraint in their level of violence both against their
own and enemy populations. Finally, on the side of the government, it is expected that
leaders would have a greater interest in preserving citizen support for the leadership.
Thus, more moderate levels of violence and a more stringent set of active preferences
for the punishment and prevention of rape are expected in states with higher democracy
78Inter-tribal violence accounts for the plurality of fatalities over the study period (48%) due especially
to several major events near the end of the period (de Waal et al. 2014, 373).
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scores. When democracy is coupled with Log-GDP, the combination offers insight in the
overall level of state development and the strength of existing institutions.79
Table 15: Difference of Means Comparison
Welch t-Test Comparison of Means on Standardized Scale
Rape Source Human Rights Violation Diff. of Means 95% C.I.
Ethnic War
Conflict-Level Rape Disappearance 0.649* -0.728 -0.569
Extra-Judicial Killing 0.178* -0.031 0.045
Torture 0.023 -0.247 -0.108
Govt-Perpetrated Rape Disappearance 0.465* -0.539 -0.391
Extra-Judicial Killing 0.006 -0.058 0.070
Torture 0.161* 0.102 0.220
Rebel-Perpetrated Rape Disappearance 0.309* -0.384 -0.233
Extra-Judicial Killing 0.163* 0.098 0.228
Torture 0.317* 0.257 0.378
Non-Ethnic War
Conflict-Level Rape Disappearance 1.131* -0.728 -0.570
Extra-Judicial Killing 1.603* -0.247 -0.108
Torture 0.023 -0.088 0.042
Govt-Perpetrated Rape Disappearance 0.465* -0.539 -0.391
Extra-Judicial Killing 0.006 -0.058 0.0702
Torture 0.161* 0.102 0.220
Rebel-Perpetrated Rape Disappearance 0.309* -0.384 -0.233
Extra-Judicial Killing 0.163* 0.098 0.228
Torture 0.317* 0.257 0.378
79Log-GDP, given its relationship with democracy, can also be interpreted as a measure of state
development.
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Table 16: Bivariate Rebel-leveraged Rape in Civil War: Group Fracture (model 1)
All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War
Rebel Fracture 0.094 0.148 0.037 0.051 0.063 0.037
(0.070) (0.091) (0.107) (0.067) (0.090) (0.106)
Rebel Preferences 0.009 0.010 −0.023 0.001 0.003 −0.022
(0.016) (0.017) (0.077) (0.015) (0.017) (0.076)
Democracy −0.099 −0.181∗∗ −0.004
(0.072) (0.090) (0.117)
Log GDP −0.089∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ 0.022
(0.030) (0.036) (0.069)
Oil −0.044 −0.043 −0.011 0.013 0.006 −0.031
(0.050) (0.061) (0.086) (0.052) (0.062) (0.105)
Drugs 0.158∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.021 0.122∗∗ 0.156∗ 0.014
(0.062) (0.083) (0.098) (0.058) (0.080) (0.099)
Tribal 0.037 0.034 0.023 −0.007 −0.004 0.036
(0.050) (0.062) (0.085) (0.051) (0.063) (0.093)
Ethnic War Dummy 0.045 0.068
(0.057) (0.055)
Constant 0.001 −0.003 0.073 0.698∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗ −0.089
(0.073) (0.090) (0.091) (0.248) (0.321) (0.520)
Observations 85 63 22 85 63 22
R2 0.154 0.250 0.037 0.223 0.291 0.043
Adjusted R2 0.077 0.170 −0.348 0.152 0.215 −0.340
Residual Std. Error 0.218 (df = 77) 0.225 (df = 56) 0.185 (df = 15) 0.209 (df = 77) 0.219 (df = 56) 0.184 (df = 15)
F Statistic 1.996∗ (df = 7; 77) 3.114∗∗ (df = 6; 56) 0.096 (df = 6; 15) 3.158∗∗∗ (df = 7; 77) 3.830∗∗∗ (df = 6; 56) 0.113 (df = 6; 15)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 17: Bivariate Rebel-leveraged Rape in Civil War: Recruitment Tactics (model 2)
All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War
Rebel Recruit 0.068∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.005 0.065∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.021) (0.028) (0.028) (0.020) (0.027) (0.028)
Rebel Preferences 0.006 0.005 −0.028 −0.001 −0.001 −0.028
(0.015) (0.015) (0.076) (0.015) (0.015) (0.075)
Democracy −0.052 −0.079 0.003
(0.068) (0.080) (0.116)
Log GDP −0.084∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗ 0.020
(0.028) (0.032) (0.070)
Oil −0.031 −0.016 −0.009 0.020 0.014 −0.027
(0.047) (0.054) (0.086) (0.048) (0.054) (0.106)
Drugs 0.113∗ 0.171∗∗ 0.028 0.082 0.101 0.023
(0.060) (0.077) (0.097) (0.056) (0.071) (0.097)
Tribal 0.044 0.039 0.032 −0.004 0.007 0.043
(0.048) (0.055) (0.082) (0.048) (0.055) (0.091)
Ethnic War Dummy 0.118∗∗ 0.130∗∗
(0.056) (0.053)
Constant 0.025 0.154∗∗∗ 0.089 0.670∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗ −0.056
(0.058) (0.049) (0.077) (0.223) (0.258) (0.528)
Observations 85 63 22 85 63 22
R2 0.238 0.415 0.031 0.314 0.457 0.036
Adjusted R2 0.168 0.353 −0.356 0.252 0.399 −0.350
Residual Std. Error 0.207 (df = 77) 0.199 (df = 56) 0.186 (df = 15) 0.196 (df = 77) 0.192 (df = 56) 0.185 (df = 15)
F Statistic 3.430∗∗∗ (df = 7; 77) 6.634∗∗∗ (df = 6; 56) 0.080 (df = 6; 15) 5.033∗∗∗ (df = 7; 77) 7.846∗∗∗ (df = 6; 56) 0.093 (df = 6; 15)
R2 Rebel Rec. Ever 0.204 0.281 0.052 0.267 0.332 0.055
Adjusted R2 Rebel Rec. Ever 0.131 0.204 −0.327 0.200 0.260 −0.323
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 18: Rebel-Perpetrated Rape: Combination Log GDP and Democracy
Dependent variable:
Rebel Rape (mean 4-category) Rebel Rape (mean dichotomous)
All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War
Rebel Fracture 0.229 0.308 0.205 0.055 0.087 0.042
(0.189) (0.258) (0.294) (0.069) (0.094) (0.112)
Rebel Preferences 0.011 0.016 −0.029 0.001 0.002 −0.019
(0.043) (0.046) (0.212) (0.016) (0.017) (0.080)
Democracy −0.129 −0.388 0.026 −0.024 −0.089 −0.030
(0.205) (0.272) (0.368) (0.075) (0.099) (0.140)
Log GDP −0.269∗∗∗ −0.233∗∗ −0.025 −0.085∗∗ −0.082∗∗ 0.030
(0.088) (0.112) (0.216) (0.032) (0.041) (0.082)
Oil 0.008 0.001 −0.146 0.011 −0.003 −0.036
(0.144) (0.173) (0.293) (0.053) (0.063) (0.111)
Drugs 0.353∗∗ 0.613∗∗ 0.002 0.127∗∗ 0.190∗∗ 0.008
(0.166) (0.244) (0.282) (0.061) (0.089) (0.107)
Tribal −0.008 −0.042 0.180 −0.007 −0.005 0.037
(0.141) (0.174) (0.253) (0.052) (0.064) (0.096)
Ethnic War Dummy 0.183 0.066
(0.152) (0.055)
Constant 2.141∗∗∗ 2.000∗∗ 0.370 0.671∗∗ 0.690∗ −0.150
(0.723) (0.979) (1.602) (0.264) (0.357) (0.607)
Observations 85 63 22 85 63 22
R2 0.286 0.356 0.151 0.224 0.301 0.046
Adjusted R2 0.210 0.274 −0.274 0.142 0.212 −0.431
Residual Std. Error 0.575 (df = 76) 0.601 (df = 55) 0.503 (df = 14) 0.210 (df = 76) 0.219 (df = 55) 0.191 (df = 14)
F Statistic 3.798∗∗∗ (df = 8; 76) 4.350∗∗∗ (df = 7; 55) 0.355 (df = 7; 14) 2.744∗∗ (df = 8; 76) 3.387∗∗∗ (df = 7; 55) 0.097 (df = 7; 14)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 19: Rebel-Perpetrated Rape: Full Models
Dependent variable:
Rebel Rape (mean 4-category) Rebel Rape (mean dichotomous)
All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War
Rebel Fracture 0.212 0.175 0.248 0.050 0.042 0.046
(0.175) (0.226) (0.310) (0.065) (0.084) (0.119)
Rebel Recruit 0.199∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.049 0.065∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.054) (0.076) (0.081) (0.020) (0.028) (0.031)
Rebel Preferences 0.007 0.007 0.004 −0.001 −0.001 −0.015
(0.039) (0.040) (0.224) (0.015) (0.015) (0.086)
Democracy −0.035 −0.208 0.047 0.007 −0.028 −0.028
(0.192) (0.240) (0.378) (0.071) (0.089) (0.145)
Log GDP −0.259∗∗∗ −0.185∗ −0.057 −0.082∗∗∗ −0.065∗ 0.027
(0.082) (0.098) (0.227) (0.030) (0.036) (0.087)
Oil 0.019 0.030 −0.122 0.015 0.007 −0.033
(0.133) (0.151) (0.303) (0.050) (0.056) (0.116)
Drugs 0.184 0.376∗ −0.057 0.072 0.109 0.001
(0.160) (0.219) (0.305) (0.060) (0.081) (0.117)
Tribal 0.005 0.00005 0.152 −0.003 0.010 0.034
(0.131) (0.152) (0.263) (0.049) (0.057) (0.101)
Ethnic War Dummy 0.351∗∗ 0.121∗∗
(0.148) (0.055)
Constant 1.988∗∗∗ 1.832∗∗ 0.563 0.621∗∗ 0.633∗ −0.129
(0.671) (0.852) (1.671) (0.250) (0.317) (0.641)
Observations 85 63 22 85 63 22
R2 0.395 0.523 0.174 0.320 0.459 0.048
Adjusted R2 0.323 0.452 −0.335 0.238 0.379 −0.537
Residual Std. Error 0.533 (df = 75) 0.523 (df = 54) 0.515 (df = 13) 0.198 (df = 75) 0.195 (df = 54) 0.198 (df = 13)
F Statistic 5.449∗∗∗ (df = 9; 75) 7.403∗∗∗ (df = 8; 54) 0.342 (df = 8; 13) 3.919∗∗∗ (df = 9; 75) 5.738∗∗∗ (df = 8; 54) 0.082 (df = 8; 13)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 20: Bivariate Government-leveraged Rape in Civil War: Group Fracture (model 1)
All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War
Govt. Fracture 0.060 0.098 −0.037 0.057 0.095 −0.023
(0.065) (0.091) (0.045) (0.065) (0.091) (0.049)
Govt. Preferences 0.011 0.005 0.032 0.010 0.006 0.032
(0.013) (0.015) (0.025) (0.013) (0.015) (0.026)
Democracy 0.049 0.028 0.071
(0.074) (0.099) (0.055)
Log GDP −0.019 0.005 −0.027
(0.031) (0.039) (0.037)
Oil 0.058 0.096 −0.005 0.067 0.093 0.021
(0.050) (0.066) (0.039) (0.053) (0.068) (0.050)
Drugs 0.114∗ 0.194∗∗ −0.005 0.117∗ 0.205∗∗ 0.007
(0.060) (0.089) (0.039) (0.059) (0.089) (0.044)
Tribal 0.062 0.074 0.027 0.045 0.073 −0.005
(0.051) (0.069) (0.039) (0.053) (0.070) (0.047)
Military Persons −0.00002 −0.00001 −0.00003 0.00000 −0.00001 0.00002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Ethnic War Dummy 0.154∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.055)
Constant −0.065 0.044 0.046 0.096 0.012 0.255
(0.063) (0.065) (0.038) (0.245) (0.318) (0.270)
Observations 85 63 22 85 63 22
R2 0.192 0.199 0.208 0.192 0.198 0.146
Adjusted R2 0.107 0.097 −0.188 0.107 0.096 −0.281
Residual Std. Error 0.215 (df = 76) 0.239 (df = 55) 0.083 (df = 14) 0.215 (df = 76) 0.239 (df = 55) 0.086 (df = 14)
F Statistic 2.261∗∗ (df = 8; 76) 1.949∗ (df = 7; 55) 0.525 (df = 7; 14) 2.254∗∗ (df = 8; 76) 1.938∗ (df = 7; 55) 0.343 (df = 7; 14)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 21: Bivariate Government-leveraged Rape in Civil War: Recruitment Tactics (model 2)
All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War
Govt. Recruit 0.017 0.028 −0.007 0.014 0.026 −0.013
(0.021) (0.027) (0.019) (0.021) (0.027) (0.018)
Govt. Preferences 0.010 0.004 0.035 0.008 0.004 0.038
(0.013) (0.015) (0.026) (0.013) (0.015) (0.027)
Democracy 0.063 0.041 0.063
(0.076) (0.102) (0.058)
Log GDP −0.022 −0.002 −0.034
(0.031) (0.039) (0.035)
Oil 0.052 0.087 −0.006 0.063 0.086 0.026
(0.050) (0.067) (0.040) (0.053) (0.068) (0.049)
Drugs 0.112∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.006 0.116∗ 0.218∗∗ 0.023
(0.060) (0.087) (0.042) (0.059) (0.088) (0.045)
Tribal 0.068 0.077 0.019 0.048 0.071 −0.011
(0.051) (0.069) (0.039) (0.053) (0.070) (0.043)
Military Persons −0.00003 −0.00003 −0.00003 −0.00000 −0.00002 0.00002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Ethnic War Dummy 0.153∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.055)
Constant −0.052 0.067 0.038 0.133 0.092 0.301
(0.060) (0.060) (0.037) (0.246) (0.320) (0.257)
Observations 85 63 22 85 63 22
R2 0.190 0.198 0.178 0.188 0.196 0.163
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.096 −0.233 0.103 0.093 −0.256
Residual Std. Error 0.215 (df = 76) 0.239 (df = 55) 0.084 (df = 14) 0.215 (df = 76) 0.240 (df = 55) 0.085 (df = 14)
F Statistic 2.229∗∗ (df = 8; 76) 1.939∗ (df = 7; 55) 0.432 (df = 7; 14) 2.204∗∗ (df = 8; 76) 1.911∗ (df = 7; 55) 0.388 (df = 7; 14)
R2 Govt. Rec. Ever 0.186 0.196 0.198 0.185 0.192 0.168
Adjusted R2 Govt. Rec. Ever 0.100 0.093 −0.202 0.099 0.090 −0.248
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 22: Government-Perpetrated Rape: Combination Log GDP and Democracy
Dependent variable:
Govt Rape (mean 4-category) Govt Rape (mean dichotomous)
All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War
Govt Fracture 0.165 0.317 −0.257 0.060 0.098 −0.013
(0.178) (0.240) (0.240) (0.065) (0.092) (0.045)
Govt Preferences 0.015 0.014 −0.094 0.009 0.005 0.045∗
(0.035) (0.040) (0.131) (0.013) (0.015) (0.025)
Democracy 0.264 0.126 0.275 0.073 0.027 0.114∗
(0.212) (0.283) (0.312) (0.078) (0.109) (0.059)
Log GDP −0.127 −0.059 0.008 −0.029 0.001 −0.061
(0.088) (0.111) (0.203) (0.032) (0.043) (0.038)
Oil 0.203 0.277 −0.124 0.075 0.096 0.042
(0.145) (0.180) (0.250) (0.053) (0.069) (0.047)
Drugs 0.161 0.387 −0.153 0.101 0.194∗ 0.025
(0.167) (0.259) (0.220) (0.061) (0.099) (0.042)
Tribal 0.154 0.185 0.161 0.047 0.074 −0.008
(0.144) (0.185) (0.229) (0.053) (0.071) (0.043)
Military Persons 0.00001 −0.00002 0.00001 −0.00001 −0.00001 0.00000
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Ethnic War Dummy 0.224 0.159∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.056)
Constant 1.118 0.716 0.462 0.159 0.040 0.476
(0.690) (0.885) (1.437) (0.254) (0.340) (0.272)
Observations 85 63 22 85 63 22
R2 0.154 0.203 0.245 0.201 0.199 0.337
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.085 −0.219 0.105 0.080 −0.070
Residual Std. Error 0.584 (df = 75) 0.629 (df = 54) 0.416 (df = 13) 0.215 (df = 75) 0.241 (df = 54) 0.079 (df = 13)
F Statistic 1.514 (df = 9; 75) 1.721 (df = 8; 54) 0.528 (df = 8; 13) 2.097∗∗ (df = 9; 75) 1.674 (df = 8; 54) 0.827 (df = 8; 13)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 23: Government-Perpetrated Rape: Full Models
Dependent variable:
Govt Rape (mean 4-category) Govt Rape (mean dichotomous)
All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War All War Ethnic War Non-ethnic War
Govt Fracture 0.164 0.299 −0.318 0.058 0.087 −0.016
(0.179) (0.243) (0.235) (0.065) (0.093) (0.048)
Govt Recruit 0.017 0.045 −0.128 0.022 0.027 −0.007
(0.060) (0.075) (0.090) (0.022) (0.029) (0.018)
Govt Preferences 0.013 0.007 −0.059 0.006 0.001 0.047∗
(0.036) (0.041) (0.129) (0.013) (0.016) (0.026)
Democracy 0.285 0.183 0.172 0.101 0.062 0.109
(0.226) (0.300) (0.310) (0.083) (0.115) (0.063)
Log GDP −0.133 −0.078 0.036 −0.037 −0.011 −0.060
(0.091) (0.116) (0.196) (0.033) (0.044) (0.040)
Oil 0.203 0.270 −0.147 0.074 0.092 0.040
(0.146) (0.181) (0.241) (0.053) (0.069) (0.049)
Drugs 0.154 0.369 −0.080 0.091 0.183∗ 0.029
(0.170) (0.262) (0.218) (0.062) (0.100) (0.044)
Tribal 0.156 0.193 0.198 0.050 0.079 −0.006
(0.145) (0.187) (0.222) (0.053) (0.071) (0.045)
Military Persons 0.00001 −0.00003 −0.0001 −0.00001 −0.00002 −0.00000
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Ethnic War Dummy 0.227 0.163∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.056)
Constant 1.159 0.857 0.290 0.213 0.125 0.466
(0.710) (0.921) (1.390) (0.260) (0.352) (0.282)
Observations 85 63 22 85 63 22
R2 0.155 0.209 0.353 0.212 0.212 0.346
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.074 −0.132 0.105 0.078 −0.145
Residual Std. Error 0.587 (df = 74) 0.632 (df = 53) 0.401 (df = 12) 0.215 (df = 74) 0.242 (df = 53) 0.081 (df = 12)
F Statistic 1.354 (df = 10; 74) 1.551 (df = 9; 53) 0.728 (df = 9; 12) 1.988∗∗ (df = 10; 74) 1.585 (df = 9; 53) 0.704 (df = 9; 12)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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